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The philosophy of linguistics is a rich philosophical domain which encompasses var-ious disciplines. One of the aims of this thesis is to unite theoretical linguistics,the philosophy of language, the philosophy of science (particularly mathematics andmodelling) and the ontology of language. Each part of the research presented heretargets separate but related goals with the unified aim of bringing greater clarity tothe foundations of linguistics from a philosophical perspective.Part I is devoted to the methodology of linguistics in terms of scientific modelling.I argue against both the Conceptualist and Platonist (as well as Pluralist) interpre-tations of linguistic theory by means of three grades of mathematical involvement forlinguistic grammars. Part II explores the specific models of syntactic and semanticsby an analogy with the harder sciences. In Part III, I develop a novel account oflinguistic ontology and in the process comment on the type-token distinction, therole and connection with mathematics and the nature of linguistic objects.In this research, I offer a structural realist interpretation of linguistic methodologywith a nuanced structuralist picture for its ontology. This proposal is informed byhistorical and current work in theoretical linguistics as well as philosophical viewson ontology, scientific modelling and mathematics.
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“Generative linguistics is a perplexing field of inquiry when looked at with philosophicissues in mind.”– Sylvain Bromberger, Reflections on Chomsky (1989)
“On the structuralist perspective, what is an object in a given context dependson what concepts or predicates are in use, and this depends on what concepts orpredicates are available. It is through language that we organize the world anddivide it into objects.”– Stewart Shapiro, Philosophy of Mathematics: Structure and Ontology (1997)
“Thus in the scientists’ use, ’model’ denotes what I would call a model-type.Whenever certain parameters are left unspecified in the desciption of a structure, itwould be more accurate to say (contrary of course to common usage and convenience)that we described a structure-type.”– Bas van Fraasen, The Scientific Image (1980)
Preface
The philosophy of linguistics is a rich philosophical domain which encompasses as-pects of the philosophy of language, theoretical linguistics, cognitive science, scienceand mathematics. Traditionally, the study of the methodological and ontological con-sequences of the field has been conducted within the remit of theoretical linguistics.The “linguistic approach” has led to many misconceptions and confusion within thefoundations of linguistics debate. For instance, I argue that a symptom of the lin-guistic approach is the vast mathematisation which has infected the field to such anextent that Platonist theories are only the logical conclusion of comments and claimsmade in the standard (mentalist) picture of the aim of the science.In this thesis, I will work within a more “philosophical approach” to certain ques-tions in the foundations and the ontology of linguistics. This approach draws fromthe fields of the philosophy of science (in Part II), the philosophy of mathematics(in Part III), metaphysics and the philosophy of language to engage with centralquestions in theoretical linguistics in a philosophically rigourous manner. Despitea marked departure from the traditional approach, I do maintain a close connectionwith actual (first-order) linguistic research throughout so as not to diverge from thegoal of explaining the science as it is and its objects as they are, i.e. the interpretiveproject.1This thesis takes on a tripartite structure. The first theme which will receivetreatment throughout will be related to how mathematics has played a role in shap-ing contemporary linguistics and how it should be interpreted within linguistics. Thenext theme is related and aims to establish a scientific modelling approach to theunderstanding of linguistic grammars. I will not only argue that this approach isappropriate but also that it solves many puzzles related to the concept of gram-mar prevalent in the syntax and semantics literature. Instead of resulting in ananti-realist position on the scientific status of linguistics, however, I will suggest astructural realist foundation. Parts I and II of the thesis can be seen as an attemptto explain the nature of linguistic models qua structures, while part III precisifies the
1This approach is by no means unique to this work but rather a rich tradition I hope to followin. Pullum, Scholz, George, Devitt, Pelletier, Peregrin, Szabó, Partee, Soames, Stainton, Tomalinand many others are excellent examples of philosophical rigour coupled with an emphasis on seriousinterpretation of linguistic theory.
realist component of the view in a novel way. Thus, the overall plan of the thesisis to provide novel insights into the structures involved in linguistic theorising andmodelling and in so doing shed light on their methodological, ontological, scientificand mathematical significance.One of the major claims of this thesis is that linguistic methodology and itsontology are separable and should be treated independently. Part I will be devoted toestablishing this claim. I argue that if this point is not appreciated, many confusionsensue. I do so by suggesting three grades of mathematical involvement in linguisticsin terms of the notion of a grammar. I advocate the first grade which views grammarsas ontologically neutral and akin to scientific models in their methodological status.In chapter 2 of Part I, I will proffer this novel interpretation of theoretical linguisticsin accordance with scientific modelling. In Part II, I will develop a thorough accountof linguistic modelling practices in both formal syntax and semantics in light of theaforementioned interpretation of the core notion of a grammar. This account will showcontinuity with modelling practices in the other sciences such as physics, biologyand economics.Once my methodological stance has been argued, I will devote my attention to theontology of linguistics and natural language. I offer a Realist approach to linguisticontology, one which draws from the Platonist ontology of Katz, Postal and Soamesbut diverges significantly in terms of their metaphysics. Specifically, I will argue fora mathematical structuralist account similar to the theories of Shapiro (1997) andResnik (1997) for mathematical reality. My picture departs from theirs in importantways though. For instance, I eschew the abstract ontology of structures in favourof quasi-concrete structures which have parts in physical reality (Parsons 1990). Ifurther amend this picture to accommodate a more naturalistic type-token distinctionin line with Szabó (1999). Thus, linguistics on this view is seen as a quasi-empiricaldiscipline which deals with phenomenon causally related to both mental competencein language (I-languages á la Chomsky) and more formal aspects of its description.It is important to note that although much of the discussion of linguistics, espe-cially syntax, will draw from the work of leading linguists such as Chomsky, I donot plan to engage in any serious Chomsky exegesis directly. My plan is rather toassess and resolve certain philosophical puzzles presented by the alleged scientificnature of the field and the mathematics which underlies it as put forward by itspractitioners.Parts of this thesis can be considered to be exercises in the philosophy of science(certainly Part II). Parts are concerned more with ontological issues and the philoso-phy of mathematics (Part III) and yet others are combinations of the aforementionedfields and the philosophy of language and linguistics (Part I). Throughout, the aim isnot only to shed new light on old debates but also to offer genuinely novel accountsof linguistics as a science and natural language as a object or rather structure in thenatural world.
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Part IThree Grades of MathematicalInvolvement in Linguistics
1
Chapter 1The Mathematisation of NaturalLanguage
The ontological basis of the linguistic enterprise has been contested since somethingresembling an official stance was adopted through the generative or biolinguistic tra-dition in the late 1950’s. On this view, natural languages are states of the mind/brainand thus part of cognitive-psychological reality. An alternative approach (profferedby Katz 1981, Langendoen and Postal 1984, Soames 1984, Katz and Postal 1991,and Postal 2003) considers natural languages (and the sentences of which they arecomprised) to be abstract objects, in the sense of being mind-independent and non-spatio-temporally extended. Linguistics on this view is a formal science on the levelof logic or mathematics. Arguments have gone back and forth in favour of specificviews without much common ground, to the effect that these linguists and philoso-phers often seem to talk past each other. In this chapter, my moderate aim will beto reformulate the debate such that a clear battleground is demarcated (at least).My chief aim will be to offer a non-ontologically-committing view which draws oninsights from computational linguistics and the philosophy of science. In order to(re)situate the debate, I shall first identify the problem of ‘mathematisation’ in sec-tion 1 and then describe the main positions on the foundations of linguistics withrelation to it in section 2, and in section 3 suggest three grades of mathematicalinvolvement for the grammars of linguistic theory. These grades involve the method-ological attitudes linguists take towards the grammar. More specifically, the gradescorrespond to possible positions on the nature of the mathematical apparatus usedin the grammar and its relation to the nature of natural language itself. Each gradehas its own set of difficulties but I suggest that the first grade of involvement offersus the most neutral and reasonable approach to linguistic methodology (while avoid-ing certain issues within its ontology). The last two grades are argued to be morephilosophically fraught and thus unstable foundations for the field (at least in theircurrent forms).
2
1.1. FORMALISATION, MATHEMATISATION AND CONSERVATIVENESS 3
1.1 Formalisation, Mathematisation and Conservative-ness
I begin this section with a distinction. The distinction is between the concepts offormalisation and mathematisation respectively. Formalisation is the familiar tool ofsimplifying natural structures or phenomena for the purpose of making them moreamenable to precise characterisation, often in terms of the language of first-orderlogic. This tool is certainly wide-spread in linguistics and philosophy. Mathematisa-tion, on the other hand, can be seen as the process of rendering natural phenomenainto mathematical structures or entities by either formal modelling, analogy or al-leged proof. It marks an ontological shift in the target system (or sometimes omissionof the target altogether). In other words, it approaches the subject of linguistics asa mathematical puzzle capable of precise mathematical characterisation and reso-lution without any attempt to interpret any features within the target system. Inwhat follows I shall argue, for instance, that an example of the formalisation is theuse of lambda abstraction as a means of variable binding and functional applicationin semantics. While an example of mathematisation are present in claims such as“the processes described by generative grammar are functions computed over phys-ical symbols by a Turing machine implemented in the human brain” (Hinzen andUriagereka, 2006: 71).In this section, I want to provide some details concerning the concept of mathe-matisation, specifically within the context of the linguistic project. The concept willremain in the background of most of the discussions to follow. Unfortunately, theterm has not received any proper definition, despite some scattered usage acrossreflective theoretical work in the philosophy of science. I will provide a workingdefinition for present purposes but this characterisation should not be considereddefinitive but rather illustrative. For the sake of contrast, I will begin with the morefamiliar concept of formalisation.The concept and technique of formalisation, its features and fecundity have beenaddressed in philosophy, logic and other fields. In general, despite cautionary tales,formalisation is considered benign and mostly useful. As Pullum (2013) states “for-malization is the use of appropriate tools from mathematics and logic to enhanceexplicitness of theories [...] Any theoretical framework stands to benefit from havingits content formalized” (493). One important feature of formalisation is conservative-ness, a property which received a more controversial treatment in Field (1980) andthe mathematical nominalism with which it came. Contrary to popular indispensabil-ity arguments as to the essential place of mathematics within the natural sciences,Field proposed a thoroughgoing fictionalism about mathematical entities related tothe concept of conservativeness given below.
A mathematical theory S is conservative if, for any nominalistic assertion Aand any body of such assertions N , A is not a consequence of N+S unless A
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is a consequence of N alone (Field, 1985: 240).
The basic idea is that nothing that can be said with mathematics can not be saidwithout it within scientific investigation. Whether or not this principle holds or canbe shown to hold for the relationship between mathematics and the sciences remainsto be seen (see Shapiro 1983, 1997). However, formalisation is certainly conservativein the way discussed above. Formal languages are devices for the simplification of anintended target domain. As the term suggests, the technique is meant to home in onthe “form” of a problem and highlight the relations in a non-obfuscating manner. Infact, formalisation is related to an emphasis on a syntactic analysis of mathematicaland scientific discourse, initially proposed in the philosophical project that camealong with Hilbert’s programme in the early 20th century.
1.2 Hilbert, Bar-Hillel and Chomsky
For Formalists, mathematics was not a pre-interpreted theory of some extra-physicalor mental reality but rather an uninterpreted calculus of symbols, the manipulationof which yields structures capable of later interpretation.
Every science takes its starting point from a sufficiently coherent body offacts given. It takes the form, however, only by organizing this body of facts.This organization takes place through the axiomatic method, i.e. one constructsa logical structure of concepts so that the relationships between the conceptscorrespond to relationships between the facts to be organized (Hilbert, 1899[2004]: 540).
Hilbert’s axiomatic method was based on a concept of implicit definition. Forexample, unlike the axiomatics of Euclid which involved explicit definition of geo-metric terms such as a point being defined as “extensionless” or the like, Hilbert’saxioms introduced implicit definition directed toward the goal of divorcing theoryfrom intuition (although intuitions might still play a motivating role for the axioms).As Shapiro puts it “geometry was becoming less the science of space or space-time,and more the formal study of certain structures” (2005: 63). The idea is that linesand points are to be defined purely in terms of the axioms of geometry and fur-thermore anything that fulfills the conditions set by the axioms will do equally well(what Shapiro calls “free-standing”). Nothing logico-conceptual is given in advanceof theory. Thus, early proof theory took the shape of providing consistency proofsfor parts of elementary arithmetic and analysis via the goal of establishing the con-sistency of the axioms (i.e. showing that they do not lead to contradiction). Whatseparated Hilbert’s programme from other versions of Formalism was a focus on fini-tary methods, an aspect which took on special significance for linguists in the early20th century. A discussion of finitism or strict finitism would take us too far afield.
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Suffice to say, the beginnings of proof theory in mathematics incorporated a notionof consistency paired with existence and a distinct axiomatic approach coupled withthe implicit definition of core concepts. The full fruition of this project could notbe achieved since the consistency of arithmetic could not be proven through finitarymeans (thanks to Gödel’s incompleteness result).1 Nevertheless, Hilbert’s axiomaticmethod had a profound effect on the scientific community at the time. This effectdid not go unfelt within the linguistic community at the time. Early 20th centurylinguistics saw the anthropological goals of figures such as Sapir and Whorf take ona secondary role to the rigour of mathematical methodology.
[D]uring the 1930s and 1940s other developments in the theory of logi-cal syntax occurred, which were ultimately to have profound implications forlinguistic research, and the starting point was usually Hilbert’s proof theory,which seemed to imply the meaning-less syntactic manipulations could sufficeto resolve a whole range of epistemological problems (Tomalin, 2007: 89).
Bloomfield was among the first to embrace this approach to linguistics. In thespirit of the clarification of confusion, the identification of errors and the general pre-cisification of the field, Bloomfield proposed the axiomatic method as its chief tool ofinvestigation. Unfortunately, logical positivism and its circumscribed philosophicalagenda also crept into Bloomfieldian linguistics. Meanings and any mental charac-terisation was anathema to early linguists. Formal syntax, just as the propositionalor predicate calculus, was a more secure footing upon which to base the scientificstudy of language. Thus, the mathematical foundations became firmly entrenched.One of the first sights of the application of recursive techniques or proof-theoryin modern linguistics was in a paper by Bar-Hillel in 1953. Bar-Hillel attemptedto extend the use of formal recursive techniques beyond the purely mathematical.By taking English as the metalanguage and French as the object language, herecursively redefined the basic parts of speech (noun, verb, etc) in order to establisha mathematical two-part recursive definition of a “proper” or grammatical Frenchsentence.
Bar-Hillel’s use of recursive definitions to analyse the structure of sentencesin natural language can be viewed as one manifestation of this pervasive desirefor the mathematisation of syntactic analysis, which became such a character-istic feature of certain kinds of linguistic research in the mid-twentieth century(Tomalin, 2007: 67).
1However, the incompleteness proof did not destroy proof theory itself. Gentzen developed aproof-theoretic approach without the limitations of the Hilbert programme and finitism in full viewof Gödel’s incompleteness. His more specific aim was to prove the consistency of logical deductionwithin arithmetic.
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This result did not go unnoticed by early Chomsky.2 With this methodology camea movement away from empirical discovery procedures (the likes of which his mentorHarris had sort) toward mathematical precision and specification of evaluation pro-cedures. This move was not unlike the move attributed to Hilbert in his axiomatictreatment of geometry, based not on spatial considerations, but pure mathematicalstructure arrived at through implicit definition. In the same way, geometry and lin-guistics can be thought to be motivated by intuition, but their study is ultimately tiedup with mathematical investigation.3 Continuing with the theme of mathematisation,Peregrin (1995) describes Chomsky’s contribution in the following way.
Chomsky’s novum was that he proposed organizing the rules into a hierarchi-cal system allowing the systematical generation, and basing all this upon settingup of the grammar as a real mathematical structure. Such a mathematizationentailed an exceptional increase of rigour and perspicuity and, moreover, it ledto the development of a metatheory, investigating into the formal properties ofgrammars (e.g. their relative strengths) (88).Although, Hilbert, Bloomfield and Bar-Hillel all had an influence on the math-ematical trajectory of the field. Chomsky’s “novum” was more directly inspired by
2Tomalin traces a quasi-empiricist position of early Chomsky, inspired by Goodman’s constructivenominalism and constructional system theory, to the eventual rejection of discovery procedures infavour of the recursive proof theoretic techniques of generative grammar.3I will return to this analogy in section 3.3. On the philosophical side, I think that mathematisationis related to the treatment of the rules posited initially for the sake of modelling a phenomenon andthen eventually for their own sake. A similar albeit Wittgensteinian diagnosis of the issue within thecontext of the foundations of linguistics can be found in Wright (1989). Simply put, it is a problemof rule-following. While generative grammar might have started out with a rather benign use offormal techniques in terms of formalisation and modelling. From the use of recursive structures andrules as tools, the movement placed the features of recursion and eventually merge at the forefrontof its scientific agenda suggesting a strong relationship with discrete mathematics and especiallyarithmetic. With Platonism, mathematisation reached full fruition and the lines between mathematicalobjects and linguistic ones were all but dissolved. The problem of mathematisation can essentiallybe viewed as the progression and instantiation of the myth of the autonomy of rules or “the imageof a rule as a rail laid to infinity” (Wright, 1989: 238). By placing rules or a generative grammar ata deep level of cognitive embedding or stating that natural language cognisers have ”internalised”rule-systems, generative linguists commit this error which ultimately leads to Platonism. Considerthe following section of Wittgenstein’s Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics IV, 48 and thelinguistic analogue proffered by Wright:
But might it not be said that the rules lead this way, even if no-one went it? For that is what one wouldlike to say - and here we see the mathematical machine, which, driven by the rules themselves, obeys onlymathematical laws and not physical ones.And analogously,
But might it not be said that this sentence is grammatical, and has the meaning it does, even if no-oneconsiders it? For that is what one would like to say - and here we see the language-machine which, drivenby the rules of the language themselves, obeys only linguistic laws and not physical ones (Wright, 1989:238).
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the work of Emil Post and the mathematisation of syntactic structure. I will brieflytouch on this aspect of early generative grammar in the next section. The metathe-ory alluded to by Peregrin is captured in the field of formal language theory (FLT)which has since Chomsky’s early work been dominated by generative (proof-theoretic)mathematics.We do not have the space to enter into a protracted discussion of FLT here. Afew details should suffice. FLT involves the mathematical characterisation of classesof formal languages. A formal language, in this sense, is a set of sequences of stringsover a finite vocabulary. The members of this set vary according the field to which weapply formal language theory, i.e. words if we are talking about natural languagesor states if we are talking about programming languages etc. Furthermore, in formallanguage theory we are concerned with the finite ways in which these languagescan be described, “FLT deals with formal languages (= sets of strings) that can bedefined by finite means, even if the language itself is infinite” (Jäger and Rogers,2012: 1957). This is usually done by means of formal grammars (i.e. sets of rulesby which we construct well-formed sentences or answer the membership problem fora class of structures).4 The linguistic side of FLT is directed towards the goal ofdescribing the various constructions of natural language syntax in terms of the classof formal languages in the infinite hierarchy of such languages that best captures it.5Lastly, the concept of mathematisation is by no means idiosyncratic to the de-velopment of linguistic theory. In the natural sciences too, problems are often ap-proached with a certain sort of mathematical transmogrification in practice (see PartII.5. for a discussion of targetless modelling). As early as Galileo, the natural worldhas been considered amenable to precise mathematical characterisation. Consider-ing the observable phenomenon of free falling objects, a pattern emerges betweendistance and time (i.e. distance is proportional to time squared). It does not, however,
4In general rules look like α→ β where the arrow denotes “replace α with β” and α and β aresets of stings from the alphabet (either terminal or nonterminal).
G will be said to generate a string w consisting of symbols from Σ if and only if it is possible to startwith S and produce w through some finite sequence of rule applications. The sequence of modified stringsthat proceeds from S to w is called a derivation of w. The set of all strings that G can generate is calledthe language of G, and is notated L(G) (Jäger and Rogers, 2012: 1957).Another important component of formal language theory is decidability. Given a string w and aformal language L(G), there is a finite procedure for deciding whether w ∈ L(G), i.e. a Turingmachine which outputs “yes” or “no” in finite time. In other words, a language L(G) is decidable if
G is a decidable grammar. This is called the membership problem.5“Generating” formal languages through grammars is not the only means of characterising ordemarcating them. These languages have been shown to be susceptible to model-theoretic treatmentin terms of monadic second order logic. For instance, Büchi’s (1960) result showed that a set ofstrings forms a regular language if and only if it can be defined in the weak monadic second-ordertheory of the natural numbers with a successor. Thatcher and Wright (1968) showed that context-freelanguages “were all and only the sets of strings forming the yield of sets of finite trees definable inthe weak monadic second-order theory of multiple successors” (Rogers, 1998b: 1117). I thank GeoffPullum for clarifying some aspects of this alternative to me.
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suffice to merely describe this pattern in plain language.
The mathematisation of the problem consists in our being able to specify therelation between distance and time in a precise way, a specification that is notpossible using qualitative language. But note here that the relation betweenthe qualitative concepts of distance and time plays an important role in whatwe call the ‘mathematisation’ of the problem [...] What is interesting, however,is that from the uses of mathematics as a type of tool for reconstruction emergesa representational framework with a life of its own (Morrison, 2015: 2-3).
Other examples include the technique of the thermodynamic limit in particlephysics. In order to explain the breakdown of electromagnetic gauge invariance,physicists help themselves to the notion of a phase transition. Phase transitionsinvolve a thermodynamic limit or “in other words, we need to assume that a systemcontains infinite particles in order to explain, understand, and make predictions aboutthe behaviour of a real, finite system” (Morrison, 2015: 27). Similar techniques areused in population genetics in which the mathematisation of finite real populationsresults in models of infinite populations and their properties. In some of these cases,such as the field of mathematical physics, the line between mathematics and thenatural world is irrevocably blurred.One key difference, however, between mathematisation in the natural sciencesand linguistics is that the mathematics is treated as a modelling tool in the latterand an explanandum in the former, especially in the case of infinity. We will delveinto these issues in much greater detail throughout the thesis, with special attentionpaid to the posit of linguistic infinity. For now, let this serve as an introduction tothe concept which will be developed through the grades of involvement in section 3.In the next section, we will move on to the mathematical approach which underliesChomsky’s seminal Syntactic Structures and the methodological traces it left behindin the ensuing field of linguistics.
1.3 The Legacy of Syntactic Structures
Though often unappreciated, the work of Emil Post has had a profound effect on thefield of linguistics.6 Chomsky’s Syntactic Structures (1957) (and other papers at thetime such as his 1956b) offers a distinctly proof theoretic approach to the idea of agrammar or rule-based production system. A Post canonical production system is ajust a tuple 〈A, I,R〉 with a finite vocabulary A or “axioms”, a set of initial words I(disjoint from A) and a finite set of transformations or production rules R (these arebinary relations) (each of which has an antecedent x and consequent y such that
(x, y) ∈ R which ensures that there are no free variables in the consequent that are
6See Pullum 2011 for discussion.
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not in the antecedent). This system resembles familiar natural deduction systemsin propositional and predicate logic. If you want to prove a specific conjecture, youstart with the members of A and derive the conjecture via repeated application of
R. “In particular, [Post] developed a generative characterization of the recursivelyenumerable (r.e.) sets, and later laid the foundations of recursive function theory”(Pullum, 2011: 280). In so doing, he provided a formalism for modelling the concept ofa logical proof. In a sense, this provides a proof procedure for discovering the stringsor formal language “generated” by a given system of rules (on a finite alphabet orvocabulary). In addition, Post canonical systems are Turing complete i.e. belong tothe same class as Turing machines.It is not surprising that the mechanism of a Post production system becamecentral to the concept of a generative grammar used in linguistics. Chomsky (1957:22) defines [Σ, F ] grammars in the following way:
[Σ, F ]Grammar : Each such grammar is defined by a finite set Σ of initial stringsand a finite set F of “instruction formulas” of the form X → Y interpreted:“rewrite X as Y ”.
From these (and earlier) insights, formal language theory was born. As we sawabove, FLT is the abstract theory of syntax in which languages are viewed as setsof strings without semantic content. For Chomsky, a [Σ, F ] grammar (or generativegrammar) is a system of rewrite rules on sets of terminal (or words) and non-terminalstrings (or phrasal categories).7 Syntactic Structures suggests a proof that the syntaxof natural language cannot be captured by a specific kind of formal language (aregular or finite-state language), although this result is technically never proven(and later developments such as Shieber (1985) prove that the more complex phrase-structure grammars are also inadequate for some languages). Natural languagesyntax is now assumed to be located somewhere in between the context-free andcontext-sensitive languages of the traditional ‘Chomsky Hierarchy’, specifically withinthe mildly-context sensitive class.8A central insight, namely that the linguistic capacity of language users is un-bounded, is what led Chomsky to develop the mathematical analogue of a computa-tional system in order to represent this phenomenon. As Lobina (2014) notes, Chom-sky adopted this position at a time when the terms “computation” and “recursion”were used interchangeably and this might explain his insistence of the centralityof recursion within linguistics itself. The idea that natural language syntax could
7There are some differences between Post canonical systems and phrase-structure grammars suchas divergent notions of variables.8A set of languages L is mildly context-sensitive iff (1) L contains all the context-free languages,(2) L can describe the copy language and certain cross-serial dependencies of that sort (like in SwissGerman, cf Shieber (1985)), (3) L is parsable in polynomial time and (4) L has the constant growthproperty.
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be represented by recursive rule systems or as computational devices was not com-pletely novel as we saw with Bar-Hillel.9 Chomsky’s work however emphasised theneed for greater precision which ultimately lead to linguists or mathematical lin-guists taking more interest in formal language theory, i.e. the mathematisation ofsyntax. However, mathematical linguists tend to restrict themselves to linguisticallyinteresting or motivated investigation into the infinite classes of formal languagesand their respective complexities. For instance, context-sensitive languages and reg-ular languages are generally of little interest given that it is unlikely that naturallanguage constructions can be found within these formal parameters (oversimplifying,the latter are too restrictive and the former too complex).Whereas in formal language theory the use of sets can be viewed as an abstractionor convenience in some sense, within recursion theory sets (in terms of functions)are not optional. If recursion is assumed to be a feature of the natural landscapeas opposed to merely a feature of our models, we move toward a more pervasivemathematisation.10It is not my purpose to detail the developments of formal language theory orformal syntax here. The claim, which I hope to impress upon the reader, is that thebeginnings of the generative or biolinguistic movement have nontrivial logical andmathematical foundations. The historiography of linguistics is a much more complexmatter than I have shown in the previous two sections, where my intention wasillustrative rather than comprehensive. Needless to say, Carnap, Goodman, Quine,Harris all deserve mention within a more complete story. However, such a taskis beyond the scope of the present work (see Newmeyer (1996) for a generativeapproach and Tomalin (2007) for a more objective attempt).It is important to mention, at this juncture, that the generative tradition in lin-guistics offered an approach to central aspects of natural language comprehensionand production that were previously unaccounted for, namely productivity, learnabil-ity and creativity. The tools of this restricted class of Post canonical systems, i.e.generative grammars, allegedly provided insight into something that could not beapproached without this mathematical apparatus, specifically the question of how afinite system could generate an infinite output (a key aspect of productivity, learn-ability and creativity on this account). Chomsky (2000) claims that the explanation of
9The history of the term “recursion” in linguistics is extremely messy. It is not my intention tobe embroiled in that controversy here. The core idea is that recursive functions introduce a propertyof self-reference. This usually involves two steps. One which specifies the condition of terminationof the recursion or the base case and the recursive step which reduces all other cases to the base.The Fibonacci sequence is an example of this procedure, so too is Bar-Hillel’s (1953) definition of aFrench sentence.10Notice, even Chomsky’s famous (1956b) disavowal of the relevance of stochastic grammar for-malisms, in which approximation through continuous mathematics is the goal, can be seen as motivatedby mathematisation. The statistical methods of continuous mathematics do not generally make a math-ematical object of the target domain but rather treat it as physical process capable of “approximate”characterisation.
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natural language creativity only became available with the advent of computabilitytheory in the 20th century (and before then seemed like a contradictory propertyfor a physical system to possess), or “[a]dvances in the formal sciences provided thatunderstanding, making it feasible to deal with the problems constructively” (Chom-sky, 1995: 4). Again, recursion commanded a central explanatory role in linguistictheory. However, Lobina (2014) claims that with the emergence of “merge” this rolesomewhat diminished.11
To be sure, the early years of generative grammar saw the employment ofPost’s production systems, a more obvious recursive formalism, but this aspectof the theory hasn’t translated much with the advent of merge, given that arecent description delineates it in very general terms as a set-theoretic operationin which repeated applications over one element yield a potentially infiniteset of structures, drawing an analogy between the way merge applies and thesuccessor function (Lobina, 2014: 2).
Despite the shift in mathematical features of the field, the analogy with thenatural numbers persists throughout the discipline. Consider this claim made byPinker (1994: 86) in a popular book on linguistics.
By the same logic that shows that there are an infinite number of integers -if you ever think you have the largest integer, just add 1 to it and you will haveanother - there must be an infinite number of sentences.
Similarly, Hinzen and Uriagereka (2006) draw even stronger conclusions concern-ing the connection between linguistics and mathematics, well-within the biolinguistictradition.
[T]he human language faculty poses much the same explanatory problemsfor contemporary physicalism as the mathematical faculty does (72).and,
Chomsky’s technical correlation between language and mathematics is alsowell-taken, given the biological isolation they both share as systems instantiat-ing discrete infinity. However, if the latter can be abstracted from FL [faculty oflanguage], just how much of mathematics is FL using to begin with? [...] Surelythe successor function fits naturally into syntagmatics (84).We shall return to this issue below, but for now suffice to say that the analogy be-tween linguistics and mathematics goes deeper than just that of the merge operationand the successor function. The ensuing movement only added to the mathematical
11Again, these issues are too unclear to delve into here. In some sense Merge can be considered“recursive” in that it is a general procedure that can apply to its own output, in another sense it canbe understood as producing constituents of types that contain other constituents of the same type.
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foundations of linguistics. The use of sets and functions have become ubiquitous inlinguistic theory but the mathematical apparatus does not stop at these relativelybenign tools of characterisation or formalisation. Along the way, merge and recursionsomehow became in need of physical interpretation.On the other side of the fence, semantics was also undergoing mathematisation.Following the pioneering work of Lambek (1958), Montague famously stated thathe “reject(s) the contention that an important theoretical difference exists betweenformal and natural language” (1970a: 188). In fact, this is a point (reiterated below)upon which he believed himself to be in agreement with Chomsky as evinced in’Universal Grammar’.There is in my opinion no important theoretical difference between naturallanguages and the artificial languages of logicians; indeed, I consider it possibleto comprehend the syntax and semantics of both kinds of language within asingle natural and mathematically precise theory. On this point I differ from anumber of philosophers, but agree, I believe, with Chomsky and his associates.(Montague, 1970b [1976]: 222).Indeed, according to Thomason (1974), Montague held syntax and semantics to bebranches of mathematics. It is not clear that Chomsky and his associates explicitlyheld the view Montague attributes to them. Nevertheless, the idea which doesseem attributable to generative linguists is that structures of natural language notonly lend themselves to mathematical characterisation but moreover there is some“special” connection between the faculty of language and that of mathematics asthey both “instantiate” a mathematical property, namely discrete infinity.All approaches agree that a core property of FLN is recursion, attributed tonarrow syntax in the conception [...] This capacity of FLN yields discrete infinity(a property that also characterizes the natural numbers) (Chomsky, Hauser andFitch, 2002: 1571).This aforementioned connection gets to the heart of the distinction between for-malisation and mathematisation which I propose and hope to illuminate in the sub-sequent sections.Whereas Syntactic Structures could be read as an application of discretemathematics to language, opening up new vistas in the study of formal grammar,Aspects made clear that formalisation, and indeed the study of languages/grammarswas not an end in itself. The goal was rather to reverse-engineer the structureof language to discover the mind that made it possible in the first place (Boeckx,2015: 128).Thus, if all of the grammars of natural language imply a discrete infinity ofexpressions, then this capacity is attributed to the language faculty by “reverse-engineering”. Statements like these are the hallmark of mathematisation. We willreturn to these issues in sections 2.1 and 3.2 respectively.
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The next few sections delve into the details of the specific foundational projectsin linguistics before moving to the grades of mathematical involvement compatiblewith these frameworks.
Chapter 2Methodology and Ontology
As previously mentioned, I will argue that methodology and ontology can and do comeapart in the foundations of linguistics. However, the ontological foundations of thescience have traditionally had an influence on the “working linguist”. For instance,pre-Chomskyan structuralists are often characterised as nominalistically motivated.They made no assumptions about a universal grammar (UG) connecting the world’slanguages or deep structure underlying surface forms and their categorisations andlinguistic descriptions were often restricted to the corpora of specific languages, i.e.natural language tokens.1 Although, certain proponents of this framework, such asHockett, viewed linguistics as an essentially “classificatory science”, this methodol-ogy by itself did not entail that natural languages were not abstract objects or mentalones. Nevertheless, the view has been thoroughly supplanted by the generative tra-dition and will thus not be the focus of the current study (even though some of itscore insights have been retained within computational linguistics, see Lenci 2008).In addition, it incorporated a physicalist view which is included in conceptualism (asa proper subset) and the nominalism at its core will be discussed in Part III. In whatfollows, I will briefly outline some of the key aspects of the generative movement interms of its methodology and ontology and then attempt a similar characterisationof the linguistic Platonist programme before considering a pluralist position whichaims to unite both views inter alia.2
1“Non-linguists (unless they happen to be physicalists) constantly forget that a speaker is makingnoise, and credit him, instead, with the possession of impalpable ‘ideas’. It remains for linguists toshow, in detail, that the speaker has no ‘ideas’, and that the noise is sufficient” (Bloomfield, 1936:23). 2The various views connected under the banner of ”public language” also deserve mention as anontological basis of natural language. These views tend to agree on the social normative nature ofnatural language conventions (although, they disagree on exactly what this nature looks it). However,the public language theorists tend not to have a clear (or unified) linguistic methodological approach,especially when it comes to syntax. Thus the methodology-ontology question is mute in this case.For an exception, see Peregrin 2008 for a discussion of the compatibility of inferentialism and formalsemantics.
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2.1 Linguistic Conceptualism
Linguistics as PsychologyBefore any serious overview can be presented on this subject, some terminology hasto be settled. I have here opted for the term “conceptualism” partly to avoid thorny(often times ideological) issues of the alternatives such as “biolinguistics” and ”gen-erative grammar”.3 The exact nature of the biolinguistic programme in linguistics isnot always clearly defined (as with many other disciplines). The questions of itsrelationship to previous incarnations of the generative tradition and the question ofthe relationship between biolinguistics and generative grammar itself are surely im-portant ones. These questions will not receive thorough treatment here (see Lasnik2005, Boeckx 2015 for discussion). I myself consider the biolinguistic position to bestronger in its claims and link to biology than the position represented by generativegrammar which is usually understood as concerned with language and its relationto the cognitive system. For instance, issues related to language evolution are morecentral to the biolinguistic approach than to generative grammar, hence the recentdiscussion of merge as an evolutionary mutation of some sort. Another way of puttingthe point is in terms of the goals of linguistic theory. In Aspects of the theory ofSyntax (1965), Chomsky differentiates between three nested kinds of adequacy con-ditions for a theory of grammar, each more inclusive than the last. The three relatedlinguistic desiderata are (1) observable linguistic performance, (2) native speakerjudgements and (3) language acquisition. The first is the class of observationallyadequate grammars which are those grammars which only account for corpora orobserved utterances of speech. Naturally, these do not give us much traction on (2)and (3). Chomsky then suggests a class of descriptively adequate grammars (DAG)which aim to capture the psychological facts of native speaker intuitions, therebyaddressing (1) and (2). However, these latter grammars are inadequate on count (3)and thus require us to ascend to the level of explanatorily adequate grammars (suchas can be found in the Principles and Parameters framework).In later developments, linguistics moves further afield from these levels. Withinthe minimalist programme, Chomsky identifies another level, one ‘beyond explanatoryadequacy’ which he calls ‘natural adequacy’. Thus, the goal of linguistic theorymoves away from the concerns which characterised generative grammar of merelydescribing linguistic intuitions or language acquisition to a theory of language asa natural object. A natural object is explained as something being bound by thebiological and physical universe, as opposed to the mathematical and conventionalones.
In principle, then, we can seek a level of explanation deeper than explanatory
3In Part II, I will offer an alternative means of capturing the scientific import of the latter term. Icould have chosen “mentalism” just as well.
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adequacy, asking not only what the properties of language are, but why theyare that way (Chomsky, 2004a).
What I am interested in is the philosophical position espoused by the view asto the nature of natural language and the corresponding focus of linguistic theory,i.e. the common conceptualism (or mentalism) at the base of both biolinguistics andgenerative grammar. In this way, I hope to understand the more formal aspects ofthe paradigm and how its claims concerning recursion, discrete infinity and merge fitinto this naturalistic picture.On the conceptualist view, linguistics is a branch of cognitive psychology andthe foundations of linguistics proper (a term introduced in Katz and Postal 1991 todescribe the job of the working linguist) are eventually to be subsumed by biology orneuroscience. A more general understanding is that linguistics constitutes the studyof a biological system which is responsible for language generation. Therefore, itincorporates a physicalist ontology. However, there are several important differencesbetween this picture and the American structuralist movement (which proffered asimilar albeit more restricted ontology).The first important difference between this programme and its predecessor is thatthe linguistic universe is expanded to include more than just the observable physicalutterances of speakers (desideratum (1) above) but also the innate linguistic struc-tures in their minds/brains. Early generative grammar postulated “deep structures”which through various transformation rules produced the surface forms of sentenceswhich we can perceive directly. These deep structures were just like the expressionsgenerated by the recursive rules of a context-free grammar or a phrase structuregrammar (i.e. a restricted version of a Post canonical system), such as S → NP, V P ;
V P → Aux, V,NP etc. Surface forms are then linked to this structure via various“transformations”. Although Chomsky would eventually eschew the notion of ‘deepstructure’ in ‘the Minimalist Program’ (1995), the idea that linguistics is concernedwith hidden cognitive structures was important progress for the field and a majordeparture from its predecessors. Katz (1971) refers to it as a “second linguistic turn”akin to the Democritean revolution in early scientific thought.
I-Language and GrammarSo what kind of thing is a language on this view? For Chomsky it is psychologicalin nature, linked to the state of the so-called “language faculty”.
We can take a language to be nothing other than a state of the languagefaculty [...] So let’s take a language to be (say, Hindi or English or Swahili)a particular state attained by the language faculty. And to say that somebodyknows a language, or has a language, is simply to say their language faculty isin that state (Chomsky, 2000b: 8).
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Furthermore, although different languages can be described in terms of differentstates, there are general, “universal” and innate properties underlying all of theseseemingly distinct languages, so much so that “deep down, there is only one humanlanguage” (Chomsky 1995: 131). This is the infamous Universal Grammar or UGhypothesis or in other words “there are aspects of the linguistic system acquired bythe child that do not depend on input data [...] Some cases of this type, it has beenargued, reflect the influence of a genetically prespecified body of knowledge abouthuman language” (Pesetsky, 2009). Interesting though this may be, the status of theUG hypothesis will not be my concern in this thesis.More importantly, a grammar is supposed to be a scientific theory of the mentalbehaviour or of the state that the language faculty is in (so different states for English,Mandarin, isiZulu etc.).A better usage would be to restrict the term “grammar” to the theory oflanguage, and to understand the language as what we may call “I-language”where “I” is to suggest “intensional” and “internalized” (Chomsky, 1990: 678).The grammar thus describes a language which is “internalised” in the sense of be-ing located in the mind and eventually the brain of the ideal speaker-listener and“intensional” in terms of a function that determines a restricted set of expressions ora “grammar” and not the entire discretely infinite faculty of language itself. Anotherword for the former characteristic is “individualistic” or non-relational in the sense ofpossessing properties that depend on or are related to only internal mental featuresof the language-user.The data associated with grammar construction is the (oft-criticised) introspectivejudgements of native speakers or the linguists themselves. This is the idea that our‘intuitive’ linguistic judgements can serve as the “voice of competence” and thus theprimary data for linguistic theories. Marantz (2005) argues that the role of intro-spective data has been mischaracterised and linguists’ judgements stand as “proxies”or meta-data aimed at representing and not reporting the data. So the judgements oflinguists’ merely indicates the need for further corpora based or distributional inves-tigation for the sake of confirmation. In addition, psycholinguistic and neuroscientifictechniques are being used by linguists not only for the sake of testing theoreticalhypotheses (as was the case with initial psycholinguistic research) but also for thesake of forming new hypotheses. Using the various techniques of psychology andneuroscience establishes greater compatibility with the other cognitive sciences andwould presumably be more in keeping with the naturalistic or scientific turn whichthe field has undergone under the conceptualist framework. Despite these advan-tages and larger integration within cognitive science, many linguists have resistedthe incorporation of scientific techniques and insisted on the formal characterisationsin terms of proof theory initially and now more set-theoretic techniques.4
4See Jackendoff 2002 and 2007 for an attempt and reflection respectively of the incorporation ofgenerative linguistics within the larger cognitive scientific movement.
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Formal Aspects of the Theory of SyntaxThe question which most concerns this research is that of the formal aspects of thetheory, such as recursion in early generative grammar and merge in minimalism,and their relation to the mathematical realm. Whether through recursion or merge,conceptualism seems to advocate for an extra-biological, or at least special, claimthat language is somehow mathematically unique. This claim starts with the ideathat the human language capacity (and cognitive capacity in general) is supposed tobe understood as finite in its resources, yet one apparent aspect of natural languageis its creative nature, assumed to be capable of (discretely) infinite expression.
The most striking aspect of linguistic competence is what we may call the‘creativity of language’, that is, the speaker’s ability to produce new sentencesthat are immediately understood by other speakers although they bear no phys-ical resemblance to sentences that are ‘familiar’ (Chomsky, 1966: 74).Most linguistics textbooks start with the claim that natural language is infinite(for examples, see Lasnik 2000, Sag et al 2003, Yang 2006). Some linguists even goas far as to claim that infinity is the only linguistic universal (Epstein and Hornstein2005). This aspect of the tradition has led to some criticism (see Pullum and Scholz2010) but it has also led to the connections with the realm of mathematics as wesaw in section 1.3 and can glean from these rather speculative comments in Chomsky(2010: 48):
The “gigantic development of the mathematical capacity is wholly unex-plained by the theory of natural selection, and must be due to some altogetherdistinct cause,” if only because it remained unused. One possibility is that it isderivative from language. It is not hard to show that if the lexicon is reduced toa single element, then unbounded Merge will yield arithmetic.In ‘On Phases’, Chomsky is more explicit on how this procedure is to be accom-plished. Even though as Tomalin (2007: 1795) notes, if the lexicon contains a singleelement, then merge cannot be applied without some sort of indexation.
Suppose that a language has the simplest possible lexicon: just one LI[lexical item], call it “one”. Application of Merge to that LI yields {one}, callit “two”. Application of Merge to {one} yields {{one}}, call it “three”. Etc.In effect, Merge applied in this manner yields the successor function. It isstraightforward to define addition in terms of Merge(X,Y ), and in familiar ways,the rest of arithmetic (2005: 6).
Talk of recursion, arithmetic, discrete infinity and the set-theoretic operation ofmerge seems to suggest a deeper analogy with the formal sciences as mentioned inthe previous section. In a lecture in 2011 at Carleton University, Chomsky claimedthat “perhaps the most elementary property of human language is that it consists of
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a discrete infinity of interpretable expressions – so there’s five-word sentences, andsix-word sentences, no five-and-a-half words sentence, so it goes on indefinitely likethe integers. That’s kind of unusual, there’s nothing like that known in the biologicalworld.” In my view, it is this alleged divergence from other aspects of the naturalor biological world which leads the linguist from a purely naturalistic endeavour toa partly formal one. The problem is that discrete infinity requires the apparatus ofdiscrete mathematics for characterisation. This is not mere formalisation but rathera mathematisation of an object (or state) claimed to be biological in nature.Let us consider the “merge” postulate for a moment. Merge is an arbitraryoperation on sets of syntactic items, essentially it takes two objects and combinesthem into one (labelled) object. It is internal merge which performs the role whichrecursion performed previously. External merge takes two distinct objects as inputand internal merge allows embedding and thus allows for recursion. Furthermore,internal merge involves duplicating items within the operation. For instance, if wemerge syntactic objects α and β to form the unordered set {α, β} and there is a γsuch that γ ∈ α and we merge this object with {α, β}, we would have two copiesof γ in the resulting structure. In this way, we can account for all movement withminimal operations in the syntax (and various constraints on the operations). It isin explaining the “arbitrariness” of merge that we once again see a parallel witharithmetic.
Within the framework just outlined, there is also no meaningful question asto why one numeration is formed rather than another – or rather than none, sothat we have silence. That would be like asking that a theory of some formaloperation on integers – say, addition – explain why some integers are addedtogether rather than others, or none (Chomsky, 1995: 208).
Here we are dealing with an arbitrary set-theoretic function which yields a dis-crete infinity of natural language expressions, i.e. biological output. In the case ofarithmetic, the output of the successor function is not usually considered to be phys-ical in any strict sense (although nominalists in the philosophy of mathematics mightdisagree). And yet both language and arithmetic are alleged to have sprung from thesame well. Whether it is Turing machines, discrete infinity or merge, my claim is thatthe conceptualist approach involves a level of mathematisation of the “natural object”of language. Linguistics thus seems to view itself as a “special” science in a sensedivorced from other empirical sciences, and wedded to aspects of the formal sciences.As I suggested in the first section, the move seemed to involve a departure from mereformalisation to a distinctive mathematisation of recursive elements specifically.
[I]n the earliest work, although recursive components were considered use-ful formal procedures that simplified the basic analytical framework, no strongclaims were made concerning their biological status. Gradually, though, as thetheory of GG developed [...] the role of recursion within the GG framework began
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to acquire cognitive connotations, with the eventual result that [...] it has beenhypothesised that recursion is a genetically-embedded computational procedure(Tomalin, 2007: 1785).
Given the conceptualist and more so the biolinguistic agenda (of integrating thestudy of language with other biological systems), the onus is on conceptualist toprovide an evolutionary story for how such an admittedly “extra-biological” discreteinfinity creating operation such as merge emerged from the physical world. In an at-tempt to do so, Hauser, Chomsky and Fitch (2002) go as far as to state that recursionor merge is the core property of the faculty of language (narrowly construed). Theygo further to state that merge is an evolutionary mutation which gave rise to humanlinguistic abilities (and perhaps arithmetic ones too). This story has met with large-scale criticism and an in-depth discussion of this postulate is beyond the currentscope but it does serve as an example of the centrality of the recursion and discreteinfinity claim within the biolinguistic paradigm. At the very least, biolinguists seemto have to account for the role of such set-theoretic operations in their science whichis alleged to be an empirical one. Is talk of recursion and infinity merely descriptiveor modelling of a physical feature of our biological makeup or is it to be taken moreliterally as an actual feature of linguistic knowledge and generation? And if so, how?In section 3.1. I will offer such an explanation on their behalf but for various reasonsthey may be less inclined to adopt it. In 3.2 I will discuss these issues in somewhatmore detail.
2.2 Linguistic Platonism
We saw a framework in two different spirits in the previous section. On the one hand,the conceptualist movement aims to offer a naturalistic account of the study of naturallanguage, one which draws on aspects of human psychology and (eventually) biology.On the other hand, it places the explanation of the discretely infinite capabilitiesof natural language users at the forefront of its scientific agenda thereby relyingheavily (almost exclusively) on set-theoretic and other formal methods of exposition.
Abstract OntologyPlatonism begins with a critique of this apparent bi-polar methodological aim andits resulting “incoherent” ontology as proponents of this view claim.Platonism is an account of linguistic foundations which holds that linguistics is thestudy of abstract mind-independent objects. The Platonist takes all of the syntacticand semantic structure posited by grammars not merely as useful tools for describingmental states but actual features of an objective linguistic reality. A natural language,like a formal language, is an abstract object. In a sense this is an externalisticconception (i.e. E-language, or P-language as it is called in Chomsky 1990) since
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natural language is claimed not be defined within human biology (or psychology), butimportantly unlike E-languages this view holds that natural language also exceedsthe bounds of physicalism. Languages on this view are of the same ontologicaltype as sets and numbers, thus not located in space or time (or springs from thesame a priori “faculty of intuition” according to Katz (1981)). Therefore, linguisticshas to be a formal science on par with mathematics. If conceptualism involved apartial mathematisation of the object of inquiry, then Platonism is the case of fullmathematisation. There are three main components of this view (which I think arepresent in its various statements and restatements), (1) an epistemic claim, (2) anontological claim and, (3) a methodological one. I will (very) briefly describe each inturn (I will hold off on a critique until section 3.3).We will start with (1). The claim here is that the conceptualist movement confuses(i.e. identifies) the knowledge we have of a language with the language we haveknowledge of, contra the nature of the dyadic “knowledge relation”. Simplistically,if linguistics is the study of linguistic knowledge or linguistic competence (i.e. an I-language), then this should presuppose the existence of the language independentlyof the knowledge of it.
[F]or any domain X, knowledge of X systematically depends on the exis-tence of X. For some real rabbit, R, one can determine in principle R’s averageblood pressure. There can be knowledge of that average blood pressure. But aquestion about the average blood pressure of the Easter Bunny has no answer(Postal, 2003: 235).
If knowledge is a two-place predicate or relation (as is assumed on this view)then the relata have to be existent to make sense of any knowledge claim. Devitt andSterelny (1989) take up issue with this epistemic identification likewise. Although,they question in what sense a language user can be said to “know” her language.They proffer a few candidates for what this knowledge relation could constitute,each more problematic than the last (we just do not seem to have the right kind ofepistemic access to the rules of our language, the rules which the grammar posits).Eventually they adopt a know-how (as opposed to a propositional or know-that)account of linguistic knowledge. A similar approach is suggested by proponents ofdynamic syntax (Cann et al, 2012).Claim (2) asserts that there is a deep ontological incoherence at the root of thegenerative approach. The claims of the theory are empirical and mentalistic, yetthe approach is formal and mathematical. There are quite a few arguments offeredin favour of a consistent Platonistic ontology in its stead. I will mention two sucharguments here, connected to the issue of mathematics. One of which might be morefamiliar than the other.
The received view claims that an NL is something psychological/biological,in the baldest terms, a state of an organ, that aspect of the brain that permits
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NL to arise [...] And yet it has been unvaryingly claimed in the same tradition atissue that NL is somehow infinite. These two views are not consistent (Postal,2003: 242).
The first major argument in favour of Platonism is based on the ontology ofsentences. Following a Quinian type/token distinct, this argument takes the form ofa modus tollens in Postal (2009). If NLs are psychological or biological (I-languages,states of the mind/brain etc.) then sentences of NLs are also physical. But sentencesare not at the correct level of abstraction to be aspects of our brains, rather if thereis anything to this conceptualist claim, we have to be talking about sentence tokens.Sentence tokens, utterances or expressions, whatever the preferred term, are indeedphysical objects but they are clearly not the objects of linguistic study (perhaps theyare appropriate units of study for psycholinguistics?). However, sentences, unliketheir tokens, are not to be found in the physical world. In other words, we can askwhen and where a sentence was tokened (uttered or expressed) but not when andwhere the Spanish sentence ¿Quién engañó a Roger Rabbit? is or was.Another argument in favour of a type/token distinction here could come from thephilosophy of science. Grammars, taken as scientific theories, can only be under-stood as structural descriptions of sentences qua types not tokens for any theoreticalgeneralisations to make sense. Otherwise we would be left in the same state as theAmerican structuralists who assumed no generalisations between languages or eventhe specific corpora under description (or so the caricature goes). I think this linemight be a bit misguided though. For instance, a biologist might “abstract” overspecific tokens of animals and speak of “species” or types of animals without requir-ing those types to be non-spatio-temporally extended. Is biology a formal science?Probably not.Nevertheless, I do think that the problem above can be blocked or rather it is nota viable response to Postal’s case against biolinguistics. This is the case becausethe response is incompatible with the core feature of natural language posited bythe Chomskyan paradigm, namely discrete infinity. If we were to collect all of thesentence tokens of every language throughout their individual histories (we can eventhrow in the extinct languages), we would not arrive at a denumerable infinity, i.e.a mapping from the sentence tokens to the natural numbers. The assumption is thatthere is no analogue in the biological world (see Chomsky quote at the end of theprevious section and Hinzen and Uriagereka (2006)). Put in another way, type-talk might be a useful convenience for theorising in biology (and other sciences)but it is a necessity for linguistics since linguistics is precisely about sentencestypes themselves notwithstanding the issue of their instantiation in the real world. Ifsentences were sets (or set-like) and linguistics was a formal science, these worrieswould presumably disappear.5
5This is not necessarily the case. There is still no analogue of the Peano axioms or an inductive
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How Big is NL?There is a more technical (and related) argument in favour of Platonism which arguesfor the nondenumerable infinity of natural languages (i.e. strictly greater than theset of natural numbers). This possibility attacks the heart of the competence modelof grammar. Although it has been largely neglected in the literature, I think it ispertinent to the issue at hand since it involves explicit mathematisation. According tothis result, the cardinality of natural language is not even a set but a “megacollection”(or proper class). If this is the case, then the Post canonical system procedure orthe generative grammar one is mistaken and does not determine or enumerate theset of natural language sentences since sets have fixed cardinalities. Thus, theseprocedures cannot capture the magnitude of natural language.It is not possible to reproduce this proof in any detail here (I refer the readerto Langendoen and Postal (1984) or for a shorter overview in Katz (1985)). I will,however, outline the strategy of the proof.Briefly, we start by defining the concept of coordinate compounding. That is, anyconstituent is a coordinate compound of a given grammatical category iff (1) it is partof that grammatical category, (2) it has two immediate constituents itself and finally(3) these constituents are conjuncts.From this they draw the claim that all sets of constituents are closed undercoordinate compounding (and thus contain their own coordinate projections6) andthe same applies to constituents of all sentences. Consider the sentence I existwhich can be extended to another sentence I know that I exist and I know that Iknow that I exist etc. Call the set of all of these sentences X . We know that (andLangendoen and Postal admit that) X is countably infinite. If X is closed undercoordinate compounding then a continuum is created since X contains X ′ whichcontains all the elements of X and their coordinate projections, i.e. I exist and Iknow that I exist and I know that I know that I exist...The reason is that each coordinate compound sentence of X ′ can be put in one-to-one correspondence with a member of the power set of X .7Therefore, since the sizeof a power set of a countably infinite set is ℵ1 or 2ℵ0 , X ′ is also of this cardinality.But since X ′ ∈ X , X must at least be ℵ1. Importantly, “at no point can a set ofsentences be obtained that exhausts an NL having sentence coordination governedby the closure law” (Langendoen and Postal, 1985: 58). This leads us straight intothe Vastness proof. The proof proceeds by contradiction. You start by assumingthat some NL is a set Y (i.e. has a fixed cardinality) and then show that Y and its
proof for the discrete infinity of natural languages. When infinity is claimed, it is assumed. SeePullum and Scholz (2010) for details.6These are like functions that take constituents of the same category and outputs a set of conjoineditems, e.g. take a set of items {Bob, Susie, Felix}, then the coordinate projection of this set is Bob,Susie and Felix.7Non-compound s ∈ X ′ 7−→ {s} ∈ X , coordinate compound s ∈ X ′ 7−→projection set...
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coordinate compounds are contained in the original set and thus of less cardinalitythan Y but you also show (via Cantor’s theorem) that the projection sets (of thecompounds) are equinumerous to the power-sets of Y, thus of greater cardinalitythan Y. Contradiction. Therefore, NL is not a set.The immediate and devastating consequence of this theorem is supposed to bethat all generative (constructive or proof-theoretic) grammars are rendered useless incharacterising NL from the onset since they assume a denumerable infinity. As a re-sult, a large research paradigm in linguistics should be abandoned. Non-constructivegrammars would have to supplant the generative methods.8 In addition, grammarscannot be about physical brain-states as per the biolinguistic paradigm since thiswould be mathematically impossible. Brain-states are finite (whatever this meansexactly) and without generative procedures for arriving at the requisite infinity (sincethese max out at ℵ0), unlikely objects of our grammars, i.e. generative grammars cannever describe linguistic reality fully. Put in another way, generative grammarssupposedly provide us with a bridge from the finite to the infinite in linguistics. Ifthe full complexity of natural languages exceeds the reach of generative procedures,then linguistic competence cannot be identified with the target of grammatical the-ory (conceived of as concerning natural language) since competence is only a propersubset of natural language (this would also help with the epistemic claim).
Mathematical MethodsFinally, moving onto (3) or the methodology of linguistic Platonism, this sectionhas attested to the possibility of the mathematical nature of the study of naturallanguage. We are now in a position to appreciate the depths of the methodologyof the Platonist programme. Although, for instance, Katz (1985) insists that theworking linguist would be unaffected by this shift in foundational interpretation andrather it is more compatible with her quotidian task, I think that Platonism marks afurther departure in terms of methodology. On the extreme side, the Vastness proofwould allow for elements of the structures of linguistic reality to be directly provena priori (a possibility Fodor 1981 refers to as “The Wrong View”). More importantly,our linguistic intuitions should serve us well in grammar construction and thus theneed for proxies (á la Marantz above) or corpora studies is rendered otiose, sincemathematicians do not need to pool mathematical intuitions for data. In addition, thecontemporary trend towards the inclusion of linguistics within the larger cognitivescientific framework would also be blocked by this foundational picture, since themethods of the latter would not be necessary to shed light on the former.On this view, mathematical and linguistic reality would be amenable to the samemethodological treatment. Ontologically speaking, linguistic objects (sentences, nat-
8See Pullum and Scholz (2001) for a discussion of the cardinality neutrality of model-theoreticapproaches to grammar. This feature will become important in section 4.1.
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ural languages) are like mathematical objects, such as sets, groups and numbers, andthus beyond the physical realm.
2.3 Linguistic Pluralism
There is a neglected position on the foundations of linguistics which is directly in-formed by the alleged heterogeneity of linguistic objects and methodology. This viewembraces the so-called “hybrid” nature of generative grammar and offers a thorough-going pluralism as its genesis in both ontology and methodology. It embraces boththe conceptualism and Platonism of the sections above (among other positions).
From Plural Methods to Hybrid ObjectsThe chief proponent of this view is Robert Stainton (1996, 2001, 2006, 2014). Iwill provide an overview here and then discuss briefly why I do not believe that thisalternative gets to the heart of the issues which form the target of the present work. Iam breaking the expository tradition I established in the previous two sections here.The reason is that arguing against pluralism allows us a natural point to justify manyof the assumptions of the discussion so far and the presuppositions of the thesis moregenerally. This early justificatory project should serve us well in later sections andparts for either the clarification of confusion or the preemption of objection.Firstly, pluralism rejects the idea that there is any real distinction to be hadwith the concept of “linguistics proper”, which was coined to isolate syntax andsemantics as the only properly linguistic domains. From the pluralist perspective,phonology, phonetics (and presumably pragmatics) are equally linguistic domainsworthy of inclusion within any debate concerning the foundations of the subject.Naturally, once we move toward a broader methodological base, the ontologicalplurality seems to follow. In the spirit of this diversification of the properly linguistic,Stainton describes the corresponding metaphysical attitude in the following way.
My own view [...] is that natural language, the subject matter of linguistics,have, by equal measures, concrete, physical, mental, abstract, and social facets.The same holds for words and sentences. They are metaphysical hybrids (2014:5).
Stainton provides various arguments based on some extremely interesting evi-dence to support this ontological attitude. I divine two main lines of argument forthe pluralist claim. The first is that the ontological attitudes of the previous sec-tions (with the inclusion of public language views and naive physicalism of the pre-Chomskyans and Quine etc.) all have something to contribute to the subject matterof linguistics and therefore its corollary that each ontology misses out on something
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essential about the picture individually. The second line is that on a specific read-ing of these ontological commitments, and contrary to prima facie impressions, theseontologies are perfectly compatible with one another.Let us consider some of the evidence for the first claim, i.e. that physicalism, men-talism, Platonism etc. all have some important sine qua non piece of the linguisticpuzzle to contribute. Above, I considered mentalism to be part of the physicalist per-suasion. For the sake of distinguishing the ontological perspectives associated withBloomfieldian physicalism and Chomskyan mentalism, I will follow Stainton in refer-ring to the former as physicalism and the latter as conceptualism (as per my usage).One argument for the necessity of the physicalist contribution comes from phonetics,another from pragmatics. The argument from phonetics simply involves the truismthat vocal and auditory organs, and the sounds which they produce, play a role inlanguage production and comprehension. Phonetics concerns the physical movementof the vocal tract, the tongue, aspiration etc. These phenomena are clear candidatesfor physical aspects of natural language. On the other side, pragmatic phenomenaseem to reference particular situations of interpretation. Interpreting indexicals suchas here and now, deixis, demonstratives and other contextual elements point to theneed to incorporate pragmatic aspects into the ontology of natural languages.The cases for the inclusion of the conceptualist and Platonist ontologies havealready been covered above. The point is that all of these facets contribute to the“properly linguistic” and the exclusion of any of them is tantamount to incompletecharacterisation.9
Problems for the ViewDespite the ecumenical spirit of the approach, there are a few aspects of this line ofreasoning which I take to be questionable. Firstly, there is a distinction between thefact that a contribution is made by a set of phenomena to the description of a general(super)phenomenon and whether or not it counts as detrimental to abstract away fromit. The idea of “linguistics proper” is an abstraction in my view. In the process ofscientific investigation abstraction is a necessary tool. In many cases this processinvolves the omission of potentially connected or relevant material. The subject ofPart II is concerned with idealisation and abstraction in generative linguistics. I willnot preempt that discussion here except to say that the aim of such abstraction is oftenthe isolation of the core or minimal structures responsible for a given phenomenon.10
9I abstract over the necessity claim of the social aspects of natural language which involves phaticsand other similar speech acts. See Millikan (2005) and Peregrin (2015) for two distinct approaches tothe legitimacy of public language as a object of scientific inquiry. See also Part II.6 for a discussionof the latter view within the context of formal semantics.10Even Stainton’s frequent parlance of a certain phenomenon not “being exhausted” by a certaindescription or methodological characterisation is misleading as scientific investigation might not beinterested in “exhausting” descriptions of phenomena but rather minimally representing them. The
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Consider the case of phonetics. It is undeniable that most of the world’s lan-guages involve sounds in terms of combinations of vowels and consonants. Some ofthese combinations are quite complex, such as the click sounds of my native SouthAfrica.11 Nevertheless, they are not essential to an understanding of natural lan-guage simpliciter since there are languages which do not produce sounds at all. Signlanguages operate on manual communication with physical gestures and signals toconvey information. Some sign languages include haptic cues (used in communitieswhose members suffer from both deafness and blindness). They have syntax andsemantics. They do not have phonetics or phonology. Assuming that phonetics con-tributes some essential aspect of natural language without which we do not havea characterisation of natural language relegates sign languages to the camp of thenon-natural. Abstracting away from phonetics could therefore be considered benign.A different rationale is required for abstracting away from pragmatic (and social)phenomena. One way of thinking about pragmatics is that is concerns language use“in context”. But for anything to be used in context or in a context is to suggest that ithad a prior form. A natural language can thus be thought of as a package comprisedof syntax and semantics which is applied to real world communicative environments.For instance, a grammatical sentence can be attributed with a meaning based on thecompositional rules of the language. The standard way of viewing the product of thisprocedure is that the sentence is endowed with a literal meaning. Now this sentencecan be used to convey a myriad of other meanings depending on the circumstances(sarcasm, deception, play etc.). There might be pragmatic “rules” (such as Grice’smaxims and some more complex tools of formal pragmatics) but these rules tend tobe violable and imprecise, they are language and world dependent. To include sucha set of variable phenomena into our core linguistic facts only seems to muddy thewaters. If the goal is to determine the universal set of rules responsible for naturallanguage, or the ontological attitude needed to describe them, then pragmatics canbe safely set aside.Let the above objections serve only to question the pluralist agenda. The issues,especially concerning the role of pragmatics, are controversial at best. My purposeis not to produce knockdown arguments here but rather to suggest how a scientistmight abstract away from some linguistic material and arrive at a foundational projectinvolving only syntax and semantics as “linguistics proper”.12 Consider Newton’stheory of the tides. The earth’s rotation and the gravitational pull of planets besidesthe earth, sun and moon are abstracted over. These factors can or do play a role in
modelling perspective I propose in section 3.1 and Part II aims to make this observation more precise.11These are technically obstruents which create small pockets of air and then release them in theproduction of loud consonants. Xhosa and Zulu are click languages of this sort.12Of course, a different scientist could aim to abstract away from semantics by the same procedure.In fact, the arguments for ‘autonomy of syntax’ often presented themselves under this guise. SeeSampson (2001) for an argument for the non-scientific/non-empirical nature of semantics based onsimilar reasoning.
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tidal force (the ancillary force of gravity responsible for the tides) but they are notpart of the core explanation of the phenomenon.Moving on to the second line of argumentation for this view, let us considerthe metaphysical pluralist claim. This argument is a response to an immediateobjection along the lines of Postal (2003, 2009) as to the incompatibility of thevarious ontologies associated with mentalism, Platonism, physicalism and publiclanguage views. Stainton begins the pluralist apology in this way.There is an obvious rebuttal on behalf of pluralism, namely that “the lin-guistic” is a complex phenomenon with parts that belong to distinct ontologicalcategories. This shouldn’t surprise, since even “the mathematical” is like this:Two wholly physical dogs plus two other wholly physical dogs yields four dogs;there certainly is the mental operation of multiplying 26 by 84, the mental stateof thinking about the square root of 7, and so on (2014: 5).However, similarly to the result of thinking about the square root of 7, I do notbelieve this is analogy is rational. Mathematical reasoning does indeed involvemental operations, some physical examples (instantiations?) and the like but this isnot usually how people conceive of “the mathematical”.13 On the standard picture,mathematics is considered an abstract science. Mathematicians study mathematicalobjects and rules which often outstrip the physical and the mental. The processesinvolved in mathematical thinking are certainly within the realm of psychology, butthe fact that physical objects obey rules of arithmetic is not enough to hold arithmeticto physical characterisation. Does the question of how many dogs are in the union ofan infinite set of dogs and another infinite set of dogs receive a physical interpreta-tion? Stainton does acknowledge that natural languages display “interdependence”of these factors which perhaps “the mathematical” does not.The main argument against incompatibility is that it rests on an equivocation ofthe terms “mental”, “abstract” and even “physical”. Once the equivocation is clearedup, it is argued, hybrid ontological objects are licensed. Let us briefly consider thedifferent senses of these words proposed by Stainton. Physical1 is something likean object under the purview of the hard sciences such as physics. Weeds, defined asunwanted plants, would apparently not count. On an extensional physical2 defini-tion, weeds show up since they have spatio-temporal and other physical properties.Mental1 includes individual mental states such as pains and hallucinations. Mental2involves a specialised notion of secondary qualities conditioned by the mental butnot identifiable with mental items. Aspects of taste and perception are suggested asexamples of mental2. Stainton uses the term “mentally conditioned” to capture thiskind of mind-dependence. Lastly, he contrasts abstract objects qua Platonic objects,with what he calls “abstractish” objects, neither in the mind nor concrete particulars.Musical scores, models of cars and legislation form part of this latter category.
13Unless we say much more about the connection between the mental and the mathematical interms of either intuitionism or finitism etc. See Part III for a discussion of some of these issues.
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The argument goes that appreciating the physical2, mental2 and abstractish na-ture of natural language will absolve worries about ontological inconsistency. Con-sider some other members of this category of objects.
Indeed, our world is replete with such hybrid objects: psychocultural kinds(e.g. dining room tables, footwear, bonfires, people, sport fishing [...]; intellec-tual artifacts (college diplomas, drivers’ licenses, the Canadian dollar [...]; andinstitutions (MIT’s Department of Linguistics and Philosophy, Disneyworld [...](Stainton, 2014: 6).
I agree that such objects exist in all of the senses which Stainton describes butI think that there is something missing from the picture, something which breaksdown the analogy between natural languages and their abstractish cousins. Naturallanguages are characterised as rule-governed by most linguists. These rules mightbe inner mental or mental2 in nature but they also constitute types as per Postaland Katz’s views. Stainton agrees to this much, “it is types whose meaning is com-positional and systematic” (2014: 4). But types of this kind seem to have more incommon with mathematical theorems and objects than they do with ordinary abstrac-tish ones. This is not the place to go into detail here (see section 3.3 below and PartIII for a different approach). But suffice to say that one feature of the former and notthe latter objects is that there are uninstantiated types. There are sentences whichhave never been uttered, and thus are not physical2 and not obviously abstractish(again, see Part III for a way of capturing the observation that they are in somesense).14 It is misleading to define such a broad ontological category and throw lin-guistic objects in with ordinary (abstractish) objects, with either extensions in spaceand time or secondary qualities with such extensions, in this way. More needs tobe said about metaphysical hybrids and their potential subcategories before makingany methodological claims based on them.Furthermore, once the restricted domain of linguistics proper is reinstated, andwith it goes methodological pluralism, many of the compelling arguments for themetaphysical variety are diminished (such as those involving phonetics and phonol-ogy). There are many insights to be had on the pluralist account, many of which Ihope to retain, however I offer a distinct approach to the methodological aspects oflinguistics, one which is equally compatible with various views on its ontology. Thetask of the subsequent sections is to present and defend this view.
14If we follow conceptualism we would consider them to be mental2 though. This claim too isincorporated into the ontology presented in Part III.
Chapter 3Three Grades of MathematicalInvolvement
So far, we have seen a gradation (perhaps descent) of mathematical involvement inlinguistics or mathematisation as I have called it. In what follows, I hope to imposesome order and argue for sober methodological reflection on these issues. I shallapproach the mathematisation of linguistics via a strategy of identifying grades ofmathematical involvement for the grammars of linguistic theory, following a similarstrategy proffered for modality by Quine (1976). The hope is that this will providecompelling argument as to which grade offers the best home for linguistic theorywhile avoiding the pitfalls of both conceptualism and Platonism. With each grade afurther methodological burden is introduced. Importantly, however, as we shall see,this progession does not follow the traditional landscape of the debate in theoreticallinguistics. The first grade is not just another label for nominalism, grade two formentalism and so on. Although, the motivations behind Platonism seem to find agood place within the bounds of the third grade, this level of involvement by nomeans entails the Platonistic positions of Katz or Postal, as I hope to show. Oneway to think about the grades is that they represent a cluster of theories each withmore commitments (in terms of connections to the target system) than the last.Within the first grade of involvement, the mathematics involved in grammar con-struction is merely a helpful aid and not structurally or ontologically committing tothe target system. The first grade of involvement proposes a quasi-instrumentalistpicture of linguistic methodology (although this is not necessarily the case, see PartII.7 for a structural realist interpretation of linguistic modelling). On this account,grammars are indeed scientific in nature (á la Chomsky) but more akin to modelsthan theories (contra Chomsky). On the second grade, the mathematics is part of thelinguistic target system itself. Grammars are representational devices and directlyrepresented (cognised, known or embodied) by speakers of the language. They aretheories of linguistic competence. This view goes beyond mere modelling, for variousreasons I will show. For now though, it is enough to understand that this grade does
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impose systematic structural constraints on the reality which the grammar describes,in addition to material preservation and correspondence to internal mechanisms.Lastly, much like the previous grade, the third grade also holds that grammars aretheories. However, on this level of mathematisation, grammars are mathematical orformal theories on the level of set theory, arithmetic or universal algebra. In essence,the mathematics involved in various grammar formalisms are enough to establish thereality or existence of linguistic objects without further empirical consideration.1
Divorcing Methodology from OntologyPart of the reason behind the failure of previous accounts in the debate on thefoundations of linguistics is an over-emphasis on ontology. The problem has beendiagnosed elsewhere (George 1989, and more recently McDonald 2009). The idea isthat what determines the separation or subject matter of a discipline is not necessarilythe ontological status of its objects but rather its approach or methodology.For instance, in the section 2.2, we saw an argument from the ontology of sen-tences to the claim that linguistics is a formal science. Nevertheless, a linguist couldgrant that sentences are not located in space or time, and are therefore abstractobjects or types, without conceding the point that linguistics is mathematics. Thereason for this is that the question of with which discipline linguistics is aligned isnot necessarily a matter of ontology. It is at least in part a methodological question.In other words, how the abstract objects, i.e. sentences, are studied and employeddetermines the science, e.g. as abstract objects in themselves or as convenient the-oretical entities for scientific study. “It is not clear that having abstracta in thedomain of a science is sufficient to make a science formal and nonempirical” (Mc-Donald, 2009: 294). Put in another way (following George 1989), astronomy involvesattributing numbers to the planets, for instance there are nine planets in the solarsystem. In a sense, astronomy involves abstracta since numbers are abstract objects
1Yablo (2013) offers a related account of the three grades of mathematical involvement for scientificexplanation. Yablo’s three grades are roughly and respectively defined as follows: on grade one,mathematics has a descriptive role (something like the first grade on my view but more limited), ongrade two it has a structural role and on the third grade it has a substantive role. He attempts tocapture the substantive role in terms of a modal notion of extricability. We can think of extricabilityin terms of logical subtraction.Logical subtraction sometimes yields a well-defined remainder, surely. Snow is cold and white - Snowis cold = Snow is white, I assume. For a generalization to be lawlike is what remains of its being a law,when we bracket whether the generalization is true (Yablo, 2013: 1014).Scarlet is said to be perfectly inextricable from red (there is no logical remainder), congruence (oftriangles) is perfectly extricable from equality in size, and action is somewhat extricable from bodilymovement (it is evaluable in some worlds in which bodily movement does not hold and unevaluablein others). My grades, however, involve mental representation and other issues which are particularto the case of linguistics. Although inextricability is a useful means of capturing the claim of gradethree.
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but it is not concerned with abstract objects qua abstract objects as in mathemat-ics. Neither astronomers, nor linguistics (I will argue), are directly interested in theproperties of abstract objects but instead their concerns lie with how abstract objectsmight be related to natural phenomena or best model such phenomena, which is anempirical question (like the number of planets). George (1996) goes on to state thatmathematical entities (such as grammars) can be identified empirically. He statesthat “[i]f I want to know the trajectory of a particle, I am engaged in an empiricalinquiry whose goal is to identify a particular function” (George, 1996: 300). Simi-larly, identifying grammars is an empirical matter. I think that this perspective is toonarrow for a number of reasons, many of which will be discussed in Part II. For onething, it suggests a bottom-up perspective on scientific and linguistic investigation.However, in many cases mathematical entities (or models) were already developedindependently (such as Post canonical systems) and then applied to natural phe-nomena. Thus, the situation is more like using a particular function to model theempirical target of the trajectory of a particle or whatever. Nevertheless, George’sanalysis does suggest a useful perspective on the applied nature of linguistics andthe status of mathematical entities within this enterprise.Linsky and Zalta (1995) take the above suggestion further in claiming that ab-stract objects are not only a convenience for scientific theorising but a necessity.Their notion of abstract object is divorced from the usual Platonic concept but theidea remains that most sciences require some sort of abstract level of interpretation,whether it is the relatively benign use of numbers for characterisation in astronomy(and everywhere else) or the idea of species or types of animals in biology, abstractaof some sort seem to be a conceptual necessity (we will return to Linsky and Zaltaat the end of Part III).The above suggests that ontology is not the best way of capturing the uniquenessof linguistics or the Platonist claim that linguistics is a formal science. The grades ofinvolvement I discuss draw the lines on methodological grounds and not ontologicalones. This is not to say that my distinctions do not have any ontological conse-quences. In fact, such commitments are part of my caution concerning the secondand third grades of involvement. Firstly, I shall introduce an useful analogy for thedebate to follow.
Finding your way in New York CityLet us imagine that some person, let’s call him Kagiso, is planning a trip to NewYork City. Kagiso is the kind of traveller who enjoys consuming as much knowledgeabout a city before arriving as possible. Let us imagine further that he is on a budgetand would like to see as many places across the five boroughs as he can during hisvisit. Thus, he is particularly interested in getting around by means of the NewYork subway system. So, he directs all of his efforts to understanding it prior to hisarrival.
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Now, there are different aspects of the system which might be of interest to atraveller. Someone could want to know the average time it takes to get from onepoint in the system to another, which stations are closer to one another and whichroutes need to be taken to get to different stations. One could also be interested inwhat the subway trains are made of, how they achieve their maximum velocity, whatkind of mechanisms are involved in the braking system etc. One might say that theirare different grades of answers which Kagiso might aim for in his understanding ofthe transit system. There are some questions to which he might not be able to getany answers or may be of no interest to him.A convenient way of viewing the grades of involvement are along the lines of thefollowing train claims.
C1’ : Structures of the representational device (phone GPS, subway grid map,picture etc.) are isomorphic (or homomorphic) to the structures of the actualsubway system.C2’ : Structures of the representational device are ontologically committing orsubstance equivalent to the subway system, i.e. made of the same stuff.C3’ : Structures of the representational device include the actual mechanisms in-volved in the workings of the subway system (trains, sliding doors, ticketingetc.).
Now in terms of our example, Kagiso could be asking a number of kinds ofquestions relating to the claims above. For instance, he could want to know theaverage time it takes to get from Central Park in Manhattan and 81st (the NationalHistory Museum) to Flushing Avenue in Brooklyn. In terms of C1′ this would requiresome sort of map of the subway grid with a scale corresponding to real distances. Ifhe were interested in an answer along the lines of C2′, he might require a 3D modelof some sort (ideally made of the same substances as the real subway) as can befound at the New York Transit Museum (incidentally located in Brooklyn).2 Asking aquestion would then involve running a real world simulation and viewing the result.
C3 would require information about how the trains actually get from Manhattan toFlushing Avenue, i.e. the inner working of their electrical makeup corresponding tohow they traverse the system. C3′ might also involve the exact routes and paths(e.g. orange line, green line and how they connect) needed to get to and from theseplaces. In other words, C3′ requires a mapping between the distances of the stationsand the workings of the trains and routes in getting from one to the other whichcould include some physics or engineering information.There is of course a way of answering the question about the distances of thisroute and all the possible routes without recourse to any of the claims above. There
2See Weisberg (2013) for a discussion on how the large scale Bay Area Model of San Franscisoassisted scientists in rejecting the proposal to build a dam in the Bay Area.
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could be a graph which accurately represents the distances between all the stationsin the NYC subway system without respecting their “actual” routes, directions orinterconnections. This graph would not be a map in the normal sense, since youcouldn’t use it to find your way from one station to another. You could use it toaccurately know the distance from Central Park to Flushing Avenue or from anyplace in the five boroughs to any other (within the subway system). Similarly, if youwanted to know the average time from one station to the next. All that needs to bepreserved in this graph are the relative spatial and temporal relations between thestations and that structure is multiply realisable. For instance, getting to and fromour designated place in Manhattan to the place we specified in Brooklyn could (anddoes) involve changing lines. Our graphs would neglect this detail. Taking the ideaeven further, there could be a permutation of the transit system of New York suchthat if we map NYC stations to stations in, say, the Kiev metro system accordingto which we would preserve the distances between the stations and average timebetween them. Now consulting the graph specified (or the Kiev metro grid) will notgive us an answer in terms of C1′, C2′ or C3′ but it will indirectly track the spatialand temporal information (or structures) in which Kagiso might be interested, in thiscase distances and times (abstracting away from delays, commuter congestion etc.).I hope to show in section 3.1 that grammars operate in this indirect manner andprovide a wealth of information despite their indirectness.Specifically, the grades, I wish to propose, can be characterised in terms of thefollowing claims.
C1 : Structures of the grammars are isomorphic (or homomorphic) to the structuresof natural language (or the linguistic competence thereof), i.e. directly structurepreserving.C2 : Structures of the grammars are ontologically committing or material preserv-ing to/with the structures of natural language.C3 : Structures of the grammars track actual mechanisms involved in languageprocessing and comprehension.
The first grade of involvement is noncommittal on all of the above claims (butalso compatible with them). The second grade of involvement is committed to C1,
C2 and C3 while the third is only committed to C1 and C2. I will show that all ofthese claims (and thus the grades which are committed to them) are problematic inthe case of linguistics. I also hope to show that neutrality on these issues is a virtue.Notice that being a grade one advocate for the NYC subway system can yieldgenuinely useful insights. Kagiso will do fine in planning his trip with using a graphor map which only represents the distances, average time, and perhaps directions(maybe just a graph containing vectors) whether or not this graph actually sharesthe spatial relations of the system or its material makeup. Nor was his graph arrived
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at by magic. Such a representation could have been devised for various reasons,perhaps it involves a simpler representation than an isomorphic structure would door the pattern it uses is more user-friendly pictorially, perhaps Kagiso knows theKiev metro system better.Going according to the grades of involvement tells a story about mathematisationin linguistics in terms of how its practitioners treat their grammars. In other words,the grades track methodological claims rather than ontological ones but in so doingshed light on how the ontological claims developed from mere physicalism to abstractPlatonism.
3.1 The First Grade: Models and Linguistic Reality
There is a growing literature on the nature of scientific modelling in philosophy.Although the role of models and their connection to the scientific enterprise hasbeen much less explored than various acccounts of or against scientific realism or thedemarcation problem etc., modelling should be of particular interest to the linguistwho, I will argue, faces a similar task to the empirical scientist in attempting toaccount for a natural phenomenon fraught with complexity by means of smaller moretractable representations of it.Simply put, the first grade of involvement places our linguistic grammars at thelevel of scientific models. Their core aim is to capture salient features of linguisticreality, not necessarily to represent it in its entirety. This is achieved by variousabstractions and idealisations, one of which is the notion of a “generative grammar”for modelling linguistic creativity. But let’s not jump ahead. Perhaps unsurprisingly,this position is much less controversial within the computational linguistics literature.“It is clear that to the extent that linguistic theories, i.e. grammars, aim to capturehuman knowledge of language, these theories are formal models” (Tiede and Stout,2010: 147).When a computational linguist provides a stochastic model or attempts to rep-resent the next word in a grammatical chain as a finite Markov process, she is notnecessarily making a claim about how human beings actually parse expressions (i.e.the exact route and train between two stations in the subway system). The modelcould have other evaluative benefits, such as predictive capabilities or efficient pars-ing complexity. Similarly, the model could be implemented in machine translation orother natural language processing uses. Explanatory models too work for a numberof reasons in ways that do not correspond to adherence to C1, C2 or C3 above.I attempt to show this property of linguistic models or grammars in the followingsubsections.My argument is that not only do grammars genuinely share a number of propertieswith scientific models but also that the only way to maintain the conceptualist ap-proach of ascribing both infinity and a physicalist ontology to natural language is by
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accepting that grammars are formal models of a target system, in this case linguisticcompetence. However, as I mentioned before, this grade of involvement is technicallycompatible with both a nominalistic and Platonistic ontology, i.e. grammars could bemodelling idealised linguistic tokens, i.e. the output of linguistic competence (Devitt2006), or an abstract mind-independent linguistic reality (Katz 1981, Postal 2003).I will not take a stand on these issues here (see Part III for an ontological account).
What are models?So, what are models? And how do they relate to reality? One place to begin is byappreciating how modelling differs from other types of scientific theorising. The basicidea is that a model is an indirect representation of a target system or some aspectthereof, in this case natural language. The model bears certain resemblance relationsto the target system such that stipulations within the model reflect aspects of thetarget system. For Godfrey-Smith, “the modeler’s strategy is to gain understandingof a complex real-world system via an understanding of simpler, hypothetical systemthat resembles it in relevant respects” (2006: 726). My claim in this section is thata grammar is precisely this sort of device and therefore that linguists find themselvesin the modeller’s position with relation to natural language. By designing grammarswhich generate or constrain the grammatical output of a given language, linguistscreate small hypothetical systems which reflect or resemble structural descriptions ofthat language via rules that comprise the grammar. In this way, models, or grammarsin this case, are theoretical intermediaries.In order to see how this works, we should appreciate that mathematical mod-els are essentially abstractions. They are abstract objects. They are designed tosimplify a target system which otherwise would be too complex to approach scientifi-cally (i.e. precisely). They might have various aims, simplification is one, explanationmight be another, prediction yet another. Sometimes these aims can come apart. Inhis classical treatment of scientific modelling, Giere (1988) held that models wereidealised structures (or abstract objects) aimed at representation of the target sys-tem in the real world. As previously mentioned, these structures or model systemsbear resemblance relations to the target system. We might be interested in struc-tural relationships such as various morphisms to capture this resemblance as in C1(although Giere preferred a less formal account of the relation).3The above picture is related to the semantic view of scientific modelling (Suppes1960, van Fraasen 1980).4 Here the ambiguity of the term “model” is utilised. In
3However, another way to think of what a model is involves an analogy with fictional worlds,pretenses or ways that the world could have been (Frigg 2010). This view breaks down the connectionwith model theory in mathematics. In this way models are akin to the fictional worlds of SherlockHolmes or Luke Skywalker. Counterfactual analyses are also generally connected to the type ofrepresentation involved in modelling. For instance, Giere (1988) affirms that model systems aresystems which would be concrete if they were in fact real.4As opposed to the then popular “syntactic” accounts in which scientific theories were considered
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mathematical logic, a model is a set-theoretic entity with a domain of elements (oruniverse) and a relation which holds between those elements. “A model, basically,is a set of objects (and relations between them) that functions as an interpretingstructure for a set of sentences.” (Godfrey-Smith, 2006: 727). Suppes (1960) heldthat scientific models and the logician’s set-theoretic models were one in the same.It is, thus, possible to talk of “truth in a model” or under an interpretation. Ourscientific theories are then interpreted according to models with certain relationsand structures. The central concepts here are “truth” and “satisfiability” and thuswe might aim for a truth-preserving correspondence with the target system. So farwe might still be tempted to accept something like C1. If grammars as models aimfor truthful representation, then the target system might have to be beholden tothe structures posited by the grammar. I will show this not to be the case in thesubsection below.In the following discussion, however, we will follow the literature in conceivingof as models belonging to a heterogeneous class of objects which includes physicalmodels (used in biology and chemistry), scale models (used in engineering), compu-tational models (used in population studies and computer science more broadly) andmathematical models (used everywhere and especially linguistics). Mathematicalmodels, of which grammars are a proper subset, can be conveniently conceived of asabstract objects (whether they are set-theoretic, logical theories or fictional worlds).
Multiple Models: Against C1There are a few ways in which a model can respect C1 or direct structure preservation.Assuming a structure for the target system, we could require there to be a strongmorphism, such as an isomorphism or homomorphism, between the model and thetarget. But as Frigg (2010) notes “[i]n order to make sense of the notion that thereis a morphism between a model system and its target we have to assume that thetarget exemplifies a particular structure” (254). In Universal Algebra, morphisms aremappings between the relations and elements of formal algebras or structures.5 Thus,on this reading of C1 we are forced to attribute a structure to the target system, i.e.natural language. This, however, is an unavoidable prerequisite for the modellingprocess.The choice between structure mappings is also not arbitrary. Establishing anisomorphism places a much stronger constraint on the relationship between a modeland a target system than does a homomorphism or weak homomorphism, since anisomorphic relation requires a homomorphism and an inverse morphism.6 The point
to be consistent sets of sentences in formal languages (“theories” in the logical sense).5An algebra is a pair 〈A;Fi〉 such that A is a nonempty set called the carrier of A or the universeof A and F = 〈fi : i ∈ I〉 are the (indexed set of) basic operations on A which are functions definedon A.6If f is an isomorphism, f : A→ B, then there is an inverse morphism f−1 on f , g : B → A such
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is that some kinds of morphisms will place an added burden on the model in terms ofits relationship to the target system. For instance, if a strong morphism is required(such as an isomorphism), then all of the elements of the target system will haveto be interpreted into the target system in a structure preserving way. Comparethe structural relationship posited between two models connected by bisimulationin modal logic. In this case, the two models simply make the same modal formulastrue despite potentially diverging greatly in their internal makeup (the simplest caseinvolves a model with a one world cycle and a model with two worlds accessible toeach other).But standardly, as we have discussed above, models involve abstractions andomissions from the target system.7 Of course, we could have a circumscribed domainor in our case a proper subset of natural language, such as syntax, as a target. Inthis case we would need to establish an isomorphism between the model structuresand the syntactic structures of various natural language constructions. Again, thechoice of mappings becomes important.The considerations above point to conceiving of C1 as introducing a range ofrelationships between the model and the target system. On one side of the range,are the strong structure mappings and on the other rather weak equivalences. In allof the cases, the theorist or modeller is attempting to establish a correspondencebetween the structures of their models and the structures of the target system.The reason C1 often fails for models is due to one of the most common properties ofmodels, they are multiply realisable. This property goes in both directions. Differentmodels with different structures can be used to model the same phenomena and thesame model can be used to model different phenomena. In terms of the latter scenario,consider a mathematical model of a pendulum and an identical model of a certaincircuit.
The mathematical structures view seems committed to identifying both thependulum model and the model of the electrical circuit with the mathematicalstructure they have in common and, thus, to insisting that the pendulum modeland the model of the circuit are one and the same model (Thomson-Jones, 2012:768).
Similarly, C1 identifies grammars by their structural/mathematical properties.But one could conceive of the same aspect of a grammar modelling two distinctnatural language constructions (as in the pendulum and circuit case). Philosophersof science are wont to find additional means of model individuation. For Thomson-Jones (2012), models are constituted by sets of propositions. For Weisberg (2013),
that f · g = idB and g · d = idA where “id” is identity and “·” denotes function composition.7Hence the movement, in the philosophy of applied mathematics, to adopt partial morphismswhich allow for undefined elements from the model to the world (see Part II.6 for discussion of thesetechniques in semantics).
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the modeller’s construal of the model differentiates between models with the samestructures. Nevertheless, more than just structural equivalence is often needed todistinguish between models.More pertinent to the case of linguistics is the scenario in which the same phe-nomenon can be represented by multiple models with non-equivalent structures. Thisis the famous problem of equivalent grammar formalisms initially presented by Quine(1972). Take two weakly equivalent grammars, phrase-structure grammar and tree-substitution grammar, for instance. These two grammars generate the same sets ofsentences or in Quine’s terms are behaviourally equivalent. The problem is that sincethey are empirical adequate or generate the same sentences, there is no way of de-ciding which grammar is the correct description of the target (in Quine’s critique, thetarget would be mental states of language users). We will return to this problem insection 3.2 and a solution will be proposed in Part III. For now, it serves to questionthe need for a model or a grammar to respect anything as strong as the constraint onstructure preservation exemplified by C1. This is also not a merely theoretical worry.Recently, there have been a flurry of formal proofs of weak or expressive equivalenceof various syntactic formalisms such as tree adjoining grammar (Joshi), generalizedphrase structure (Pollard) and categorial grammar (Steedman). Furthermore, Chom-skyan syntax can also be shown to be equivalent to these formalisms (see Michaelis,2001; Mönnich, 2007).8There is another related worry stemming from the modelling literature. In Weis-berg (2007b), he discusses a particular kind of modelling strategy, namely multiplemodels idealisation. This practice involves constructing many connected but incom-patible models each of which focuses on one or more aspect of the target phenomenon.This strategy differs from other kinds of idealisation “in not expecting a single bestmodel to be generated” (Weisberg, 2007b: 646). Naturally, structure preservation orone-to-one correspondences are not appropriate within this practice. Since scientifictheories have diverse goals such as accuracy, simplicity, predictive power etc. and theconstruction of one model to fit all of these criteria necessarily involves “tradeoffs”,this approach offers the theorist a way of meeting all of these objectives separately.“If a theorist wants to achieve high degrees of generality, accuracy, precision, andsimplicity, she will need to construct multiple models” (Weisberg, 2007b: 647). Thispractice is common in climatology, ecology, biology and population studies.If we consider the various models used in the service of linguistic theory and aimedat natural language, this picture seems to further militate against strict adherenceto C1. Pragmatic models such as Stalnaker’s model of common-ground and theconversational context or Lewis’ scorekeeping in a language game are distinct fromoptimality theoretic formalisms of phonology and generative grammars for syntax.Even if we stick to the linguistics proper abstraction, generative enumerative syntax
8Or rather Stabler’s (1997) formalisation and interpretation of minimalist syntax has been shownto be equivalent to some of the above grammars.
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(based on proof-theory) and model-theoretic semantics (based on model-theory) em-body distinct mathematical properties and formalisms, yet they both serve to capturean interconnected part of linguistic reality. Within syntax alone, we could conceiveof the nested adequacy conditions of Chomsky (1965), mentioned in section 2.1, asmultiple models with distinct goals. Although these models might not be strictlyincompatible, there can be no notion of a structure preserving mapping (betweenmodel and target) when multiple models with distinct structures are being used tomodel a single target.Thus, the idea that models or grammars have to preserve the (assumed) structureof the target system through mappings or morphisms is too strict and not a necessarycondition on linguistic modelling.
Idealisation: Against C2In this section, we will see how the rejection of C2 or material preservation canrescue the conceptualist position from inconsistency. Let us return to the modellingprocess á la Weisberg.
Modeling [...] is the indirect theoretical investigation of a real world phe-nomenon using a model. This happens in three stages. In the first stage, atheorist constructs a model. In the second, she analyzes, refines, and further ar-ticulates the properties and dynamics of the model. Finally, in the third stage,she assesses the relationship between the model and the world if such an as-sessment is appropriate. If the model is sufficiently similar to the world, thenthe analysis of the model is also, indirectly, an analysis of the properties of thereal-world phenomenon (2007a: 209).
At stage three, however, scientists often do not associate similarity of their mod-els and the target system with “truth” or even approximately true descriptions. Forinstance, in biology, Fisher described a model of fictitious three-sex organisms toexplain the emergence of two-sex organisms involved in sexual reproduction (Weis-berg, 2007b: 223). In physics, Boyle’s law is usually explained by assuming that gasmolecules do not collide. This is not strictly true since low-pressure gases do collide.They do not tend to reflect the collisions in their behaviour with the result that thesecollisions are not admitted into the model (see Strevens (2007) for discussion). Andin linguistics, we are asked to consider an idealised linguistic community of speakersand hearers who know their language perfectly and are never error-prone (Chomsky1965).The tools of models are abstractions and idealisations of various sorts. Theseterms are sometimes used interchangeably in the literature (we will choose a side inPart II.4). The basic idea behind these techniques is simplicity or tractability. Ab-straction generally involves the removal of extraneous or superfluous material of the
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target system in the model. Idealisation sometimes additionally involves distortionsof the real world such as the cases mentioned above.The details of these strategies are not of particular importance at this stage.9However, there are some important features of idealisation which are relevant tothe discussion at hand. For one thing, it is not ontologically committing as per
C2, especially in the non-alethic cases (strictly false models). Fisher’s three-sexmodel does not commit the target system to the existence of three-sex organisms,nor does Boyle’s law commit the physical world to non-colliding gas molecules andimportantly nor does Chomsky’s model commit us to idealised speakers. Even moresimply, a physical model of DNA does not commit the structure of DNA to the specificdimensions or the material composition of the model, e.g. a metre in size and plasticor styrofoam in composition. Secondly, as previously mentioned, models need not bedirectly related to the target system under study. In economics, von Thünen proposeda model of an isolated state on fertile land cut-off from all communication and contactwith the outside world by a barren wilderness around its borders. Mäki claims thatthe false assumptions underlying this model serve the purpose of “neutralizing anumber of causally relevant factors by eliminating them or their efficacy” (2011: 50).Thus, actually true and causally relevant aspects of a real economy are removed fromthe model.In a similar fashion, grammars understood as models do not commit us to anyspecific ontology of natural languages. In the syntactic models of FLT, we treatsentences as sets of (uninterpreted) strings. This idealisation in no way commits usto natural language expressions being strings or sets of strings. In the semanticsliterature, meanings are designated by functional types. Meanings are not mathe-matical objects or functions in reality. Tiede and Stout (2010) go further in claimingthat we are not committed to natural languages being discretely infinite just be-cause recursion is a feature of our generative grammars.10 Discrete or denumerableinfinity is assumed or a “modelling choice” on their view (and mine). The featuresor properties of the target system which we want to represent in our grammars areproductivity, systematicity and conciseness. The first two properties are familiar fromthe literature on compositionality (presumably they would hold that this principle toois a modelling choice). The last property is assumed to prevent overgeneration ofgrammatical expressions.11Now it is clear to see how the conceptualist can have his cake and eat it too.
9For some details with relation to linguistics, see Part II and Nefdt (2016).10This is true for technical reasons as well, as recursion does not guarantee discrete/denumerableinfinity.11Here they borrow from Savitch (1993) who shows why we might assume that languages are(essentially) infinite despite having no evidence for them not being simply largely finite. Savitch’spaper is a formal attempt at capturing parsimony judgements in grammars, i.e. we treat finite sets asessentially infinite if this allows us to get simpler descriptions than we would if we treated them asfinite.
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The “core” property of linguistic creativity is modelled as discete infinity, the latterbeing the element of our models of natural language competence. Here we can freelyemploy idealisations such as sets of uninterpreted strings as sentences governed byrecursive rules. The target system, however, is not committed to the ontology of themodel, i.e. sets and functions etc. Therefore, the target system can still be a physicalobject or brain-states of individual language users.Postal (2009) addresses (and dismisses) this (or a related) possibility briefly. Heclaims that to understand “infinite generation” or recursion as idealisations of somesort is to illegitimately equivocate on the terms ‘idealisation’ and ‘recursive’. Asopposed to the idealisation of say a frictionless plane in physics, this idealisation ismore close to “one which claims the solar system has an infinity of planets” (2009:110). Postal deems such idealisations “silly”. However, I would argue that if suchan idealisation were useful to a physicist or astronomer or helped understand someother property of the solar system, then it would be a perfectly acceptable aspectof a model (statistical cosmology is full of such idealisation). See footnote 11 for areference and suggestion as to why an infinity assumption could be a simplifying toolfor a linguist even if the target system is in fact finite. In addition, physics aboundswith such idealisation. See the example of the thermodynamic limit in section 1.If we maintain a separation between models and linguistic reality, the formerbeing capable of the abstraction required for infinity statements and the latter beingcapable of physical description, then the conceptualist movement can be rescued fromalleged “incoherence”. See the figure below for an illustration of the current pictureof linguistic modelling (adapted from the general scientific picture in Giere 1988: 83).There are two salient relations here, the first is between the formal description ofthe grammar and the grammar as a model itself, i.e. recursive phrase-structure rulesor constraints on feature structures etc., and the second is between the grammar andthe target system which it needs to resemble in some way (the dashed line indicatesthat this resemblance relation is intentionally left vague).According to the above diagram, the formal descriptions of the grammar mightinvolve things like merge or recursion thus committing the grammar to discrete in-finity (or the capacity for such cardinality) but the target system is in no similarway committed. For example, in discussing the question of the size or cardinality ofnatural language(s), Langendoen (2010) claims that “from the fact that one’s gram-matical model is closed under such an operation [iterative or recursive operations], itdoes not follow that the language it models is” (2010: 140). This would require anadditional argument or proof.12Langendoen’s claim corresponds to the picture above in which the grammar aimsto resemble or model certain aspects of the target system, such as our ability toprocess and produce previously unheard utterances or the fact that there seems tobe non-arbitrary cut-off point for creating distinct expressions via repeated uses of
12Langendoen (2010) does, however, go on to attempt to offer such an argument.
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conjunction or adverbial modification. Importantly, this feature of the model does notimpose strict structural requirements on the target system as per C1. The resem-blance relation could go in both directions, bottom-up or top-down, but in neithercase does it commit the target system to formal features of the grammar in ontologyas in C2. Hence, there is no incoherence here and this picture is derived from a sim-ilar view suggested for the rest of the sciences. In addition, if we return to the ideaof “reverse-engineering” in the claim by Boeckx in section 1.3, we can appreciatethe error of mathematisation in a new light. Attempting such a “reverse-engineering”assumes that the formal features of the model, such as recursion, requires an onto-logical interpretation in the target system such as an account of its evolution withinthe language faculty.Grammars are abstract objects with an number of formal mathematical proper-ties, these properties do not necessarily pertain to their linguistic targets in anyontologically significant way.
Lewisian Modelling: Against C3Much like C1, a range is introduced by C3 which starts from tracking specific lin-guistic mechanisms to more general cognitive mechanism involved with language (butalso possibly other cognitive processes such as memory, movement, planning etc.). Itis not clear, however, that a grammar needs to track any mental happenings what-soever. The target of linguistic grammars could be outward linguistic behaviour orpatterns which emerge from communities of speakers. In a sense, the individual idi-olects (or I-languages) could determine the nature of these patterns, at least in part,but they could also be partly determined by external mechanisms such as linguisticconventions. Of course, different targets might in fact make different models desir-
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able. For instance, on the Lewis’ view, which will be discussed in this section, theexplanation of subsentential elements of the grammar is of ancillary importance. Aconceptualist might find such a view unappealing for this reason. In Part II.6. wewill see how this view can be modified to account for such elements.Before we discuss Lewis’ view which has held sway amongst philosophers oflanguage more so than theoretical linguists, let us briefly consider another exampleof how a model might not aim to track internal mechanisms responsible for production.A theorist might be interested in how people go about solving particular multiplicationproblems. There are two models which might be of interest here, standard “timestable” multiplication or the more complex binary multiplication. There could bevarious reasons for preferring one model to the other such as respective processingtimes. The algorithm for binary is the same as that of standard times table or decimalmultiplication but operates via three manoeuvres, namely 0×0 = 0, 1×0 = 0, and 1×
1 = 1. So in binary, you merely replace symbols with other symbols with no carryingover as in decimal multiplication. The results are inter-translatable. In a sensethen, it does not matter with which you choose to model arithmetic performances,since despite the different methods they turn out to be equivalent. In fact, mentalmultiplication might be “truly” captured by neither method. Nevertheless, the modelscould represent not only the results of such a mental calculation but other featuressuch as timing correlations or common error explanations. Therefore, the actualmechanisms involved in multiplication might be quite different from the structuresof the model and yet the model might indirectly correspond to those mechanismsnonetheless. In a sense, both methods exist at Marr’s first level of the descriptionof computational processes in which the function computed and the reasons why arestated. His second level states which algorithm actually computes the function (seefootnote 17 for more details). We will consider positive views against interpretinggrammars in terms of C3 in section 3.2 but for now, we can simply appreciate thatsuch a requirement seems unnecessary.Furthermore, with relation to C3 or the claim that grammars track actual mecha-nisms involved in natural language cognising, there is a compelling reason to thinkthat this is not necessary. Lewis (1975) offers an account of how human beings uselanguages, construed as abstract objects (or functions from sentences to intensions),which is in the spirit of the first grade of involvement presented in this section. ForLewis, languages are abstract objects or functions which assign meanings to setsof strings (sentences). A language is then utilised by a community of speakers ifand only if there is a convention in that community of truthfulness and trust in thatlanguage. The definitions of the terms are of no particular use to us here.In terms of Fig. 1, the reality which is being modelled is linguistic communication.The formal description is given in terms of functions and sets of sentences (a grammar)and the resemblance relation is provided by a notion of “convention” which allows fora given formal object (or grammar) and not another to model linguistic communicationaccurately.
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For an abstract language to be “realised” on this view, is for a community ofspeakers to possess a convention of some sort in that language. Sounds and sen-tences get their meanings relative to such a community of speakers and a meaningfunction (abstract language). However, there are a number of issues with taking anuncharitable reading of this proposal, i.e. taking it to be literally about the realisa-tion of nonspatio-temporal abstract objects in the real physical world. Some issuesare related to the specific six conditions placed on the notion of convention (seeGilbert (1989) for discussion). In terms of the dialectic of this chapter, one mightwonder how exactly this “realisation” relation is to be construed on a literal readingin which abstract objects are considered to be outside of the causal nexus. In otherwords, how does a community of actual speakers access a function from sentences tointensions or abstracta in the necessary way?On the modelling view, the above relation is unproblematic. On this account,languages are merely modelled as functions from sentences to intensions. Yalcin hasa similar interpretation in mind with relation to formal semantics.
Semantic theory is not interested in the semantic value of properties of theseabstract objects qua abstract objects. Rather, it is interested in an aspect ofthe question which of these abstract objects well-models what it is one knows,when one knows a language (2014: 36).
Yalcin goes on to remonstrate against Lewis’ impoverished notion of a language,especially its lack of the property of productivity (which he [Yalcin] considers tobe a central desideratum of semantic theory). I think that the reason for this isthat Lewis was rejecting C3-like reasoning and instead opting for an explanationof how a linguistic community uses or realises a public language (assigns meaningsto its sentences). Therefore, the model was impoverished or rather simplified forthis purpose and thus did not include additional properties such as productivity orsystematicity and the usual compositionality facts. As previously mentioned, there isa way to retrieve these properties within Lewis’ general framework and I will discussit in Part II.6.A caveat. I am attempting to describe the grades of mathematical involvement notin terms of natural languages directly but rather in terms of the grammars of linguistictheory. Of course, various ways of specifying the nature and role of grammars couldshed light on the ontology of natural languages themselves but as we saw, in thissection, this need not be the case. So what does Lewis have to say about grammars?In his earlier work on conventions, Lewis (1969) is non-committal about the spe-cific nature of grammars. He states that they should somehow be finitely specifiablebut infinitely capable, have a lexicon, and possess a generative as well as transforma-tional component (so as to distinguish natural from formal languages which possessthe latter in addition). He goes further in stating that grammars also need to as-sign interpretations to the set of generated grammatical sentences via compositional
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projection rules. In Lewis (1980), he opts for a more broadly construed sententialaccount which importantly casts doubt on C3.
I use the word ‘grammar’ in a broad sense. Else I could have found little tosay about our assigned topic. If it is to end by characterizing truth-in-English,a grammar must cover most of what has been called syntax, much of what hasbeen called semantics, and even part of the miscellany that has been calledpragmatics [...] You might insist that a good grammar should be suited to fit intopsycholinguistic theory that goes beyond our common knowledge and explainsthe inner mechanisms that make our practice possible. There is nothing wrongin principle with this ambitious goal, but I doubt that it is worthwhile to pursueit in our present state of knowledge (81).
This is compatible with grammars being scientific models (or abstract objects inGiere’s sense) aimed at representing only the class of linguistic objects or languagesusable by various communities (and a few innocuous extras). The grammars do notseem to specify linguistic competence or abstracta in the traditional sense or “innermechanisms” of language users, rather they specify functions that can describe ormodel the linguistic behaviour of language-using communities.Lewis’ position (as with my own) can be seen as a conciliatory intermediate po-sition between the two different ontologies mentioned in the previous sections.13 Ina sense, both positions, conceptualism and Platonism, are correct. They both tell apart of the story. Understanding the whole story involves appreciating how theseontologies connect with one another. If we appreciate a language as an abstractobject in the sense of it modelling the patterns of speakers/hearers, we can connectthe two ontologies. As Yalcin mentions, we are not interested in languages as ab-stract objects qua abstract objects but rather as formal tools for modelling linguisticbehaviour. So in this sense, a language is a formal object picked out by a linguisticcommunity by means of the finite rules of the grammar. It might be somewhat mis-leading to describe the view thusly. In the parlance of scientific modelling, a naturallanguage, which is an abstract object for Lewis, is used to model the particular lin-guistic conventions of a given community. Substitute Lewis’ language for grammar
13Despite strongly opposing Lewis’ view in print, Chomsky’s generative project can be charac-terised in a similar fashion to Lewis’ project defined here. Consider Pullum’s (1983: 449) remarks ongenerative grammar.
The discipline of generative grammar is founded on a crucial distinction between a language considered asa formally specified set of structurally described strings and a language considered as a behavioral repertoire.A grammar is by definition a membership specification for a language in the former sense. Chomsky has notprovided any new definition of the notion “grammar” that severs it from its essential function of specifyingthe membership of a language. Therefore I continue, as is normal in generative work, to use the theoreticalterm “language” for the set of strings (or string/structure pairs) defined by a grammar, and not for anythingill-defined such as the set of dispositions toward verbal responses that characterizes a particular languageuser.
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here and his languages for rule-governed linguistic behaviour or competence andyou have the first grade of involvement for linguistics.14By taking the scientific modelling route, as I have, we are also less bound by orsusceptible to the specific follies of Lewis’ account, in terms of specific conventionsand their realisations in linguistic communities or languages as abstract objects inthe strong ontological sense. Rather we are using models or grammars as toolsfor describing (predicting, reproducing etc.) representational systems which bearsome resemblance to the physical reality of natural language, be it mental or social.The Language is given to us by the formal grammar which in turn sheds light onthe Languages we use in our daily lives, in the construction of said grammar. Myposition allows for some neutrality on whether we are modelling mental processesor states or the behavioural output of public languages as in Lewis (1975). Wemight discover that the features of our models do track the internal mechanisms ofindividual language-users but this is by no means entailed by the modelling process.I will close this section by offering two reasons for why the conceptualist andthe Platonist might be reluctant to accept the first grade of involvement respectively.Firstly, as previously mentioned, the first grade does not entail any specific ontolog-ical position. It is perfectly compatible with our grammars modelling abstract objectsthemselves, theories (in the logical sense) or bee dances for that matter and not onlythe human mind/brain. Thus, it is a weaker claim than the conceptualist positionin this sense. I think that this is an advantage of the view but it might escape animportant aspect of the Chomskyan project, namely representationalism. I will returnto this point in the next section.Then, a Platonist might object that this story is all very well for generative gram-mars and denumerable infinity but the Vastness proof of Langendoen and Postal
14In fact, adherence to a strong interpretation of C3 can lead us astray in some cases. There isa school of thought which takes infinity or fixed cardinality not only to be a modelling choice, asin the previous section, but to be a feature of the particular mathematical model used in linguistictheory, namely Post canonical production systems. Thus, infinity is an artefact of the model. Itis obvious that not all the artefacts of models should receive interpretation in the target system.Especially if productivity facts can be captured by alternative formalisms which do not posit theputative property. For a specific example, Sampson (2001) criticises Chomsky’s problematic “unduepreoccupation with strings” in The Logical Structure of Linguistic Theory (1975). He points outthat treating the syntax via derivations of strings and sets of strings is an unnecessary detour whenphrase-structure grammars could be characterised with well-formedness conditions on trees directly.Furthermore, the derivational alternative forces certain untoward consequences.
Chomsky’s approach forces him to impose two quite arbitrary restrictions on phrase-structure rules,namely, that no rule may rewrite any symbol A as either the null string, or as a sequence including A.Both of these forbidden types of rule frequently seem appropriate in describing real language, and under thealternative view of phrase-structure grammars there is no objection to them (Sampson, 2001: 156).
In this case, the model has features that the real world does not. In many other cases, the targethas features which outstrip the models. Trying to find a home for every feature of the model as amechanism or constraint might turn out to be deeply problematic.
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shows that linguistic reality cannot be captured by such devices or models. Soour grammars (defined generatively) if indeed they were models, as I have argued,would not be serving the purpose for which they are intended, that is representingthe target system since they cannot even capture its totality. To the latter point, Iargue that the story I provided is completely compatible with model-theoretic ap-proaches to syntax (such as Generalised Phrase Structure Grammar, Head-DrivenPhrase Structure Grammar, Sign-Based Construction Grammar etc.) which do notpresume any upper-bound or fixed cardinality on the set (or “proper class”) of naturallanguages. In addition, our models might be modelling a denumerably infinite subsetof natural language and perhaps have no need to go beyond generative capabilities(see footnote 11 for a related strategy). All of these options and more are open toa theorist within this grade of involvement.15 Not to mention, the science of linguis-tics is accounted for in a way which is consonant with the natural sciences whileexplaining the formal aspects of grammars such as infinity and recursion in termscompatible with naturalism.
3.2 The Second Grade: Representational Realism
On the second grade of mathematical involvement, the linguistic rules and their var-ious posits (such as PRO, traces or copies depending on your generative persuasionetc.) of grammars are argued to have greater significance to the physical systemrepresented than indirect representation or modelling of some sort. Linguists some-times speak of the rules of a grammar being “internally represented” on this view.Chomsky (1986a: 243) describes a speaker “equiped with a grammar” as someonewho “internalizes a system of rules”. On the basis of such an internalisation of arule system R, the speaker’s linguistic behaviour can be explained or predicted bythe structure of R (i.e. C1). To glean how this level of involvement is starkly dif-ferent from the position described in the previous section, Pylyshyn is particularlyilluminating.
[D]espite the uncertainties, none of us doubted that what was at stake inall such claims was nothing less than an empirical hypothesis about how thingsreally were inside the head of a human cognizer. We knew that we were notspeaking metaphorically nor were we in some abstract way describing the formof the data. (1991, 232)
We can see from this quote that the second grade of involvement, or “represen-tational realism” as Pylyshyn calls it, is a much stronger claim than first grade.Grammars, on this view, are really like scientific theories and their posits are of thesame nature as atoms and quarks are in physical theory, that is actual features of
15Part II will explore the fecundity of this idea more fully.
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the physical system. If a grammar posits a mechanism of wh-movement or a recursiverule like adjectival modification (AP bar in X-bar theory), then these are featuresof a language user’s actual brain-state when parsing these structures. This is inline with some form of C3 set out at the beginning of this chapter. The claim thatlinguistics will eventually be subsumed by biology or neuroscience seems less vagueon a second grade of involvement understanding.It is important to pause here to consider the difference between theories andmodels again. In the previous section, I took models to be indirect representationsof a target system. The mathematical structures involved in the building of modelsor grammars did not necessarily reflect any structural features of the target systemin kind. For instance, positing recursive elements in the grammar only modellediterative constructions in natural language indirectly, therefore I held that naturallanguage did not need to be committed to recursion. In fact, the move within gener-ative grammar from the recursive structures of Post-canonical systems to the singleset-theoretic merge operation is evidence of the fact that recursion is an aspect ofthe models or grammars which can change without the target system changing (pre-sumably language didn’t change when linguists moved from the Extended StandardTheory to Minimalism). Scientific theories, on the other hand, represent the targetsystem or natural world directly. In other words, scientific theories tell us whatthere is in the world. If grammars are scientific theories, then the structures andposits within them are claimed to be actual features of natural language. On thisview, recursion and infinity are aspects of natural language competence and indeedconceptualists often speak this way (as in the many examples shown in section 1.3).Such an interpretation of the role of grammars naturally lends itself to analogieswith mathematical cognition which presumably involves similar structures. For in-stance, if merge is an evolutionary mutation, it cannot merely be a formal aspect ofa model. In order for this claim to even begin to make sense, it has to be assumed tobe a claim about actual features of linguistic competence or reality posited by thegrammar. Thus grammars preserve the very structures of linguistic reality and thesecond grade of involvement is committed to some version C1 as well as C3 (we willsee how it is committed to C2 in section 3.2 below).Evans (1981) would find himself on this grade of involvement, in my view. Inresponse to a criticism (initially levelled at Chomsky by Quine (1972)) that weaklyequivalent grammars (mentioned in section 3.1, with different internal structures butequivalent behavioural output) pose a problem for representational realism, Evans of-fers a dispositional account of tacit (semantic) knowledge. Tacit knowledge for Evansis inferentially insulated (“not even potentially at the service of any other projectof the agent” (1981: 339)). The important aspect of Evans’ dispositional account isthat it has an empirical, testable component. Two weakly equivalent grammars createdistinct dispositions, ones which have distinct explanatory power.16 In other words,
16Evans argues that given two weakly equivalent systems, one containing axioms or primitives and
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there are ways in which we can divine which grammars are “internally represented”by an agent on the basis of certain dispositions elicited by the structures or positsof the grammar.17 Accounts such as this one were part of the motivation behindearly psycholinguistics. However, the failure of hypotheses such as the derivationaltheory of complexity or the claim that “the complexity of a sentence is measuredby the number of grammatical rules employed in its derivation” (Fodor, Bever andGarrett, 1974: 319), showed that this project was not the sought-after evidence forrepresentational realism. In fact, as Devitt (2006) notes, even when there is somepositive evidence for posits of a grammar such as constituent structure (like in thefamous “click location” experiment), this offers no proof of the psychological reality ofthe rules unless we presuppose the truth of the second grade involvement (represen-tational realism or Devitt’s Representational Thesis (RT)). These experiments couldshow no more than that competence respects certain structural posits of our gram-mars (Devitt’s minimal position M). Fodor et al. themselves could not find any placefor internalised grammar rules in actual parsing, “[t]here exists no suggestions abouthow a generative grammar might be concretely employed as a sentence recognizerin a psychologically plausible model” (1974: 75).The interesting fact about psycholinguistic or physiological evidence is that itplays no real role in grammar construction. The primary data for the grammar onthe second grade tend to be native speaker judgements (as discussed in 2.1. above).Since Fodor et al. (1974), there has been a lot of research conducted on psychologi-cal and biological effects and interactions in language production and comprehension.For instance, Cowart (1989b) discovered that familial handedness can have an effecton grammaticality judgements involving subjacency. “[R]ight-handed speakers with-out left-handed relatives are more sensitive to subjacency violations (rate them asless grammatical) than right-handers that have lefthanded relatives” (Keller, 1998:7). If linguists were indeed in the business of developing grammars qua scientific
another containing composition rules and constituents, the former unlike the latter will be unable topredict the human speaker’s ability to understand previously unheard or novel sentences. However,the dispositional account notoriously suffers from philosophical rule-following problems. See Kripke(1982).17Evans’ position has been developed by Peacocke (1986, 1989) and Davies (1987) to involve alevel 1.5 between Marr’s first and second levels of the description of computational psychologicalprocesses. The first level is the computational one which specifies the goals and reasons for thecomputation. The next level is the algorithmic level in which the nature of the computation is specified,i.e. how it proceeds and is represented. The last level is the level of implementation which specifiesthe physical realisation of the computation. Marr himself held that the competence-performance dividemirrored the computational and algorithmic distinction (and that critics mistakenly take Chomsky’sinternalised grammar rules to be at the algorithmic level). Peacocke claims that level 1.5 “states theinformation on which the algorithm draws” (1986: 101). This level allows us to be agnostic about theexact algorithm employed in natural language cognising while still offering a way of capturing theclaim that grammar is concerned with individual psychology. For this reason, I think that this levelbelongs in the first grade of involvement which similarly avoids commitment to C3 and the range itintroduces (between Marr’s levels 2 and 3).
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theories of I-languages or brain-states, then such data would surely be relevant tothe task. Yet this and other types of physiological evidence seems to have no placein the grammars of the second grade.18 This is related to an argument presented inSoames (1984) to the effect that linguistics and psychology are empirically divergentor they require different sets of evidence for confirmation of their theories.The problem is that representational realism (strong C3), and the second gradeof mathematical involvement generally, confuses the nature of a grammar. In ad-dition, this confusion has led to undue mathematisation of the object of linguisticinquiry. Grammars are abstract objects, mathematical entities or models as I arguedin the previous section. These tools are distinct from what George (1989) calls “psy-chogrammars”, or “the mental state of knowing a grammar” (91). By appreciating thisdistinction, one can appreciate that grammars tell us nothing about mental processesor how those processes are implemented in a physical system like the human brain(the job of “physiogrammars”).
It is often claimed that being in such a mental state involves mentally rep-resenting the grammar. This claim is compatible with the grammar being silentas to the nature of these mental representations. Indeed, the grammar is notitself a characterization of a system of mental representation; it is the object ofa speaker’s knowledge, not a description of how that object is represented bythe speaker (if it is) (George, 1989: 91).
Even if we do accept this grade of involvement and its representational realism,we are still left in some confusion as to the biological underpinings of the movementor in George’s terms how we have any traction on the physiogrammar. This is thePostal problem of how the features of the grammars which involve sets, sentence typesand discrete infinity are supposed to be captured by a physical biological systemlike a brain-state. In section 3.1. I offered a coherent picture of this relationship interms of models and their idealisations. I also suggested that Chomskyans would bereluctant to accept this picture. The reason for this reluctance is that I believe thatthey have a stronger structural connection in mind, a combination of C1 and C3, asevinced by their adherence to representational realism, which takes the rules andposits of the grammars to be structurally committing and thus actual structures ofthe mind/brain of language users used during processing. In order to capture thestructural and representational nature of the second grade, the more apt analogyseems then to be something along the lines of a measurement-theoretic account.
Grade 2.5Measure theory in mathematics is the study of how numbers are systematicallyassigned to physical phenomona. The standard example is temperature. Numbers
18I thank Geoff Pullum for drawing my attention to this research and general point.
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are assigned to measure the temperature of various physical systems/environments.Different measurement systems can be systematically mapped onto one another. Inthis case, Fahrenheit and Celsius metrics are related in a structure preserving way.More technically, in analysis, a measure is a function that assigns a non-negativereal number to each of the subsets of a certain set. The function assigns 0 to theempty set and is additive (larger subsets are composed of smaller ones). For example,in algebraic topology, the Euler characteristic is a number assigned to the structureof a topological space that is invariant under various ways that the space is bentor curved. Once more, the Euler number is assigned to objects in systematic way,so that, for instance, all Platonic solids have the same number (i.e. 2) as a sphere(because they can be reshaped into a sphere).An approach with similar aims (but a distinct history) can be found in the measurement-theoretic accounts of cognitive psychology and the philosophy of mind.19 Johnson(2015) proffers precisely this sort of analysis for generative grammar (in the spirit ofSuppes 1960 and specifically Matthews 2007). It must be noted that measure theoryin mathematics (involving σ-algebras) is distinct from the representational measure-ment theory often discussed in psychology and the philosophy thereof. One aspectof this distinction is that in the latter types of accounts two theorems need to beproven, (1) the representation theorem and (2) the uniqueness theorem. (1) ensuresthat the model can be numerically represented in a way that preserves structure (amapping or homomorphism from aspects of linguistic competence to sets in our case).While (2) specifies the unique set of numerical representations that satisfies the for-mer theorem (the exact measure function). Johnson argues that the Quinian problemof extensionally equivalent grammars is actually a virtue in light of a measurement-theoretic analysis of generative grammar. In the same way that invariance plays arole in topology, the structures that are equivalent according to various grammarformalisms can be taken as invariant and anything outside of this is considered tobe extraneous artefacts of the theories in question. This is the notion of ‘notationalvariants’ discussed in Chomsky (1972) and Chomsky (2000). Johnson describes it as“two theories (formal grammars, etc.) are notational variants iff they are empiricallyequivalent, in the sense that [...] ‘they do not differ in their empirical consequences”’(2015: 163).He goes on to claim that this notion should play a more significant role in iden-tifying symmetries in linguistic theory and thus the meaningful or real empiricalcontent of various theories or grammars, i.e. distinguish between the empirically rel-evant and the ‘merely artifactual additional’ structure. Importantly for our purposes,the Postal problem is not legitimate in the context of measurement theory. It wouldbe absurd to ask whether numbers were “inside” or part of temperature or thermome-ters, or length measurements of physical objects for that matter. When we measuretemperature, we are not committed to the existence of numbers even if they are used
19For an historical overview, see Diez 1997a and 1997b.
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in the service of its measurement. In addition, measurement theory could deliver usfrom commitment to C2, since the mathematical apparatus involved in grammars suchas sets are not part of the target system in any ontologically committing way. Inthis view, measurement is a type of modelling.20If this analogy is indeed appropriate, then we can start to understand state-ments like the following (often misquoted) one made by Chomsky (in the context ofa discussion about Goodman):
“We don’t have sets in our heads. So you have to know that when we developa theory about our thinking, about our computation, internal processing and soon in terms of sets, that it’s going to have to be translated into some terms thatare neurologically realizable [...] if we want a productive theory-constructive[effort], we’re going to have to relax our stringent criteria and accept things thatwe know don’t make any sense, and hope that some day somebody will makesome sense of them - like sets” (Chomsky, 2012: 91).
A fully-fledged measurement theory for linguistics will supposedly show exactlyhow sets can be mapped uniquely and systematically onto the structures of natu-ral languages as physical systems. The dual requirement of a representation anduniqueness theorem helps to distinguish between this grade and the first described inthe previous section. The models or theories of the second grade of involvement area special class of the general type and place restrictions such as accurate structure-preserving descriptions and morphisms on the relationship between the model andits target system.One of Chomsky’s staunchest critics, Christina Behme, admits to the coherence ofsuch accounts for a notion of mathematical modelling in physical systems. But sheadds that such a story is not available for a Chomskyan concept of I-language since“there is currently no proposal providing a systematic correspondence between neu-rophysiological structures in the brain and the elements of the set-theoretic linguisticmodel” (Behme, 2015: 33). So the problem is that there is nothing resembling eitherthe representation theorem or the uniqueness theorem for linguistics currently on of-fer. Hence Chomsky’s hopeful statement above. Even Johnson admits that realisationof measurement theory in linguistics is some way off but he holds that the first stepsin terms of fragments of linguistic theory can be amenable to such analysis such as“merge” (see Johnson (2015) for details). A stronger sentiment is found in Soames(1984) when he argues for the “empirical divergence” of linguistic theory from cog-nitive psychology (and, one can assume, neurophysiology by similar reasoning).21The claim is that the formal structures of grammars are not likely to be isomorphicto the internal structures of the mind/brain, nor should we expect them to be (here
20See van den Bogaard (1999) for a development of this idea.21He also argues for “conceptual distinctness” or the claim that linguistics and cognitive science“are concerned with different domains, make different claims and are established by different means”(Soames, 1984: 155).
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conceptual distinctness comes in, see footnote 21). In fact, as we glean from Fodor etal. (1974) the rules of the grammars tend not to be reflected in psychological realityand from the Cowart case, they also tend not to involve physiological considerations.The grammar itself is agnostic with relation to the structures of the psychogrammarsand their corresponding physiogrammars.Furthermore, there is a question of what exactly is being “measured” in linguistics.In the hard sciences, there are obvious candidates for such measurements such astemperature, length, mass, spin etc. In linguistics it is not as obvious what is beingmeasured, if anything. Johnson (2007: 384) claims that “[m]easurements in linguisticstypically are not quantitative, but instead concern such things as the grammaticalityor acceptability of a sentence, its sound and meaning, etc.” This might very wellbe the case but such measurements are not necessarily malleable in the same wayas quantitative measurements are. For instance, the acceptability of a sentence isnot a fixed feature, it varies empirically with each individual speaker. He goes on tosay that “[t]hese measurements are used to reveal and explore various patterns thatexist within various interestingly clustered sets of sentences”. But once again, thefeatures involved in linguistics are not statically presented but heavily influenced bycontext. Measurement within a controlled experiment in physics might yield usefulresults which can be extrapolated outside of these conditions but such controlledexperiments in linguistics with grammaticality judgements, for example, have led toserious challenges. The dynamic turn in syntax and semantics is testament to thefailure of linguistic isolation or static conceptions. The grammaticality of a sentencecan change or shift when context is added often resulting in the evaporation ofanomalies even as strong as category mistakes. Consider the pair, (1)*I’m the saladand (2) No no he was the turkey club, I’m the salad.For Johnson, a linguist measures the linguistic properties of a sentence, for in-stance, when she categorises its subject NP as an agent and so on. This claimis somewhat out of sync with measurement theoretic analyses which generally dealwith magnitudes or quantities. The latter are properties which involve gradationand comparison, such as the properties of being tall or being fast.22 Propertiessuch as being an NP or being an Agent have no such quantities and thus cannot becompared or measured in the same ways. Lastly, even if a measurement theoretic ac-count were viable, it would still involve only the psychogrammar and physiogrammaras relata. Assuming the abstract grammar rules (involving merge and other devices)would somehow map onto physical structures is committing the confusion mentionedabove in the context of George (1989).In many ways, a measurement-theoretic analysis induces more questions than itprovides solutions for in generative linguistics. This makes it not only more prob-lematic but also more complex in light of simpler accounts such as the one provided
22The work on gradable adjectives is one case in which measurement theoretic modelling in thegrade one sense of involvement has been quite fruitful.
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in the previous section. Much more work needs to be done to render this a viableinterpretation of the generative programme or its use of discrete mathematical tools.Thus, C3 is still not viable at this stage.
The Problem with Core GrammarLastly, the purported adherence to C2 of this grade of involvement needs to be ad-dressed. In the section 3.1, we saw how assuming material preservation or substanceequivalence between models and their targets is not necessary. Idealisations, false-models, even measurement models are all counterexamples to the claim that it is. Yeton the second grade of involvement, there is a position which seems to incorporate anaspect of C2. In section 1, within the broader context of linguistic mathematisation,I quoted Hinzen and Uriagereka as stating that “the processes described by gener-ative grammar are functions computed over physical symbols by a Turing machineimplemented in the human brain” (2006: 71).In my view, statements of the above nature (frequent across the generative linguis-tics literature) are aimed at a specific concept within the second grade of involvementcalled “core grammar”. As Pullum (1983) describes the posit,
Chomsky does not assume that the grammars actually internalized by hu-mans are (necessarily) defined as possible by universal grammar (UG). A basic“core” defined by UG is involved, but there is also a “marked periphery” of addi-tional special constructions and exceptional cases that are learned on the basisof experience and not shaped in the same way by UG (448).
This proposal relies on the much maligned competence-performance distinctioninitially presented in Chomsky (1965). The idea is that competence is constitutedby a generative grammar and indeed represented in the mind of the speaker. How-ever, what psycholinguistic experiments are sometimes tracking are the heuristic andstochastic devices responsible for immediate parsing and performance needs (algo-rithms in George (1989)) hence the empirical divergence. One way to think of therelationship between the two systems is that the performance system checks itselfon the competence grammar as it processes language in real-time. Think of the com-petence grammar as the generative grammar box situated somewhere in the mind,around it are the various quick-fire linguistic responses to external stimuli. The boxis responsible for checking whether or not a given input is well-formed. When weproduce and interpret sentences on the fly, we generally do not rely on this box. Butupon reflection we often consult it to “check” whether or not a given string of wordsis in fact grammatical (hence the divergence between grammaticality and acceptabil-ity judgements). The idea stems from the notion of “core grammar” as opposed to“peripheral mechanisms” in early generative syntax. To lend some credence to thisidea, at the beginning of Aspects, Chomsky seemed to base his idealisation of thetrue subject matter of linguistic theory on precisely this distinction (i.e. an idealised
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speaker-hearer in a homogeneous speech community with perfect knowledge of herlanguage and immune from the vagaries of memory limitations and the like). AsStabler notes,
The linguistic idealization is apparently grounded in the empirical assump-tion that the mechanisms responsible for determining how phrases are formedin human languages are relatively independent of those involved in determiningmemory limitations, mistakes, attention shifts, and so on (2011, 70).
This is all very well. But the concept of a “core grammar” has never been preciselylaid out in the literature nor has its separation from peripheral mechanisms. AsPullum notes, “it is not clear whether the word “grammar” should be replaced by“core grammar” at the appropriate points. Nor is it clear to me what difference itwould make” (1983: 449). If we are to follow a traditional competence-performancedivide, we run into infamous problems. For one thing, it is not clear that the linebetween ideal competence and actual performance can be drawn as sharply as itis suggested here. Various aspects of performance have been shown to be highlysystematic and context has been argued to have a significant effect on grammaticalityor acceptability judgements (see Jackendoff 2002, Cann et al. 2012, Baggio et al.2012). Furthermore, the assumption of domain specificity (which comes with thecompetence-performance divide) cannot go unchecked. In fact, some FMRI studieshave challenged this classical architecture of the brain-areas associated with specificfunctions of language (see Binder et al. 1997 for one such study). In addition, evenwith this distinction in place, we still do not have much traction on the physiologicalor biological aspects of the grammar, i.e. why this competence constitutes an I-language or brain-state when neurophysiological data seems to be irrelevant to itsdescription (e.g. the objection raised above in the handed subjacency case).The problem for the second grade of mathematical involvement is that in theabsence of any evidence of the psychological or neurophysiological correspondencerequired for a measurement-theoretic analysis (or something like it) or a precisenotion of “core” mechanisms, the success of its grammars as scientific theories isunclear. Moreover, it conflates different conceptions of grammar such as the abstractgrammar (what I identified with a model in the previous section) and the psychogram-mar (involving mental representation). I tend to side with Higginbotham (1991: 559)in stating that at the current level of scientific knowledge in linguistics, the secondgrade of mathematical involvement of grammars is not indefensible but rather inartic-ulate, taking C1, C2 and C3 along with it. I go a step further, however, in claimingthat it is therefore an unsound methodological position in light of better options,such as the first grade of involvement. I think that Katz (1981), Postal (2003, 2009)proceed in a similar fashion. The difference is that they offer something along thelines of what I shall call the third grade of mathematical involvement for grammars asa more sound footing for the foundations of linguistics. In the next section, I evaluate
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this possibility and find it no more satisfying on methodological and philosophicalgrounds than the second grade but with an increased epistemological burden.
3.3 The Third Grade: Grammars as Mathematical The-ories
So far we have been trying to characterise the nature of the linguistic enterpriseaccording to the mathematical involvement of its grammars. Along the way we metwith Postal’s challenge (2003, 2009) of trying to reconcile (1) the physical biologicalaspect of natural language (or the empirical scientific status of linguistics) with (2) theformal aspect of its description. In 3.1. I argued that this can be done successfully.However, my view took no essential position on the ontology of natural languageand thus could be compatible with something other than (1). For those who holdsomething like (1), the second grade of involvement (the topic of the previous section)was the next natural step. However, on that grade, I argued, it is not clear how to meetPostal’s challenge among other things (at least as the view currently stands). There isstill another option available to those interested in a coherent ontology for linguistics.This option takes the form of rejecting (1) outright and placing (2) at the forefront ofthe linguistic agenda.23 So the third grade of mathematical involvement for grammarsplaces linguistics at the level of a formal science. Importantly, however, I hope toshow that this position is not exhaustively captured by the linguistic Platonism ofsection 3.2. and specifically does not necessarily entail its ontology.A grammar, on this grade, is also viewed as a scientific theory but of a specifickind, namely a mathematical theory. The modelling picture of 3.1 (and Fig. 1) isthus truncated and the formal descriptions of the grammar, such as the proof systemsfamiliar from mathematical logic literature along the lines of the Post canonicalsystem of section 1.3, specify linguistic reality directly. Another way to put thisis that the structural relation between the grammar and the target, as per C1, isidentity. On this view, grammar construction involves intuiting or deducing aspectsof an abstract linguistic reality in similar fashion to proof construction in logic ormathematics.On this grade of involvement, in order to describe or explain certain (constitutive)properties of natural languages at the appropriate level of abstraction (types in lieuof tokens) such as recursion or infinity, mathematics is not only structurally necessaryas in C1 but also materially so as in C2 since both the grammar and the target areequally abstract.My argument against this construal of the relationship between mathematics and
23This is not to say that proponents of this view deny the psychological or physiological aspectsof natural languages. Rather they argue that linguistics proper does not concern such things. Thoseaspects are more relevant to pyscholinguistics or neuroscience.
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linguistics takes two forms. On the one hand, I will argue for a methodologicaldistinction between linguistic and mathematical theorising. On the other hand, Iwill argue that even if this latter objection can be overcome, the third grade ofmathematical involvement still does not entail linguistic Platonism, since interpretinglinguistics as a formal science opens up myriad possibilities within the foundationsof mathematics.Methodological distinctness might seem obvious to some. It might be argued thatit is clear that linguistics does not make similar claims to mathematics nor use similarmethods to establish those claims, namely a priori methods. Linguistic grammars areconcerned with natural languages, use empirical data and are thus scientific theories(or models) not formal ones. However, doing this might be begging the questionagainst the Platonist or the adherent of a third grade of involvement story (notidentical to the Platonist) as I have represented them here. In addition, assumptionsabout empirical correspondence can lead us astray as in the second grade examplesof the previous section between linguistics and cognitive psychology. The Platonistclaim is precisely that natural languages are abstract in the same sense as naturalnumbers are, linguistic claims are true of an objective (necessary) acausal realityand grammars are proof systems or mathematical theories describing properties andrelations of this reality.24One reason for the methodological discrepancy between linguistics and mathe-matics could be that linguistics certainly seems to use mathematical tools in iden-tifying the properties of its objects (as do many sciences) but it does not seem tomathematically define the objects of its inquiry or rather use mathematical methods.Or as I have argued in section 3.1, linguists are interested in grammars conceived ofas abstract objects but not qua abstract objects. In mathematics, once you stipulateor prove the consistency or necessity of an object, its existence follows (considerrestricted comprehension or ‘separation’ in ZFC set theory). In linguistics, simplyfinding a consistent set of rules is not enough. These rules have to model the struc-tures of real-world languages or linguistic competence, i.e. contingent facts. Thefields of mathematics and linguistics are thus methodologically distinct.Of course, a theorist on this grade of involvement could accept all (or most) of thisreasoning and still maintain that linguistics is a formal science of a slightly differentorder. Katz (1981) anticipates some objections similar to the ones I have raised above.
24If linguistics and mathematics were truly methodologically indistinct, then we would expectcertain questions in the philosophy of mathematical practice to be relevant to linguistics, but theyare not. Azzouni (2005) discusses three explananda of mathematical practice that seem to have noanalogue in linguistics. It is there argued that any account of mathematical proof needs to explainconformity (general agreement on results), phenomenology (“aha moments” in maths) and conservativeformalizability, as Azzouni puts it, “the success of the Principia Mathematica program of Russell andWhitehead exhibited, among other things, the conservative formalizability of classical mathematics,as it then existed” (2005: 153). However, although all of these properties are questionable in thecase of linguistics, it is unclear whether they are any less so in contemporary mathematical practice.
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He holds that there is a “single faculty of intuition” responsible for competences ofdifferent a priori areas of knowledge and the varying abstract objects under theirrespective remits. As for the connection between linguistics and mathematics, he hasthe following to say.
It may be said, for example, that the practice of the grammarian and the math-ematician are dissimilar in that the working mathematician, unlike the workinggrammarian, does not spend large amounts of time soliciting and collecting in-tuitions. Conversely, the grammarian does not make extensive use of formaldeductive procedures (Katz, 1981: 215).For Katz, this is all just a matter of degree and the comparatively short history oflinguistics. Comparing linguistics as it is today (or in the 80’s) to mathematics as itis today is like comparing logic in the time of Aristotle to contemporary mathematicallogic. Eventually as the science progresses, we will rely on intuition gathering lessfrequently. It is interesting to see a parallel here with Chomsky’s hope for the futurein the previous section. As for the lack of deductive procedures, he argues, that this ismisleading. If we are talking about the proofs within metatheory (about systems) suchas soundness, completeness, incompleteness etc. then linguistics indeed does notinvolve too much mathematics of this kind (with the notable exception of the Vastnessproof mentioned in 2.2.). If, however, we are talking about first-order theories orproofs then there is an analogue in linguistics. The derivations of our Post canonicalsystems or generative grammars are such devices and these are ubiquitous. Onceagain, he thinks that the metatheory will also come along as more formalisation (orrather mathematisation) occurs in the study of natural language (a prerequisite formetatheory in formal systems).I think that this is an interesting idea, even if it is speculative at best. Certainly,the history of geometry have shown a progression from concern with physical spatialintuitions and with the rise of non-Euclidean geometry in the 19th century culmi-nating in the Hilbert programme in the 20th, to an abstract science not essentiallyinformed by real-world constraints. I am not sure, however, how to imagine a similarscenario with relation to natural language in which linguistic intuitions no longerplay any definitive role in grammar construction.What underlies the methodological distinctness claim in my view is another con-fusion in terms of the nature of grammars which relates back to George’s (1989)characterisation. In the previous section, on the previous grade of involvement,grammars as models or abstract objects were confused with psychogrammars andthe physiogrammars which underlie them. On this grade of involvement, grammarsare confused with the abstract objects themselves. As mentioned in section 3.1, weare not interested in grammars as abstract objects qua abstract objects but ratheras abstract objects qua models of linguistic phenomena.This is my case for the methodological separation of mathematics and linguistics(I will pick this up again in Part III within a more ontological setting). We can now
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move on to the second part of the argument, namely that even if we do accept thethird grade of mathematical involvement for the grammars of natural language, thisin itself does not entail linguistic Platonism as I have described it in 2.2.The reason is that the third grade of involvement, the claim that linguistics is aformal science akin to logic or mathematics (but perhaps not identical), does not nec-essarily entail the existence of abstract mind-independent objects. The philosophyof mathematics offers many different approaches to the ontology and interpretation ofmathematics including nominalism. It is not clear to me why a Platonistic linguisticsis considered to be the default position for a coherent ontology or for an analogywith the formal sciences. In fact, there are a number of reasons for opting for analternative picture.For one thing, if we accept a Platonistic ontology for linguistic objects we face Be-naceraff’s famous dilemma. Benaceraff (1973) argued that there is a tension betweenthe semantics and epistemology for any theory of mathematical truth. If we attemptto offer a standard account of its semantics (in terms of our best truth-conditionaltheory) then we have reference to abstract objects which moves us further away froma standard (causal) account of its epistemology.25 An indepth discussion of thisdilemma is not necessary at this stage and will be the addressed in more depth inPart III. Suffice to say, that with Platonism comes an added epistemological burden.Not only is reference to abstract objects difficult to explain but knowledge of anacausal non-spatio-temporal realm beyond the physical is highly problematic.This problem inter alia has prompted many philosophers of mathematics to optfor nominalistic accounts of mathematics, which do not posit abstract objects (Field1980, Azzouni 2004). There are also structuralist accounts, modal (Hellman 1989)which only require possibilia, eliminative, which similarly to nominalism, do not positmathematical objects, non-eliminative, which do but in a “places-as-objects” withinstructures notion of object (Resnik 1997, Shapiro 1997). And then there are varietiesof Platonism, hard-line (Gödel 1944) and more light-weight versions (Linsky andZalta 1995). This list is not exhaustive by any means.For instance, we will consider a modified version of ante rem or non-eliminativestructuralism (chiefly presented in Shapiro 1997) as a foundation for linguistic on-tology in Part III.So if linguistics is a formal science, as the third grade of involvement assumes itis, then there is no principled reason to opt for the naive Platonism of section 2.2. Asmentioned at the start of this section, the third grade of mathematical involvementfor grammars, in which grammars are mathematical theories, does not entail anyspecific ontology for linguistic objects (or their necessary existence). Furthermore,we still have to account for the empirical side of linguistic research and how abstractlanguages relate to everyday spoken languages.
25It’s no surprise that Katz (1995) felt the need to respond to this dilemma by arguing thatmathematical objects needed neither a standard semantics nor a causal theory of knowledge.
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3.4 Subconclusion
There are many advantages to carving up the positions on the foundations of lin-guistics and linguistic practice in the way that I have attempted to do in the previoussections. By appreciating the role of grammars on each grade of mathematical in-volvement, we can divorce methodological concerns from ontological ones. We canrestate the conceptualist view on less “incoherent” or rather “inarticulate” groundsand resituate the debate outside the scope of metaphysical complications. I furtherargued that by understanding grammars as formal scientific models, we can resolvethe objections posed by Katz, Postal and others of the linguistic Platonist persuasionas well as avoid talk of abstract objects in themselves. The grades also exposed andconfronted the mathematisation of natural language by showing that with each gradeadditional claims (C1-C3) as to the significance of the mathematical apparatus wereimposed.In this opening part, I have attempted to resituate (and hopefully reenergise) thedebate on the ontological foundations of linguistic theory as well as the scientificnature of the discipline. I have placed the role of grammars at the center of my threegrades of mathematical involvement for linguistics by describing them in terms ofthree methodological commitments, C1, C2 and C3. The purpose of the grades isto show that the traditional characterisations of the various positions on the foun-dational issues as well as contemporary practice need not forge a marriage betweenmethodology and ontology, as these concepts can be shown to be clearly separablefor linguistics. Furthermore, I argued that the first grade of involvement offers thelinguist the path of least resistance, drawing from insights in computational linguis-tics and scientific modelling. I argued that the second and third grades are moreproblematic but certainly not beyond redemption or merit. Specifically, I consideredand rejected a measurement-theoretic analogy for a methodological stance that takesrepresentations as real posits of grammatical theories (on the second grade). Finally,I clarified the third grade of mathematical involvement by drawing from the philos-ophy of mathematics and the various possibilities it brings into the logical space ofinterpreting linguistics as a formal science. My hope is that, at the end of the day,whichever path a linguist chooses to take for the interpretation of her field, it will bemarked more clearly by appreciating or at least considering some of the argumentspresented above.In the next two parts of the thesis, I will aim to provide more details of modellingin linguistics and an ontological framework which could support it.
Part IIMethodology in Syntax and Semantics
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Chapter 4Modelling in Syntax
The purpose of the following part is to explore the power of the modelling idea inlinguistics. The generative tradition took the form of a scientific revolution in themiddle of the 20th century. The techniques and methodology which came along withthe movement claimed to place the study of language at the level of an empirical,naturalistic science which would eventually be subsumed by biology or neurophysi-ology. As we have seen in Part I, arguments have been proffered which challengedthis claim on ontological grounds (Katz 1981, Carr 1990, Katz and Postal 1991),methodological grounds (Soames 1984, Hintikka 1999, Devitt 2006) and linguisticgrounds from the various competing frameworks, some of which were spawned fromthe initial generative approach (Pustejovsky 1995, Prince and Smolensky 1993/2004,Kempson et al. 2001, Jackendoff 2002).In this chapter, I offer a lens through which to appreciate the scientific contribu-tion of the generative tradition in linguistics in terms of the first grade of involvementof the previous part. This account specifies the types of modelling practices thatthis framework brought to the study of natural language(s), namely minimalist mod-els idealisation (Weisberg 2007), a type of modelling that is ubiquitous in the hardsciences such as physics and chemistry. I use the above claim to provide an expla-nation of how the diverse and competing approaches to linguistics, specifically ofthe dynamic variety (Cann, Kempson et al.), are related to the generative one anda continuation (as opposed to a revolution) of the modelling strategies of the initialscientific revolution in linguistics. I argue that the generative tradition can thus beappreciated for ushering this type of modelling practice into the study of languageand more broadly construed in terms of it.This analysis does not presuppose any evaluative benefits or disadvantages ofspecific modelling trends. In addition, it does not aim to exhaustively capture all themodelling strategies employed by linguists, only some of the salient ones.In the first section, I discuss modelling in the sciences with a focus on the notionof minimalist idealisation in model-building. This is by no means an attempt ata comprehensive account of the vast and diverse philosophical terrain of scientific
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modelling, of which I have no intention (or need) of chartering at this time. In thefollowing section, I attempt to provide an analysis of linguistic modelling drawingfrom the core tenets of the generative programme from the initial Standard Theory(1965) to Minimalism (1995). I identify two types of idealisation, namely minimalgeneration and isolation, both of which I argue are species of minimalist idealisation.In the next chapter, I attempt to extend this analysis to the dynamic turn in syntax andother related frameworks such as Optimality Theory and the Parallel Architecture.Lastly, in section 5.3 , I discuss frameworks or rather types of frameworks which donot build their linguistic models by means of minimalist idealisation.
4.1 Modelling and Idealisation
Scientific modelling is a burgeoning field within the philosophy of science. Theidealisations and abstractions involved in modelling have been argued to be pervasivein the sciences and seem to inform and shape much theorising in fields from physicsto biology (see van Fraasen 1980, Cartwright 1983, Suppe 1989). In this section,I will focus on idealisation as I believe it plays a central role within the modernlinguistic approach to natural language.The terms ‘idealisation’ and ‘abstraction’ are sometimes used interchangeably inthe literature. I will follow Thomson-Jones (2005) in distinguishing between theseconcepts. Thus, idealisations involve misrepresentation of the target system or spe-cific aspects of it, while abstractions merely omit certain factors. “[W]e should takeidealization to require the assertion of a falsehood, and take abstraction to involvethe omission of a truth” (Thomson-Jones, 2005: 175). Thomson-Jones cites Chom-sky’s invocation of an ideal speaker-listener in the study of linguistic competence asa canonical case of idealisation.1 Another case of idealisation is Fisher’s Principlein evolutionary biology that states that the sex ratio of most animal species is 1:1based on a hypothetical model which postulates a fictitious three-sex organism.At first glance, this definition of idealisation might seem at odds with standardsemantic accounts of modelling, such as Giere (1988), which assume resemblancerelations (often in the form of morphisms) between the model and the target system.However, the idea of resemblance relations still holds even in an extreme case suchas the Fisher model, in the form of a hidden ceteris paribus clause. We assumethat all other factors of the biological world are held constant for the distortion oridealisation to explain the evolutionary stability (or evolutionary stable strategy,ESS) of the 1:1 sex ratio. In this way it resembles a reductio or constructive proof
1“Linguistic theory is concerned primarily with an ideal speaker-listener, in a completely homoge-neous speech-community, who knows its (the speech community’s) language perfectly and is unaffectedby such grammatically irrelevant conditions as memory limitations, distractions, shifts of attention andinterest, and errors (random or characteristic) in applying his knowledge of this language in actualperformance.” (Chomsky, 1965: 4).
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in logic and mathematics, in which the laws of logic (such as noncontradiction) areheld constant while an absurd hypothesis is entertained (and eventually rejected).We will return to the issue of explanation and ceteris paribus hedges briefly in thenext section.As previously mentioned, for Godfrey-Smith, “the modeler’s strategy is to gainunderstanding of a complex real-world system via an understanding of simpler, hy-pothetical system that resembles it in relevant respects” (2006: 726). The importantphrase here is “in relevant respects”. The relevant features of the real world which themodel resembles might not be the properties which we are aiming to explain directly,these could be distorted if the model resembles the target system in other respects.In fact, it is unclear how idealisation would operate if there were no resemblancesat all between the models and reality. Imagine a distortion or idealisation insertedinto a system which in no way resembles the real world or the laws of nature. Notonly would it be extremely difficult to predict the effect of such a distortion but itwould be unclear as to the role of its introduction in an otherwise distorted world.Of course, idealisations may be introduced for a variety of reasons. Weisberg(2007: 641) identifies a common type of idealisation in the hard sciences called“Galilean idealisation” which introduces distortions for the sake of computationaltractability. A frictionless plane in physics is often referenced as a case of suchan idealisation. No such thing exists in the real world and yet the idealisationis extremely useful in theoretical and applied mechanics. Formal language theoryin linguistics possesses similar idealisations. In this field, natural languages aretaken to be sets of uninterpreted strings organised according to their complexity. Ofcourse, no natural language is wholly uninterpreted, but this idealisation is essentialfor much of the work done in computational linguistics and the construction of variousgrammar formalisms. Before moving on to the nature of linguistic idealisations suchas these, let us consider what role they might play in the explanation of linguisticphenomena.
4.2 How the Laws of Linguistics Might Lie
In the philosophy of physics, Cartwright (1983) famously argued that the explanatorypower of the fundamental laws of physics lies in their falsehood. Her simulacrumaccount of explanation relies on the idea the fundamental laws are not strictly trueof observable reality but only true of highly idealised objects of scientific models.Reference to these latter objects are usually prefaced with ceteris paribus clauseswhich impose conditions never actually fulfilled in the phenomenal world (or theworld of appearances, surface form in linguistics). Intriguing though this idea mightbe, it is generally considered to be quite a contentious matter in the philosophy ofscience and physics (see Elgin and Sober (2002) for a contraposition of Cartwright’sclaims).
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Nevertheless, in the case of linguistics this account seems somewhat more appli-cable. As we saw in Part I, the conceptualism upon which the generative programmeis based seeks ultimately to explain linguistic laws (or rules of the grammars) interms of biological or neurobiological reality. Thus, linguistic models, which areconstituted by grammar rules, are not true of real world languages (which rarely metthe requirements of such rules) and it is not even clear how they could be true of ac-tual neurobiological states (which involve neural processes and synaptic connectionsetc.). The explanatory power of linguistic theories lies in the rules of the grammarsof idealised languages, or I-languages.In this way, the rules of generative grammars can be characterised as one ofStainton’s options for an explanation of the field in stating that “the practice issloppy, loose talk –which is strictly speaking false, and will eventually have to bereconstructed as corresponding truths about mental states and processes” (Stainton,2014: 8).2Ignoring the pejorative connotations of the previous statement, the competence-performance distinction which rests on the idealisation of a perfect linguistic commu-nity, incapable of error, further suggests that this picture might not be inappropriatefor the rules of generative grammar. Whether or not we adopt an additional ide-alisation of core grammar (see section 3.2 of Part I. for details) to which the rulesapply or the faculty of language narrowly construed (á la Chomsky, Hauser and Fitch2002), the rules or laws of linguistics are not true of surface expressions but rather ofhighly idealised and internalised linguistic structures of the grammars. In addition,generativists are insistent that the rules of the grammar do not pertain to expressionsof public languages or E-languages but the I-languages which in turn stand proxyfor mental states and eventually brain-states to be explained by neuroscience. Theyare similarly insistent that the requisite cognitive and neurological structural reali-sations are forthcoming. Thus, the laws of linguistics seem to be doubly mendacious,in firstly being directed at explaining idealised structures of idealised communitiesof cognisers and secondly suggesting as candidate targets of the models mere place-holders for later biological instantiation. In the following section, I will delve deeperinto the nature of linguistic idealisation.
4.3 Minimalist Idealisation from ST to Minimalism
In this section, I investigate two kinds of idealisation both aimed at discovering theminimal causal basis responsible for a particular property or phenomenon of the tar-get system. It is an idealisation in the sense I have been using, in that the modelsmake no attempt to represent the target phenomenon in its complete state or “de-idealise” to include extracted phenomena. In other words, we misrepresent the target
2He eventually goes on to reject this interpretation of generative linguistics.
4.3. MINIMALIST IDEALISATION FROM ST TO MINIMALISM 67
system as involving only the core causal factors we deem necessary for the expla-nation or generation of a given phenomenon or property. Weisberg (2007) describesminimalist idealisation as “the practice of constructing and studying theoretical mod-els that include only the core causal factors which give rise to a phenomenon” or “putmore explicitly, a minimalist model contains only those factors that make a differenceto the occurrence and essential character of the phenomenon in question” (Weisberg,2007: 642). If this were mere omission, then we would be able to reintroduce theabstracted phenomenon into the model.Consider the frictionless plane example again in mechanics. If we include friction(or fluid/air resistance) into the model, the predictions will fail, since these forcesresult in a loss of energy and thus a loss in speed and acceleration among otherthings. Admittedly, these elements are reintroducable into the system (and perhapsindicative of Galilean idealisation). A better example of minimalist idealisation ispresented in Weisberg (2013: 100).
A classic example of a minimalist model in the physical sciences is theone-dimensional Ising model. This simple model represents atoms, molecules,or other particles as points along a line and allows these points to be in oneof two states. Originally, Ernst Ising developed this model to investigate theferromagnetic properties of metals. It was further developed and extended tostudy many other phenomena of interest involving phase changes and criticalphenomena.
I believe that the generative tradition was largely motivated by such modellingpractices, specifically through two versions of minimalist modelling, which I callminimal generation and isolation respectively. I provide examples of each in thefollowing subsections. Before doing so, however, I shall state (following Blutner2011)3 five core characteristics of the generative tradition in linguistics.
1. Autonomy of Syntax: The idea that the core “generative” component in naturallanguage production is the computational system which produces the set ofgrammatical expressions. This system operates independently of the seman-tic, pragmatic and phonological components of the grammar (or in Blutner’swords “there exists an encapsulated system of purely formal generalizationsorthogonal to generalizations governing meaning or discourse” (2011: 27)).2. Universal Grammar: The claim that despite surface differences between theworld’s languages, there is a set of genetically endowed linguistic universalscommon to all possible human languages (developments such as the Principlesand Parameters framework allow for external linguistic input to shape the initialsettings of the grammar).
3Although I have substituted his third tenet for the Universal Grammar postulate and my descrip-tion of the rule-based view is somewhat different to his.
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3. Innateness Hypothesis: A rationalistic approach to natural language acqui-sition in which human infants are endowed with a linguistic system prior toencountering any input. Often motivated by the “poverty of stimilus” argument(for some interesting empirical support for innate linguistic biases in child lan-guage acquisition, see Culbertson and Adger 2014, Culbertson and Newport2015).
4. Competence-performance distinction: Linguistic theory is concerned with aideal linguistic competence and not necessarily with the various aspects ofperformance or actual parsing and processing in real-time.
5. Rule-based Representationalism: This is the view that the posits of the gram-matical theory or rules of the grammar are actual features of the human agentor ‘cognizer’ (actual goings-on in her mind/brain) at some level of deep neuro-physiological embedding. To ‘know’ or have a language on this view is to havesubconscious (tacit or implicit) access to these rules.
Blutner goes on to argue that a broad construal of the generative tradition interms of these aspects (or similar ones) should encompass frameworks such as Jack-endoff’s architecture of the language faculty, Pustejovsky’s generative lexicon and theoptimality theory of Prince and Smolensky. Importantly for my purpose, the dynamicsyntax framework rejects many (if not, all) of these tenets outright and thereforeI believe that the extension of this approach under the auspices of the generativeone cannot follow the same lines as Blutner proposes for the other frameworks. Inother words, the dynamic tradition constitutes a genuine theory change. I do notintend to dispute this point or argue that dynamic syntax is generative syntax in dis-guise. Rather, I propose an even broader construal of the generative tradition, alongscientific modelling lines. This analysis maintains the broad construal of Blutner’sproposal but extends it in terms of modelling strategies as opposed to theoreticalposits, i.e. generative linguists and dynamic linguists (and linguists of the othergenerative persuasions) build their models in similar ways, using similar strategies.It is on to these strategies that the next section moves, while in section 5.3, I alsomention contemporary frameworks which do not follow these practices.
4.3.1 Minimal GenerationMinimal generation is perhaps the most explicit version of minimalist modelling inlinguistics. One criticism of the pre-Chomskyan linguistic paradigm (the Structural-ism of Bloomfield, Hockett and others) was its alleged inability to explain linguisticcreativity. By focusing on statistical or classificatory aspects of specific corpora (ofactual speech), this approach limited itself to dealing with finite tokens of naturallanguage and thus could not account for the linguistic creativity.
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As we saw at the beginning of the thesis, it was in drawing inspiration from com-putability theory that the early generative tradition placed the notion of a generativegrammar (subclass of a Post-canonical system or Turing machine) at the forefront ofthe discipline. The idea was to capture the discretely infinite set of expressions ofnatural language via finite means. In the Standard Theory (1965) or ST, phrase-structure rules performed this task. Certain rules allow for recursive structures suchas NP →(adj)* N . Think of this as a loop in a push-down automaton (the class ofautomata associated with Context-free or Phrase structure grammars) which allowsfor unbounded iteration and thus a discretely infinite set of new expressions, e.g.Thabo is intelligent; Thabo is very intelligent; Thabo is very very intelligent etc.The product of the phrase stucture rules (or rewrite operations) contributes to thedeep structure or underlying syntactic form. This structure feds into the trans-formational component of the grammar which is responsible for surface forms ofexpressions (through movement and deletion). ST was a progression on the transfor-mational grammar of Harris (1951) and Chomsky’s Syntactic Structures (1957) withthe addition of a lexical component or lexicon which received input from the phrasestructure and inserted lexical items into the deep structure. Kernel sentences, sim-ple declaratives devoid of any modification which can be combined to form complexsentences, were also eschewed in favour of deep structure which could represent sur-face forms more minimally. This framework affirms the fourth tenet of the generativetradition, namely the competence-performance distinction. “ST does not attempt toanswer the questions of language perception and production [...] rather than directlyrelating meaning and expression, it relates them indirectly, through deep structure.”(Langendoen, 1998: 242). A direct relation (or determining relation) of meaning toexpression is a matter of a perfomance grammar on this view and thus outside of thescope of linguistic theory.ST, I claim, involves an example of minimal generation in the rewrite rules ofthe phrase-structure. In order to explain the creative aspect of natural language(or the specific examples of iterative structures such as conjunction and adjectivalmodification), i.e. the property of interest, we postulate a finite set of rules whichallow for recursive structure and thus for infinite expression. The rule formulation isnot descriptive but rather generative in the sense that it is supposed to representmultiple structures and with recursive elements (indicated by Kleene star above)potentially infinite structures. There are other ways to account for creativity. Forinstance, we could argue that we have a very large set of stored linguistic expressions(wholesale, not piecemeal) and we instantiate these expressions when prompted byexperience (see Evans 1981 for a comparison between the two methods). However,this explanation would not be a case of minimalist idealisation in the same way thatassuming we possess a finite rule system capable of infinite output is. The definitionI propose can be stated in this way:
Minimal Generation: The explanation of a complex linguistic phenomenon or prop-
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erty is provided by a model which includes only the interaction of the smallestpossible units underlying the phenomenon/property.4The above suggests a explanatory dimension to the modelling of a given phe-nomenon via the least possible units. In fact, the syntacto-centrism (tenet 1) of thegenerative tradition can be understood in terms of minimal generation. The idea isthat we understand ‘generation’ in linguistics to be a means of providing explana-tions to causal questions.5 For example, if we want to explain why language usersare prone to judging certain kinds of sentences (displaying certain kinds of syntacticstructure) as felicitous or not (grammatical), then we do so by stipulating the leastamount of rules which generate that type of sentence to model this behaviour. Thus,the rules of the grammar/model facilitate knowledge of the real world system throughidealised models. This is similar to explaining the superconducting properties of cer-tain metals via the Bardeen-Cooper-Schrieffer model which involves phase transitionsand a thermodynamic limit, i.e. the nonveridical postulation of infinite particles. Nowit is an idealisation technique because this story is not always strictly true such that“the endeavor is explanation; the feature of idealization [...] is the deliberate fal-sification of the causal workings of the system whose behavior is to be explained”(Strevens, 2007: 1). Strevens describes how Boyle’s Law is usually accompanied bya “causally distorting explanation” which involves ignoring the long range attractiveforces between molecules and the collisions they exhibit inter alia. Similar ideali-sation is involved in explaining linguistic phenomena on this account. For instance,garden path phenomena (as in the example below) are notoriously difficult to parse byreal speakers, yet they do correspond to syntactic rules, as in the famous case below.
1. The horse raced past the barn fell.
The rules of the grammar do not strictly correspond to speaker judgements in thesecases but rather following Cartwright they correspond to the idealised structure thatis the speaker’s I-language or state of the language faculty. They are true of a model.Thus, the model/grammar is not a direct representation of the target system, sincespeakers tend not to be able to parse these sentences despite their grammaticality.The Extended Standard Theory or EST of the 70’s (Chomsky 1973, Jackendoff1977), introduced further minimalist idealisations into the generative approach. Onthis account, the phrase-structure rules are simplified even further to account for abroader range of linguistic universals (or phrasal categories) via the binary branching
4In a popular syntax textbook, Carnie describes the generative approach as “[t]he underlyingthesis of generative grammar is that sentences are generated by a subconscious set of procedures(like computer programs) [...] The goal of syntactic theory is to model these procedures [...] These rulesare thought to generate the sentences of a language, hence the name generative grammar.” (2013:6). 5Of course, this is not to be confused with the “generation” of Post canonical systems which isconcerned with generative enumeration of a set. This is not a causal notion.
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of the X-bar theory. In contrast to the many phrase structure rules of transformationalgrammar and ST, we now have only three types of rules which generate all therequisite structures. The three rules are (1) a specifier, (2) an adjunct and (3) acomplement rule, represented respectively below (where X ′ is a head-variable and
XP, Y P, ZP,WP are arbitrary phrasal categories determined by that head).
1. Specifier rule: XP → (Y P )X ′ or XP → X ′(Y P )
2. Adjunct rule: X ′ → X ′(ZP ) or X ′ → (ZP )X ′
3. Complement rule: X ′ → X(WP ) or X ′ → (WP )X
Now X-bar theory vastly overgenerates the grammatical or well-formed linguisticstructures and needs to be reined in by various other devices (such as theta-gridsetc.). It is an idealisation in the sense discussed above. Once again, the model ofgrammar homes on the minimal causal basis necessary for grammatical representa-tion. In addition, we move closer to an account which respects the innate structure ofthe language faculty, the third core characteristic of the generative approach (men-tioned in section 4.3). As previously mentioned, in Aspects of a theory of Syntax(1965), Chomsky differentiates between three nested kinds of adequacy conditionsfor a theory of grammar, each more inclusive than the last. The three related linguisticdesiderata are (1) observable linguistic performance, (2) native speaker judgementsand (3) language acquisition. The first is the class of observationally adequategrammars which are those grammars which only account for corpora or observedutterances of speech. Naturally, these do not give us much traction on (2) and (3).Chomsky then suggests a class of descriptively adequate grammars (DAGs) whichaim to capture the psychological facts of native speaker intuitions, thereby address-ing (1) and (2). However, these latter grammars are inadequate on count (3) andthus require us to ascend to the level of explanatorily adequate grammars. By min-imising the set of rules which learners have to acquire, we approach the explanatoryadequacy necessary for a story about language acquisition.
[L]inguistics was supposed to be embeddable into cognitive science morebroadly. But if this is the case then there is a concern about the uncheckedproliferation of rules-such rule systems might be descriptively adequate, but theywould fail to account for how we acquire a language-specific grammar (Ludlow,2011: 15).
The X-bar innovation also pulled in the direction of universality as the new grammarrules or schemata could represent a greater number of tree (or hierarchical) structuresand thus capture more of the constituents of a greater number of world languages,again with minimal resources. As per the definition of minimalist idealisation, weare only interested in the core causal factors involved in grammatical production,i.e. the models of ST and EST only contain these factors. In the opposite direction,
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Newmeyer (2002) describes the generative semantics project as attempting to modeltoo much and his words are particularly illuminating within the scope of the currentsection.
The dynamic that led generative semantics to abandon explanation flowedirrevocably from its practice of regarding any speaker judgement and any factabout morpheme distribution as a de facto matter for grammatical analysis [...]Attributing the same theoretical weight to each and every fact about languagehad disastrous consequences (121).
Another way of putting this is that the models were moving from minimalist idealisa-tions to more comprehensive representations of the target systems (often includingpragmatic phenomena such as implicature). In the next section, I describe anothervariety of minimalist idealisation modelling, one which, I think, is crucially involvedin both the Government and Binding (1981) and Minimalist (1995) approaches.
4.3.2 IsolationNatural language, and the linguistics which attempts to study it, is a diverse objectof inquiry. Any theory which aims at a comprehensive account of its nature has toacknowledge the diverse factors involved in its explanation. When discussing syntax,semantic considerations invariably enter into certain descriptions (often captured byselectional restrictions on lexical items), when doing semantics, phonological aspectscan be relevant (e.g. prosody) or pragmatic features (implicature, context shifting,metaphor, sarcasm etc.). Standard generative grammar places syntax at the centreof the language faculty (state of human language competence in the brain) and ban-ishes these other aspects into various post-computational spell-out or logical form.However, some proponents, such as Jackendoff in his Parallel Architecture (2002),jettison the syntacto-centric account and describe the language faculty as involv-ing multiple generative mechanisms and interface principles between them. Dynamicsyntax too rejects the centrality of syntax but goes one step further than Jackendoff inrejecting its autonomy likewise. The models of the generative approach aim not onlyto identify the minimal properties which “generate” (in the causal sense of produce)the intended aspect of the target system but also the relevant causes involved inthis generation. This is where isolation comes in. Isolation is the modelling strategywhich involves isolating or separating out the specific types of causal explanationsdeemed relevant to the phenomenon we are interested in producing.The scientific modelling involved in generative linguistics often includes a prop-erty known as “modularity”. Modularity is the property of a system which involvesseparating it into discrete, individual subsystems which contribute to the systemsoverall organisation and operation. Isolation is similarly the technique of buildingmodels of these separate subsystems independently of one another (or as much as
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possible). One can think of it as the modelling technique which corresponds to theproperty of modularity.6 So the definition, I offer, is as follows:
Isolation: The separation of a system into distinct minimal causal models for thegeneration of separate (but potentially related) properties or families of prop-erties.7
This type of idealisation not only involves compartmentalising causal explanationsbut also potentially neglecting certain relevant causal factors outside of a givenmodule. For instance, in an economic model of national GDP, one could exclude thecontribution of a particular industry or sector (say, the value of production in thetextile industry) even if this industry does in fact contribute to overall GDP. Stabler(2011) describes the competence-performance idealisation of Aspects in a similarway. “That is, we aim to find domains with causal interactions that are relativelyclosed, domains that can be described relatively autonomously” (2011: 69). I arguethat Government and Binding or GB (1981) can be described in terms of such amodelling strategy. In this theory, separate modules govern separate aspects ofthe syntax (and semantics). As before, the minimalist idealisations identify an evensmaller set of properties (for maximum generality). For example, there are only threecore levels of the grammar on this account, namely D-structure, S-Structure andLogical Form. S-structure is derived from D-structure and logical form in turn fromS-structure. The latter derivation is governed by a single move alpha transformationat both the D to S-structure level and the S-structure to LF level (as opposed to avast number of separate movement operations in ST and EST).Importantly, the GB framework distinguishes seven separate modules which gov-ern or generate different aspects of the grammar, in line with the initial autonomyof syntax thesis (tenet 1 above). The phenomena in question might involve multiplemodules interacting but are explained within their distinct causal modules (as inthe hypothetical GDP case above). One important application of the governmentrelation involves the notion of abstract case, such as nominative, accusative, dativeand so on (considered to be a universal property common to all languages, althoughoften unrealised in surface morphology). Governance (which is a relation betweenheads and their phrasal categories, involving the dominance relation of m-command)
6This is a somewhat more general account of “modularity” than is found in the canonical cognitivescience literature, such as Fodor (1983) or Pylyshyn (1984). This is because modularity is posited asa genuine property of a system or set of systems. Hence the claims usually associated with it such asdomain specificity and inaccessibility. Isolation, on the other hand, is an idealising technique usedin the service of model-building.7Mäki (2011) and Portides (2013) discuss isolation in models as well. Although their analysesinvolve conceptual omission or “screening off” of features of an actual system. They differ in thatMäki considers the isolation as a result while Portides considers it as a process within the modelconstruction. In this way, my conception is closer to Portides’. I do not, however, include a conceptualact within my characterisation.
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also interacts with theta-theory which encodes semantic and functional roles such asagent, patient etc. However, Case theory and theta-theory do not necessarily coin-cide, despite being related causal explanations for various phenomena. For example,in the latin sentence below, both the theta-grid of the verb ‘to give’ or dare and thecase of the indirect object requires/selects for a dative noun form of Brutus.
(i) Caesar dedit pecuniam Bruto. (Caesar gave the money to Brutus)
In GB these explanations are independent of one another. The idealisations of thetheta-theory do not include those of the case theory, or rather they offer orthogonalminimal causal structures to explain the occurrence of the indirect object ‘Bruto’. InGB, Chomsky describes the overall grammar in the following way (which exemplifiesisolation idealisation).
The system that is emerging is highly modular, in the sense that the fullcomplexity of observed phenomena is traced to the interaction of partially inde-pendent subtheories, each with its own abstract structure (1981: 135).
Finally, the minimalism program or MP, as perhaps the name suggests, providesthe most radical case of minimalist idealisation at work. MP is often described as aprogramme or approach as opposed to a distinct theory on the same level as GB orthe Parallel Architecture.
Minimalism isn’t itself a theory of the language faculty that as such would orcould compete with other such theories. No matter one’s theoretical persuasion,a minimalist strategy of linguistic explanation is something one can choose tobe interested in or not (Hinzen, 2013: 95).
Thus, in many ways, MP is the canonical case of a modelling strategy as I havedescribed it. In MP, we start our models with only what we “must take to be true” andthen rebuild the system from this basis. Once again, we see the concept of minimalgeneration described in the previous section. In terms of isolation, MP maintainsthe generative approach’s separation between form and function (or competence andperfomance). In other words, the structure of the language faculty is independent ofits communicative role. Furthermore, the communicative or functional aspects of thegrammar are isolated from the formal features which have an alternative causal basisand role within a theory of grammar.Previously we discussed Chomsky’s notions of descriptive and explanatory ade-quacy. In MP, a level ‘beyond explanatory adequacy’ (also called ‘natural adequacy’)is introduced. The goal of linguistic theory now becomes to explain language as anatural object (in the sense of being bound by the biological and physical universe,as opposed to the mathematical and conventional ones).
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In principle, then, we can seek a level of explanation deeper than explanatoryadequacy, asking not only what the properties of language are, but why theyare that way (Chomsky, 2004a).
In MP, language is considered to be a perfect system, optimally designed since itsgrammar constitutes a perfect computational system via economy principles for syntaxand semantics (economy of derivation and economy of representation, respectively).Lappin et al. (2000) argue that both perfection and optimality are unclear notions inthis framework and should constitute serious challenges to MP’s adoption by thoselinguists working within the GB framework. In terms of my dialectic, the differencebetween GB and MP is especially illuminating.
Throughout the modern history of generative grammar, the problem of de-termining the character of FL [faculty of language] has been approached “fromtop down” [as in GB framework]: How much must be attributed to UG to ac-count for language acquisition? The MP seeks to approach the problem “frombottom up”: How little can be attributed to UG while still accounting for thevariety of I-languages [internalised language or specific state of the languagefaculty] attained, relying on third factor principles? The two approaches should,of course, converge, and should interact in the course of pursuing a commongoal. (Chomsky, 2008b: 4).Chomsky’s distinction between “top down” and “bottom up” is not entirely clear.It can be, however, related to a topic in the theoretical physics and chemistry con-cerning what is referred to as “foundational” versus “phenomenological” approaches.The latter are the various frameworks such as GB, ST and the principles and pa-rameters (P&P) which offer specific analyses of linguistic phenomena. Foundationalapproaches, on the other hand, aim to answer the questions concerning the reasonsbehind the use or application of a given formalism. This might involve the search fora set of first principles which independently motivate the use of certain theoreticaltools or explanations.8 Hinzen (2000) offers a comparative analysis of the minimalistprogram and the principles and parameters framework along these lines. He states,among other things, that minimalism attempts to rationalise rather than describe thephenomena under study. Furthermore, it aims to discover general principles under-lying explanations and avoid overly technical solutions. GB can be compared to MPsimilarly. Whereas the GB framework approached the constitution of the commonlinguistic substrate or Universal Grammar by asking ‘how much’ structure needs tobe innate, MP asks the question of ‘how little’ structure is needed. The operationof merge (as well as select and move), which takes two items and creates a la-belled set containing both of these, is supposed to be the minimal requirement onthe productive capabilities of the language faculty. Our complex model of naturallanguage syntax now only involves a single operation which serves as the minimal
8I thank Reinhard Blutner for drawing my attention to this point and research.
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causal basis for the entire system isolated from other potential causal factors (suchas functional roles, the conceptual system etc.). As we have seen, there are someinteresting ramifications of the merge postulate, both evolutionary and ontological.In this section, I have claimed that the generative programme in linguistics, fromST to MP, encompasses minimalist idealisation in the form of both minimal generationand isolation in the models of the various theories. I followed a Cartwrightian line inclaimining that these techniques are indeed idealisations in terms of falsehoods notonly because the rules of linguistic theory pertain to highly idealised models but alsobecause these models are taken to stand as placeholders for the true descriptions ofa future neuroscience. I now move onto extending this analysis beyond generativegrammar (narrowly construed) to other frameworks and the dynamic turn in syntax.
Chapter 5The Dynamic turn and otherFrameworks
5.1 Other Generative Frameworks
Within the more broadly construed generative tradition in linguistics, we find manyexamples of both isolation and minimal generation, as I have described them above.Perhaps Jackendoff’s parallel architecture (PA) serves as one of the best cases ofboth isolation and minimal generation and therefore a useful starting point.One of the aims of Jackendoff (2002) is to better integrate linguistics withincognitive science. In order to achieve this aim, he rejects a number of components ofthe Chomskyan view of generative linguistics, for instance the syntactocentrism, orthe view that syntax is the central generative element of language. Jackendoff holdsthat this was a mistake. In opposition to this view, he proffers a parallel architectureof the language faculty.
The alternative to be pursued here is that language comprises a number ofindependent combinatorial systems, which are aligned with each other by meansof a collection of interface systems. Syntax is among the combinatorial systems,but far from the only one (Jackendoff, 2002: 111).
He goes on to describe each independent rule-bound and hierarchical system inisolation from one another. This analysis includes a reconceptualisation of semanticsas “a combinatorial system independent of, and far richer than, syntactic structure”(Jackendoff, 2002: 123). Given this high level of modularity, we can glean a perfectcase of isolation idealisation at work. Each system, phonological, syntactic andsemantic are generated by independent structures. Due to this modelling strategy,the interfaces between these structures becomes of particular importance in terms ofa holistic concept of natural language. For an idea of how this works, consider theconcept of the well-formedness of a sentence. Within the frameworks of the previous
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chapter, the syntax determined the well-formedness of a sentence and the othersteps in the derivation (phonological and semantic) were somewhat epiphenomenal(recall Chomsky’s famous Colourless green ideas example which was meant to showgrammaticality outwith interpretability). In the parallel architecture, the situation isdifferent. A sentence is only well-formed if it is so within each separate system andthere is a well-formed interface between them.1 Burton-Roberts and Poole (2006)take issue with this aspect of PA. They argue that trying to capture the structuresof the modules independently results in a loss of the initial rationale behind thosestructures.
The term ‘semantic’ [...] is relational. It suggests that the module is dis-tinct from the central conceptual system in being dedicated to specifying thesemantics-of something – expressions generated by the syntax, presumably.But this implies that those expressions have semantic as well as syntactic prop-erties [...] Equally, a mechanism that specifies the semantics-of syntactic ex-pressions cannot be encapsulated with respect to syntax. Its rationale lies insyntax, being effectively ‘interpretative’ of it (as in models the PA claims torepudiate) (Burton-Roberts and Poole, 2006: 622).
The complaint is essentially that the models of PA neglect causally relevantmaterial, i.e. part of what determines the semantic module is syntactic in nature orrelated to syntax. This, however, is consonant with my characterisation of isolationidealisation (in terms of falsehood). In this type of idealisation, causally relevantaspects are often ignored and false models are created for explanatory purposes. Wewill return to the interpretative nature of semantics in the chapter 6. For now, itsuffices to appreciate the isolationist modelling of the PA, whether it can retrieve theconnections with syntax (through interfaces) or not is not our chief concern here.Nevertheless, despite the differences, the parallel architecture does maintain theautonomy of syntax (and phonology and semantics) as well as the UG hypothesis(although Jackendoff takes pains to divorce the concept from misinterpretations insection 4.2. of the book) and the competence-performance distinction (once againwith some criticism of how the idealisation has “hardened” over the years).Optimality theory (OT) is another approach in which minimalist idealisation isharnessed. Minimal generation is both an implicit and explicit device in OT. Explic-itly, the formalism contains a generator which generates an infinite number of outputsor candidates for representation for each input of the grammar. The evaluator compo-nent then chooses the optimal output from the set of outputs through a set of ranked,violable constraints or con (in the sense that violations are permitted but those ofhigher level constraints count more than violations of lower level ones against the
1Some of these interface principles or rules are constraint based, such as the head constraint(borrowed from HPSG) for the syntax-semantics interface or the required linear order mapping be-tween phonology and syntax. There are also static idioms which bypass syntax entirely and occurbetween the phonological and semantic components.
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potential optimal candidates). con is considered to be universal (in line with tenet 2).In terms of generative grammar, it possesses an assumption “that there is a languageparticular ranking of constraints from a universal set of constraints” (Blutner, 2000:2). One reason for questioning the place of OT within generative linguistic modelling,as I have been describing it, is that it seems to be constraint-based as opposed toderivational or “generative” (in the proof-theoretic sense). It should be noted thatGB also has a distinctive constraint-based flavour (more on model-theoretic syntaxin section 5.3). However, importantly as Smolensky (2001) notes, “OT has beenformulated in both derivational and non-derivational or ‘parallel’ forms. Both vari-ants are coherent expressions of the theory”. The core idea in both cases can beexplained in terms of minimal generation idealisation. The property of being an “op-timal candidate” is generated directly by a universal set of inputs narrowed downby a minimal set of constraints. Blutner (2000) himself offers a bidirectional OTapproach to semantics which is somewhat different to the generally unidirectionalanalysis of the generative tradition. Nevertheless, the key idea here is the minimalset of constraints. In OT phonology (where the framework received dominant status),the best analyses are the ones which generate a given typology of phonetic combi-nations via a minimal set of constraints and their relative rankings (see Hammond1997, McCarthy 2003b). In OT, there is no room for extraneous constraints. In fact,the methodology is essentially concerned with defining the fewest and often mostspecific constraints necessary for generating optimal candidacy.I think that this should be sufficient to display the pervasive nature of minimalistidealisation through both minimal generation and isolation within the broader gener-ative tradition. It might be objected at this point that there is major theory continuitywithin the frameworks so far discussed and perhaps the modelling practices can bemore easily explicable in these terms. I do not think that this is necessarily thecase. Cartwright, Shomar and Suárez (1995) argue that theory and modelling areindependent processes in the sciences. They argue that theories can serve as toolsfor models but are not to be defined by them (i.e. not just a collection of modelsin the van Fraasen (1980) fashion). Unfortunately discussing this version of instru-mentalism will take us too far afield, although in a similar vein to Cartwright et al.,I will attempt to show, by example, that modelling practices can be held constantdespite significant theory change. However, my method is the reverse of the onethey take. While they argue that the London model of superconductivity underwentmodel change without theory change, I will argue that dynamic syntax utilises similarmodelling strategies to the generative tradition while the theory has been shifted onalmost all accounts.
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5.2 Modelling Dynamics
In this section, I hope to extend my analysis of the modelling strategies employedwithin the generative programme to a rival approach, namely dynamic syntax (DS).In so doing, I also hope to provide an account of the theoretical differences betweenthese frameworks and their genesis in terms of the choices of minimal structureswithin the models as opposed to a shift in modelling strategies in toto. As previouslynoted, I will not be disputing the claim that DS marks a significant departure from thetheory presented in generative grammar. For instance, the competence-performancedivide, representationalism and the autonomy of syntax are all unabashedly aban-doned in this framework.In an attempt to account for the deep context-dependence of natural languages,DS roots its idealisations in the “dynamics of real-time language activities” (Cann etal., 2012: 359) where semantic factors inevitably affect any analysis. Thus, there isno autonomous syntactic component and the idealisations of formal language theory(which were heavily reliant on the alleged connection between formal and naturallanguages) are jettisoned in favour of a model of incremental semantic growth.
This theory does not characterise the surface (constituent) structure of asentence, but instead models the process of assigning an interpretation to astring of words in a left to right fashion. In other words, taking informationfrom words, pragmatic processes and general rules, the theory derives partialtree structures that represent the underspecified content of the string up to thatpoint in the parse (Cann, 2001: 4).
For the point of illustration, let us return to the idea of well-formedness. Wesaw with generative syntax and the parallel architecture, two different but relatednotions of the well-formedness of a linguistic expression or sentence. In DS, thedeparture is more stark. Syntactic well-formedness is no longer the determiningfactor within the linguistic concept. For instance, in multi-person dialogues, certainsentences (or strings) can be plainly ungrammatical in isolation and yet give riseto well-formed structures.2 Consider the example from Cann et al (2012: 365) below:
Father: We’re going to Granny’s.Mother: to help her clean out her cupboards.Child: Can I stay at home?
2Although the notion of ‘string well-formedness’ is not part of this approach (i.e. there is no‘membership problem’ in the Turing sense), the idea of a well-formed or ‘complete’ utterance is present(on the basis of which grammatical judgements are made). “We may take the concept of ‘completeutterance’ in some language L to be one for which it is possible to construct a propositional tree oftype t from an uttered string of words using the lexical, computational and pragmatic actions licensedin L (Cann et al. 2005: 398).
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Mother: By yourself? You wouldn’t like that.
Various traditional locality requirements on pronouns or anaphors (such as your-self ) are violated in this exchange and yet it is unproblematically interpretable andnatural. Thus, the models of DS are built up from a basis that goes beyond thesingle-person and sentence level boundaries of the previous frameworks which wehave discussed. In addition, the formalism acknowledges the word-by-word contri-bution within expressions and not only the final output of a derivational process (inthis way following the path of unification-based grammar formalisms such as GPSGand HPSG etc.). “The way this is achieved is to begin from a goal associated withsome very partial structure and progressively enrich that structure through the parseof a string of words” (Cann et al 2005: 33). Various techniques from semantics anddynamic semantics, such as underspecification and updates, are incorporated in orderto accomplish this analysis.The usage-based (parsing) elements of this formalism take it further from theabstract rule-based representationalism of the generative tradition toward a charac-terisation of linguistic knowledge as a type of “know-how”. Thus, it seems as thoughthe models of DS are vastly different from those of the generative tradition andindeed, in some respects, they are. However, in terms of the type of modelling em-ployed by practitioners within this framework, I think some important continuity canbe found. Primarily, I hope to show that DS does employ a minimalist idealisationapproach to its models.In order to see this, let us revisit the motivations behind some of the aspects of thetheory change in DS. One of the leading motivations behind DS (and the dynamicturn in linguistics in general) is the apparent failure of static accounts to deal withphenomena such as ellipsis, anaphora and tense. In other words, the objection is thatby focusing the minimal models on a static sentence and single person boundary,the generative tradition (and other approaches) has failed to capture the propertyof interest in these cases, i.e. acceptibility judgements of speakers in many of thecases involving dialogue data etc. Furthermore, ignoring such data as performanceerror or dysfluency is claimed to result in incomplete models as well as only a partialapproach to the language acquisition problem (or the ‘explanatory adequacy’ of thegenerative tradition) since young children are confronted with such data on a dailybasis and it is systematic. “The effect [of ignoring the aforementioned data] will bethat no single linguistic phenomenon will receive a complete characterisation” (Cannet al. 2012: 367).Thus, the problem is not with the technique of minimalist idealisation but ratherwith the starting point. In order to account for the complete desired property or phe-nomenon, for instance anaphora in English, we need to consider a different minimalmodel, such as the discourse level or dialogue data. The modelling strategy remainsconstant in this case. DS modelling merely starts its idealisations from a differentplace but aims to generate the property of interest (grammaticality or anaphoric bind-
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ing) in a minimal way. I think that isolation might be somewhat harder to establishas most DS models are quite integrative.In DS, linguists are still in the business of developing minimal models and at-tempting to “generate” (in the sense of minimal generation) the properties or expla-nations thereof by offering a causal basis which ignores extraneous material. Theframework might seem to aim for “completeness” but this completeness should not beconfused for completeness at the initial modelling stage. In other words, the modelsaim to account for phenomena such as anaphora, ellipsis, quantifier scope etc. in amore complete way than their predecessors (of the generative persuasion) but theyaim to do so through the most economical means possible (replete with the gamutof ceteris paribus modifiers and the like). For instance, underspecification playsan important role in the theory. This is a technique used to represent or generatemultiple semantic (or other) representations within a single representation. Under-specification is a common technique for dealing with a wide range of ambiguities(both lexical and structural) in natural language semantics (and processing), withoutnecessarily altering anything at the syntactic level.3 Semantic underspecification isbasically an intentional omission of linguistic information from semantic description.The underlying idea is to postpone semantic analysis until it can be executed in sucha way that various ambiguities can be resolved. In other words,The key idea of underspecification is to devise a formalism which allows torepresent all logical readings of a sentence in a single compact structure. Sucha formalism allows one to preserve compositionality without artfully casting puresemantic ambiguities into syntactic ones. (Lesmo and Robaldo, 2006: 550).This process amounts to a type of storage of interpretations without immediatelychecking for consistency. At a later stage these interpretations are pulled out orextracted and interpreted in parallel. A given semantic representation can be under-specified in one of two ways.1. atomic subexpressions (constants and variables) may be ambiguous, i.e.do not have a single value specified as their denotation, but a range of possiblevalues;2. the way in which subexpressions are combined by means of constructionsmay not be fully specified (Bunt, 2007: 60).These paths specify constraints on representations of meaning and are often viewedas meta-representations which display all the representations that satisfy the set ofconstraints, i.e. all the possible readings of an expression.The point is that underspecification is a means of capturing multiple meaningswithin a single structure and a clear example of a minimalist idealisation. Under-specification is essentially misrepresentation for the sake of disambiguation at a
3Representing the scope ambiguities through alternative syntactic derivations can led to an ex-plosion of ambiguity and the need for innumerable alternative syntactic configurations. See Bunt andMuskens (1999) for a proof of this based on the ambiguity in an average Dutch sentence.
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later stage in the process. The rules of the grammar (or DS) then apply to this ide-alised compact structure. Many of the other techniques utilised in DS are similarlymotivated. The framework (non-trivially) exploits the strategy of minimal generation,as I have described in the previous chapter. In this way, it is within the modellingparadigm of the broader generative tradition in linguistics despite theoretical differ-ences.
5.3 Model-theoretic Syntax and Overgeneralisation
Before concluding, I think it expedient to address a potential objection. One poten-tial concern when offering accounts of modelling in linguistics (and the sciences ingeneral) is the overgeneralisation of explanation. In describing a phenomenon whichadmits to certain vague or imprecise notions such as ‘causality’, ‘minimal’, ‘genera-tion’ etc., a theorist can often provide explanations which trivially capture too much(or everything) and thus fail to distinguish between relevant alternatives. If all oflinguistics from Hockett’s finite grammar to Smolensky’s harmonic grammar or Croft’sradical construction grammar could be explained in terms of minimalist idealisation,it would be no surprise that dynamic syntax followed suit. Fortunately, I believe thatthis is far from the case. In what follows, I will briefly mention some linguistic frame-works (or families of frameworks) which I believe do not have minimalist idealisationat their core. Once again, it is in no way my claim that minimalist idealisation isa preferable modelling strategy. I take no position on the fecundity of one type ofmodelling over another, my project is merely a descriptive one. I should also notethat this analysis is not meant to be exhaustive. Many frameworks, including gen-erative grammar, can and do involve other forms of modelling and idealisation. Myclaim is that minimalist idealisation is at the centre of many of these frameworks, notthat is the only strategy used to model linguistic reality within them (or to theorisemore generally).As I have mentioned, there are some similaries between both the parallel archi-tecture and DS to model-theoretic approaches to grammar, I think that this wouldbe a good point at which to describe these non-minimalist idealisation approaches.In Pullum and Scholz (2001), the notions of generative-enumerative versus model-theoretic syntactic formalisms are discussed and teased apart. The former are relatedto the formalisms discussed in the previous sections (with the exception of DS whichhas elements of both). These formalisms drew inspiration from the syntactic (orproof-theoretic) side of mathematical logic (and Post’s work on the subject)4. How-ever, model-theoretic approaches were developed from the semantic side of logic anddiverge from the generative-enumerative approach significantly. In this way, I thinkthat model-theoretic syntax idealises its models in a distinct way as well, i.e. notvia minimalist idealistion.
4See Part I.1.
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One of the core technical notions of the previous formalisms was that of “gener-ation” in the ‘recursively enumerate’ sense of defining a device with a finite set ofrules capable of generating an infinite set of sentences/strings/structures. On thecontrary “[a]n MTS [model-theoretic syntax] grammar does not recursively define aset of expressions; it merely states necessary conditions on the syntactic structuresof individual expressions” (Pullum and Scholz, 2001: 19). Think of this approach interms of model-theory. A sentence is well-formed iff it is a model of the grammar(defined in terms of constraints which act as the axioms of the formalism). To bea model of the grammar is to be an expression which satisfies the grammar (meetsthe constraints). Consider the first-order analogy. To be a model of arithmetic is tosatisfy (or make true) the axioms of arithmetic (Peano or others). There are nonstan-dard models of course and Gödel’s famous incompleteness result showed that therecan never be a complete axiomatisation of arithmetic (i.e. no system will be able tocapture all the truths of arithmetic). The point is that the idea of “being a model” ofa grammar in this sense is quite divorced from the idea of “being generated” by agiven grammar.Formalisms such as Generalised Phrase Structure Grammar (GPSG) and Head-driven Phrase Structure Grammar (HPSG) are examples of this constraint-based ap-proach.5 Some differences between the approaches involve concepts such as set car-dinality. In section 4.3. we saw the motivation behind early generative grammar wasto capture the notion of linguistic creativity described in terms of discretely infiniteoutput. This is a corollary of the generative-enumerative approach, i.e. generativegrammars generate or produce a fixed number or set of expressions (the upperboundis ℵ0 or the cardinality of the natural numbers). Contrary to this, model-theoreticor constraint-based grammars do not impose such size-limits and are generally non-committal in terms of cardinality (which is not to say that they cannot account forcreativity).Now, there is certainly a parallel between specifying a set of axioms or con-straints in defining a grammar and specifying a set of rules in generating one butthe latter approach is more in line with minimalist idealisation than the former forimportant reasons. There are other significant differences but I shall focus on thosethat involve (or result in) a shift in modelling practices. We have already seen thatthe concept of infinity generation is abandoned on the model-theoretic approachbut another important (relevant) departure from minimalist idealistion is the levelat which the models are defined. For frameworks within this paradigm, models areindividual expressions not sets of such expressions. In generative approaches, forthe sake of generality, there was a movement towards categories (as sets) of ex-
5Although in the introduction of their textbook, Sag, Wasow and Bender (2003) speak in generativeterms about the purpose and nature of grammar. “Thus we will again and again be engaged in theexercise of formulating a grammar that generates a certain set of word strings - the sentences predictedto be grammatical according to that grammar” (2011: 21). They also stress the importance of capturingthe infinite set of expressions of natural language (through Kleene star operations and the like).
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pressions and rules involving these categories (recall the X-bar rule schemata insection 4.3.1). Model-theoretic accounts quantify over specific expressions and thestructures relating to these expressions.
For example, if trees are the intended models, quantifiers in the statementsof MTS grammar range over a set of nodes, not over a set of trees (Pullum andScholz, 2001: 23).
There are some important consequences (or perhaps advantages) of this featureof model-theoretic approaches. They all seem to be related to the greater specificityor accuracy which they allow the grammar to express or capture. For instance,expression fragments can more readily be treated under this framework. These couldbe fragments with syntactic structure or information (and semantic or phonologicalas well) that are not strictly grammatical (such as and of the example in Pullumand Scholz (2001)) and thus would not be generated by a generative grammar. Byfocusing on individual expressions we can also capture the use and proliferationof neologisms and the lexically creative aspect of natural languages. Given thatthe lexica of various languages are constantly changing, a formalism (or family offormalisms) which can capture (or at least not make bad predictions) about suchexpressions would be useful.6There are a number of other such differences related to models as individual ex-pressions. Some linguists (within the probabilistic school) have been claimed thatthe generative-enumerative approach can be described as “prescriptive” in the pe-jorative “grammar school” sense from which linguists have taken pains to separatethemselves. There are constructions and phrases that pop up all over human lan-guage (and corpora) that would be deemed simply ungrammatical in the generativesense (i.e. not generated by any rule).7 Manning (2003) claims that the genera-tive approach (what he calls “categorical linguistic theories”) are prescriptive in thesense that they place hard boundaries on grammaticality when these boundaries aremuch fuzzier in reality. This, however, is in keeping with idealisation. Neverthe-less, the probabilistic linguistic models he suggest in their stead are beyond thecurrent scope. Importantly, the criticism is related to the model-theoretic approachand its method of idealisation. In one way, generative grammars idealise too little(as per minimalist idealisation) and, on the other, they overgenerate (due to the lackof specificity). Hence the need for theta-grids and other ways of narrowing down thegrammatical output of the grammar in generative frameworks such as Governmentand Binding.
6Both language fragments and neologisms can be captured by the incremental word-by-wordparsing formalism of DS in a generative-enumerative way.7This is related to the motivation behind DS and its claim that generative grammars offer in-complete descriptions since this miss out on relevant and systematic data found in corpora andmulti-person discourse. I thank Geoff Poole for pointing out to me that a traditional GB/Minimalistaccount in terms of ‘ellipsis’ might work as well for these cases.
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Constraint-based grammars focus on individual expressions and their satisfactionof a certain set of constraints. In so doing, they not only move away from the ideaof minimal transformational derivation, but also admit for increased specificity at theindividual expression level and in turn at the initial model level. The model aims toadmit and satisfy as many constraints as needed to encode syntactic, semantic andother information, in order to characterise grammatical well-formedness. However,the descriptions involved in the models of the grammars can be quite complex. Infact, the models or expressions can be infinite in length on the constraint-basedview (a welcomed feature for adherents of Langendoen and Postal’s vastness proof).Whereas in generative grammar this is not the case (without significant modificationon the notion of “generative” or “derivation”). This is another advantage of the MTSframework according to Pullum and Scholz (2001). So our base case could begin witha potentially infinite model with a multitude of constraints (well-motivated of course).With the development of generative approaches in sections 4.3 and 4.3.2 we saw aprogression toward generality and the exclusion of (even causally relevant) material,in the model-theoretic framework of constraint-based approaches we see the reverseand a progression toward specificity and the inclusion of more information somecasually relevant material, others not necessarily so (e.g. there might be irrelevantphonological information for instance). In addition, these approaches tend not to bemodular or make use of isolation idealisation. For instance, feature structures, whichcan be thought of as functions from sets of features to values (or valences), in HPSG,are used to model grammatical categories as information structures. These structurescan be extremely complex (as anyone who has used or seen a tree in HPSG canattest). The inclusion of semantics introduces additional information and structureinto the features structures.
The richer feature structures we are now using, together with our highlyschematized rules, have required us to refine our notion of how a grammar isrelated to the fully determinate phrase structure trees of the language (Sag etal, 2003: 167).To close off this sketch, let us consider a basic operation in the grammar, namelyunification. This operation takes two feature structures and creates one that containsall the information (and constraints) of both (as long as it is not inconsistent). Thuswe are building larger and larger information structures into the scientific models ofthe grammar. I think we have moved quite a distance from minimalist idealisationand the modelling practices that come with it. One aspect of minimalist idealisationis that de-idealisation is very often not possible, recall the Ising model of ferromag-netism mentioned in section 4.3 in which particles are represented simply as pointsalong a line. Feature structures and model-theoretic syntax allows for gradabilityof representation and the re-introduction of removed material. To be more specific,in formal language theory, sentences are modelled as semantically vacuous strings.A grammar, as a generative device, specifies the types of rules applicable to these
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strings in order to generate different sets of stings, i.e. languages, of varying complex-ity. For example adding recursive rules to the rules which generate regular grammarsgives rise to context-free grammars and so on (this picture is overly simplistic for thesake of illustration). Given this idealisation, there is simply no room for semanticcontent or phonological character to enter into the resulting model. These aspects oflanguage are dealt with separately (in line with isolation idealisation). Contrastedwith this, in constraint-based or model-theoretic approaches we can admit as muchinformation into the base syntactic feature structures as we like, including semanticand phonological features. The models are not incompatible with introducing moreand more information or features in order to “come closer” to the real world targetsystem. This is the hallmark of Galilean idealisation (or mere abstraction) as Weis-berg (2007, 2013) describes it or distortion for the sake of computational tractabilitywith the possibility of reintroduction of abstracted or idealised material. However,this is generally not a feature of minimalist idealisation.
5.4 Subconclusion
It might be useful at this juncture to consider why these chapters should be of par-ticular importance or interest within and outwith the field of linguistics. Linguisticsis a scientific chimera, often lacking a clear unified methodology, theoretical persua-sion or direction. The dominance of the generative tradition is receiving increasedscrutiny and there is a plenitude of frameworks waiting in the wings to take its place.On the one extreme, divergences are often exaggerated and these frameworks areconsidered to be incommensurable (in the Kuhnian sense). On the other extreme,genuine differences are overlooked and considered to be mere ‘notational variants’of one another (in the Chomskyan sense). The present chapters aimed at finding amiddle ground in the identification of commonalities, in terms of scientific modellingpractices, while respecting genuine theoretical advancements and divergences. Inthe conclusion of this part, we will have something more to say about these issues.Here, however, I have argued that the generative tradition emcompasses tworelated varieties of modelling, namely minimal generation and isolation. These mod-elling strategies fall under the auspices of a modelling practice commonally found inthe sciences, namely minimalist idealisation as described by Weisberg (2007, 2013).Under this paradigm, linguists aim to identify a core (minimal) causal model whichgives rise to a property or phenomenon of interest while ignoring other (even po-tentially relevant) features of the target system. In this sense, the strategy involvesa distortion or idealisation of the target system in order to capture the least setof elements responsible for a given property via the initial misrepresentation. Fol-lowing a line set by Blutner (2011), I extended this analysis beyond the standardaccounts within generative grammar such as Government and Binding and the Min-imalist program, to include Jackendoff’s parallel architecture and optimality theory.
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Lastly, I attempted to unite the modelling practices of the generative tradition with acompeting approach which lacks the similar theoretical underpinnings of the parallelarchitecture and OT, namely the dynamic syntax of Kempson et al (2001). I arguedthat although the theoretical underpinnings of this latter framework do seem distinct(and genuinely are) from those of the larger generative programme, they approachthe target system of natural language in similar ways. For the sake of nontriviality,I presented an overview of linguistic frameworks which do not share this modellingapproach.
Chapter 6Modelling in Semantics
Formal semantics is a mathematical framework for the investigation of meaning innatural language, its structure and significance. As a field, semantics has beenbeset with objections ranging from claims as to its triviality, its limited scope and itsquestionable scientific target. In this chapter, I present a view of formal semanticsas applied mathematics where the “application” maps formal syntactic models ontothe world or assumed structure of the world. I attempt to address the questionsof the purpose, target and efficacy of formal semantics through the analogy withapplied mathematics and also thereby shed light on its explanatory and predictivepower and the syntax-semantics interface. The account presented here draws fromdetailed comments on the nature of compositionality, negative polarity items andunderspecification techniques in semantics.
6.1 Formal Semantics as Applied Mathematics
In the previous chapters, I aimed to provide an account of the modelling practicesinherent in specific theories of syntax and redefine the generative programme in mod-elling terms (or in accordance with the first grade of involvement of Part I). In thischapter, I aim to pair that analysis up with the modelling involved in formal seman-tics. It will not, however, be my mission to analyse individual theory development inthis chapter as it was in the last. Firstly, because the modelling perspective seemsto have been more generally acknowledged by semanticists of various persuasionsand secondly because my purpose here will be to offer an underlying philosophi-cal characterisation of modelling in semantics in accordance with a tradition withinapplied mathematics and its philosophy.A good place to begin to understand the nature and place of formal semanticsin linguistics and philosophy is by appreciating its essential connection to a the-ory of formal syntax. Although the mathematics which inspired formal syntax (thegenerative enumerative formalisms of proof theory) diverges from the model theoretic
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underpinnings of formal semantics, the scientific import of semantics can and shouldremain substantively linked to syntactic theory and phenomena. In this chapter, Iargue that formal semantics can be construed as the mathematical application ofmodel theoretic techniques to a formalised structure of grammatical discourse givento us by theoretical syntax. In this sense, formal semantics is an applied mathemati-cal discipline whose target is not necessarily the empirical world directly but ratherthe structures generated by a syntactic analysis of natural language, i.e. syntacticmodels.An alternative approach to understanding the nature of semantics can be gleanedfrom the tradition connected with a theory of truth. Davidson (1965) famously re-versed Tarski’s direction of explanation for truth as relying on a fixed theory ofmeaning and instead used a fixed theory of truth to establish a systematic theory ofmeaning.1 Unlike syntactic models which aim to capture facts about grammaticalitycapable of construal independent of correspondence to objects or situations in theworld, a largely structural enterprise, semantic theories, on this view, tend to attempta link between linguistic formalism and nonlinguistic reality. Thus, it is no surprisethat semantics has held the attention and fascination of philosophers of language toa more significant extent than its syntactic counterpart.2 There are many insightsto be had within this framework. However, we have to be wary of conflating thescientific project of modelling linguistic phenomena with foundational projects aimedat accounting for them philosophically.3The rich philosophical tradition on linguistic meaning notwithstanding, formalsemantics has emerged as a programme strongly connected to the syntactic projectof linguists. I will continue this approach to understanding the role and nature ofsemantics in the present work. I will further argue that in order to appreciate thescientific explanations present in semantics, i.e. how semantic modelling works, thisview is essential.Semantics as a distinct scientific discipline within theoretical linguistics has hada controversial history and continues to be divisive among some theorists. Manylinguists, following Chomsky, believe that a theory of meaning has no part in anexplanation of linguistic competence or the faculty of language narrowly construed(see Chomsky, Hauser and Fitch 2002). Others, such as Horwich, advocate a more
1“It is possible to view a Tarski truth characterization for a language L as simply specifyingthe extension of ‘true’ for L, explaining how the truth value of a sentence depends on the semanticproperties of its parts, and providing the basis for accounts of logical truth and logical consequence”(Soames, 1984: 416).2This aspect of semantics is related to the notion of ontological commitment. Rayo (2007) makesthe connection between truth conditions and ontology by stating that “[t]o describe a sentence’sontological commitments is to describe some of the demands that the sentence’s truth imposes on theworld” (428). These demands are captured by the truth-conditions.3Yet another distinction is presented by the recent introduction of “meta-semantics” or the philo-sophical investigation of the purpose, place and methodology of semantics within scientific inquiry. Iwould consider the present chapter a part of this nascent tradition.
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Wittgenstinian line in terms of usage-based concepts. A growing trend in the phi-losophy of language, which includes radical contextualism, aims to narrow the rangeof phenomena which is in need of specific semantic treatment (as opposed to say,treatment in terms of pragmatics). Some, such as Sampson (2001), claim that linguis-tics dances on the boundary line between the sciences and the humanities, whereassyntax can receive a scientific (read: empirical) treatment, semantics is significantlymore amorphous and falls squarely on the humane linguistics agenda.In section 6.2, I investigate the aim, target domain and methodology of semantics.In section 6.3, I argue that semantic analyses act as a sort of engineering whichmakes our syntactic models applicable to the world and linguistic communication byinterpreting them. I will argue that formal semantics should be construed as a typeof applied mathematics in the spirit of Hughes (1997), Suárez (2004) and others,much like engineering or mathematical physics, in which the formal model theoreticapparatus is applied to the syntactic models of human language use and cognitionas interpreting structures or mappings. First, however, an outline of the aims, targetand methods of formal semantics is in order. In section 6.4, I use the case of NPIlicensing to investigate the predictive capacity of semantic models. Lastly, in section6.5, I use the philosophical apparatus set up in the previous two sections to accountfor the syntax-semantics interface.
6.2 Aims, Target and Methods
6.2.1 Semantic ExplanandaThe literature on formal semantics commonly presupposes a modelling perspective.Semanticists often refer to their task as modelling semantic phenomena or creatingsemantic models in order to capture semantic facts. For instance, Yalcin claims that“[l]inguistic syntax and semantics are ultimately concerned to produce explanatorymodels of aspects of the knowledge that underwrites this capacity” (2014: 36). Ina discussion of context-sensitivity, Dever (2012) asserts “[c]ontext-sensitivity of lan-guage can be modelled in a formal semantic theory by assigning semantic valuesrelative to a context, or by assigning semantic values that are functions from contextsto more standard semantic values” (55). Here the optional nature of the modellingdevice indicates that the semantic model is an indirect representation of the tar-get property (e.g. context-sensitivity). Though modelling parlance is widespread,this by itself is not enough to establish that semantic theory constitutes scientificmodelling. In fact, the term “model” itself is ambiguous between the concept of acertain interpreting structure in model theory (consisting of a domain of objects andinterpretation function) and a scientific model (a special type of representing device).Needless to say, the influence of model theory on formal semantics did not aid inthe resolution of this confusion. As Hodges puts it,
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Semantic models don’t belong in the same list as scale models, analoguemodels, diagram models, mathematical models and so forth. The reason whythey are called ‘models’ at all is historical and rather indirect (2009: 667).
Thus, there is a distinction between semantic models in the mathematical logicsense and semantic modelling in the scientific sense, i.e. the modelling practisedin formal semantics. We would do well to keep these different conceptions in mindgoing forward. Nevertheless, pace Hodges, modelling in semantics might, and I arguedoes, resemble modelling in the applied sciences. However, in order to understandmodelling in any scientific domain, one needs to isolate the aim, target and methodemployed to achieve the modeller’s aim.On to the first task. Semantics is often considered to be in the business ofarticulating a theory of meaning. The theory of meaning in question has certainimportant characteristics. For Davidson, one core explanandum was learnabilitywhich he took to be evidence of compositionality. “Then we may state the conditionunder discussion by saying: a learnable language has a finite number of semanticalprimitives” (Davidson, 1965: 9).This coupled with the ubiquitous claim that there are an infinite number of naturallanguage sentences results in a particular version of the principle of compositionality.
When we can regard the meaning of each sentence as a function of a finitenumber of features of the sentence, we have an insight not only into what there isto be learned; we also understand how an infinite aptitude can be encompassedby finite accomplishments (Davidson, 1965: 8).
Although learnability is certainly a worthy aspect of linguistic investigation, itdoes not often fall under the purview of formal semantics explicity (although it isassumed).4 Rather, the aim of semantics is to account for “semantic facts” such asthey are “found in the world” so to speak (represented in (6.1) to (6.5) below). Thisaim is not to be confused with the explanation of meaningful linguistic behaviour ingeneral which would include pragmatic phenomena.Stating the linguistic facts for which semantics is responsible is not an easytask. The problem is that even selecting what counts as data is a theoretical matter,especially in linguistics. For instance, generative linguists often strive for whatthey call explanatorily adequate grammars which take language acquisition data asexplananda. In Dynamic Syntax, grammars are influenced by parsing phenomena(see Part II.5). Therefore, deciding which linguistic phenomena make it into semanticmodels is not a theory neutral activity. The best one can hope for is to capture
4This division of labour corresponds to similar adequacy conditions for a theory of grammardescribed in Chomsky (1965), where the level of explanatorily adequate grammars aim to account forlanguage acquisition data.
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the intersection of various facts which often receive treatment from formal semantictheories.5 A good place to start is with a canonical textbook of Larson and Segal.6Larson and Segal (1995) split the data in need of formal semantic description intofive categories, primary or “immediate” facts, secondary ambiguity facts, semanticallyanomalous statements, entailment and thematic relations respectively.
(6.1) Snow is white.
(6.2) Flying planes can be dangerous.
(6.3) *The theory of universal grammar stole my sandwich.
(6.4) 1. Susan is a woman.2. Susan is a mammal.
(6.5) 1. The train travelled from London to Paris.2. The inheritance passed from John to Mary.3. The substance changed from liquid to gas.
The first three of these examples represent a class of expressions which arecommonly associated with formal semantic description, namely standard declarativesinvolving predication (and their disquotational counterparts), ambiguous sentencesor sentences with two or more readings and semantically anomalous sentences (withotherwise acceptable syntactic structure).7 The next set of sentences in (6.4) areconnected by some kind of entailment relation. And finally the last set of sentencesare thematically related in that they all convey the action or concept of change ortransition. Thematic relations are usually linked to the notion of argument structure.In Jackendoff (2002), thematic role determines syntactic word order via a principle oflinking hierarchy for NP arguments. He claims that the principle belongs neither tosyntax nor to semantics proper but rather the interface between them.
5We can see the difficulty in demarcating the “neutral” data if we consider examples of the so-called “non-substitutivity of logical equivalents” from Partee (1979). Formal semantics treats thepair Irene believes that p and Irene believes that q differently even when p is equivalent to q. Thissuggests that human psychology plays a role in semantic modelling.6This approach is not merely a convenience. I follow Giere (1988) here in starting from an analysisof textbooks as opposed to active research in a field (I do not maintain his focus on them throughoutthough). If we wish to learn what a theory is from the standpoint of scientists who use that theory, one way toproceed is by examining the textbooks from which they learned most of what they know about that theory(63).
7The latter phenomenon has recently been claimed to have significance for formal semantics andlexical semantics in general with relation to the type theoretic structure required within the formalism.See Asher (2011).
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In all of the above cases, linguistic meaning is associated with a particular formor syntactic structure whether it is subject-predicate or VP, quantifier-pronoun orthematic role. Grammaticality or the absence of grammaticality as in the case ofsentences like (6.3) provides a guide to semantic interpretation. This is generallynot the case with pragmatic phenomena. Consider the following examples said ofa job applicant in a reference letter and to a friend by a second language Englishspeaker respectively.
(6.6) Tolani has excellent handwriting.
(6.7) *She said me to stay.
In the first of these cases, more than syntactic arrangement is needed in order tointerpret or retrieve the intention of the speaker, such as context, tone etc. In (6.6)the sentence is grammatical yet the speaker or writer does not intend the literalmeaning of the sentence. (6.7) is not a sentence of English, yet it is intelligible.Formal semantics is not responsible for these sorts of phenomena.8This layout of semantically relevant data dovetails in some respects with Yalcin’s(2014) claims as to the nature of what constitutes a semantic datum. His characteri-sation includes productivity facts, entailment facts, communication facts, acceptabilityfacts and truth or appropriateness facts. Productivity facts are supposed to be relatedto the ability to produce and understand previously unencountered linguistic expres-sions (what I call “compositional semantic facts” below). Entailment facts are relatedto implication, consistency and contradiction (e.g. sentences in (6.4)). Communica-tion facts are related to the systematic transfer of information within any languageuser’s arsenal. Acceptability facts are related to anomaly (as in (6.3)). And finallytruth or appropriateness facts are related to the fact that we judge sentences like(6.1) as true or appropriate in certain contexts.Most of these types of data are friendly amendments to the view currently underdiscussion. However, I would hesitate to include “communication facts” under theremit of formal semantics proper for a few reasons. For one thing, communicationfacts are too broad and encompass all kinds of pragmatic and even nonlinguisticinformation transfer. Furthermore, “systematic information transfer” need not involvegrammatical form of any sort. Incompetent speakers of a language can still conveyinformation in a systematic manner, including this data might not serve us well assemanticists. Consider a pidgin language established for trade purposes betweentwo remote villages. Although standard pidgin languages involve significant syntac-tic poverty, they still manage to convey systemic information which includes pluraland number specifications (often through reduplication as opposed to derivational
8In fact, a criticism of the generative semantics movement of the early 70’s, one which is associatedwith its downfall, is that it attempted to model too much phenomena. See Newmeyer (1996) andLudlow (2011).
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morphology). There are no native speakers of pidgins and thus the semantics of suchlanguages resemble a hodgepodge of resources and contextual inferences.9Therefore, the way in which to weed out extraneous factors, such as pragmaticphenomena or ungrammatical but otherwise meaningful signs, is by returning to apoint suggested by Davidson, mentioned earlier. The difference between data such asthat represented in (6.1)-(6.5) and (6.6)-(6.7) (and some communication data) aboveis that the meaning of the former can be derived compositionally from the syntaxwhile the meaning of the latter cannot.Thus, the principle of compositionality is not only a means of capturing desirablelinguistic properties such as learnability, productivity and systematicity but it alsoacts as a filter for relevant versus irrelevant data for linguistic semantics. More onthe nature of compositionality as a modelling choice in section 6.5. Higginbothamdescribes the overarching point in characteristically illuminating fashion, “[s]emanticsconnects forms with meaning: but the theory of meaning and the theory of form donot proceed along separate tracks. Information about each can provide evidence forthe other” (1989: 159).The picture that is emerging of the “semantic facts” for which a scientific theory ofmeaning should account is based on the relationship between syntax and semantics.On this view, formal semantics aims to explain only “compositional semantic facts”. Orin other words, semantic analyses do grow on trees (or directed graphs or categorialproofs etc.).
6.2.2 Target of the ModelEven if the so-called “semantic facts” or domain of inquiry are agreed upon pretheo-retically, there are divergent views on what exactly the overarching target of seman-tic modelling is, i.e. what explaining or modelling the aforementioned semantic factsamounts to. Another way of distinguishing aims and targets is that the aim could bethe explanation of compositional semantic facts but the target could be consideredin terms of the location of those facts.
Cartesian SemanticsOn the dominant tradition, linguistics is the study of a distinct language facultyinside of the mind/brain of the language user. Following Higginbotham (1989),this view can referred to as “Cartesian linguistics” and correspondingly “CartesianSemantics”. On this view, the target of linguistic inquiry is a type of tacit knowledgeon the part of speakers brought out by their linguistic judgements. In an almost
9These languages are learnable but cannot be acquired. When pidgins do get adopted by lin-guistic communities, they tend to undergo what is referred to as “creolisation” which involves theestablishment of systematic syntactic and semantic rules. Nevertheless, this latter point is not un-controversial.
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Kantian move, the collective idiolects of speakers constitute an objective reality andsubsequent target of linguistic inquiry which in this case is an internally representedsystem of rules or I-language. The idea, initially proposed by Chomsky (1957), isthat a grammar (or generative grammar) of a language L constitutes a scientifictheory of an internalised rule system for generating all and only the grammaticalsentences of L. A speaker ‘knows’ or ‘cognises’ this system of rules and producesjudgements or linguistic intuitions based on this knowledge of the grammar. However,the extension of this idea to semantics proved controversial for most Chomskyans (andin part resulted in the Semantic Wars of the 70’s). Nevertheless, many contemporarysemanticists consider themselves to be squarely rooted in the generative tradition.For example, compare the following quotes from Yalcin and Glanzberg respectivelyon the object of semantic theory.
I shall also assume, as is generally assumed in the tradition of generativelinguistics, that linguistic competence is the primary subject of study for linguis-tic theory. Thus, in effect, linguistic theory studies what knowledge—or moregenerally what cognitive states—underwrite our linguistic abilities (2014: 261).
and,
From the perspective on semantic theory I am recommending here, commu-nicative uses of language reveal aspects of the state of mind which consists inunderstanding and speaking the language. It is the state of mind, or the seman-tic aspect thereof (‘knowledge of meaning’, understood in the technical sense),that semantics is foremost concerned with modeling (2014: 31).
Pinning down precisely what sort of “knowledge” is involved in the exercise oflinguistic abilities is a notoriously difficult task (but as Glanzberg notes, does involve“modeling”). Following Devitt and Sterelny (1989) and Devitt (2006), let us take Gto be a grammar or set of rules the members of which form a fragment of English.The question is then, what relation does a speaker of English have to G?There are few options. We could say that a speaker behaves in accordance with
G (“as if governed by G“ in Devitt and Sterelny’s words). However, this will not dofor the Cartesian linguist since the speaker could be behaving in accordance withsome internalised G′ which is identical to G in behavioural output (see Part I.3.1).The next possibility is that the speaker ‘knows’ that G is a fragment of Englishgrammar and applies it accordingly. This is the strong representational thesis (ofDevitt 2006). It attributes propositional knowledge (knowledge-that) of the rulesof a language to the language-user. Now of course, the speaker does not possessexplicit propositional knowledge of her language, but rather this knowledge is tacit.10Unfortunately, this does not explain much. In attempting to explain what exactly this
10The distinctions between explicit, implicit and tacit are not always stated clearly. A roughcharacterisation (along the lines of Dummett) is that explicit knowledge is verbalisable upon re-
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tacit knowledge constitutes, we are returned to the same issue as above, i.e. doesit involve behaving in accordance with G or having a(n) (unconscious) propositionalattitude towards G and how do we distinguish its rivals G′ etc.?The challenges for this view do not cease here. Chomsky (1980a) introduced theterm of art “cognise” in many ways to avoid the sorts of concerns that are broughtforward with the term “knowledge”. It is unclear how this strategy eliminates theworries though.11
Public LanguageA rival conception of the target of semantic (and linguistic) modelling is usuallypresented under the umbrella term of “public language”. A chief proponent of thisview is Michael Dummett. For Dummett, natural languages are constituted by thesocial practices in which they are used. Thus, the target of semantics is the publiclanguages which emerge from shared linguistic activities in a community of languageusers. These shared practices are explained in terms of conventions.12 Millikan(2005) similarly argues that “a primary function of the human language faculty isto support linguistic conventions, and that these have an essentially communicativefunction” (25). She thus offers an alternative approach to the Chomskyan view thatthere is no “public object” which corresponds to a natural language. However, con-trary to many views on the nature of a public language, such as the Platonism ofKatz and Postal, Millikan argues that,
[t]he web of conventions that forms the mass that is public language is not anabstract object but a concrete set of speaker–hearer interactions forming lineagesroughly in the biological sense. These lineages and their interactions with oneanother are worthy of scientific study. Nor are their properties derivative merelyfrom the properties of I-languages (2005: 28).
Non-cartesian views on the target of linguistic theory emphasise the communica-tive social aspects of natural language. A specifically semantic proposal in this veinis contemporary Brandomian inferentialism. The core idea of this framework is thatin the same way that the meanings or content of logical constants can be deter-mined by the inferential roles they play in a logical system (via introduction andelimination rules), the meanings of ordinary terms and words in natural language
quest/prompting, implicit knowledge is derivable from explicit (through inference or something of thatsort) and tacit knowledge is something like behaviourally attributable but not verbalisable or deriv-able (this is vague). On other accounts, tacit knowledge has been described as I have describedimplicit knowledge here.11See Ludlow (2011:50) for a discussion of why knowledge is too “thick” a notion for our linguisticpurposes and cognise is too “thin” a notion.12See Davidson (1986) for the claim that knowledge of shared linguistics conventions is neithernecessary nor sufficient for communication. Also see Lepore and Ludwig (2007) for overview of thedebate between Davidson and Dummett on this issue.
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are determined by their inferential roles. This is a radical idea which challenges anumber of tenets of the referential/truth-conditional theories of meaning the likes ofwhich have dominated the semantic landscape since the work of Frege and Russellin the early 20th century.In a recent exposition of the inferentialist programme, Peregrin (2015) argues forthe central place of rules within semantics. Unlike the Chomskyan conception ofrules which are internal and individualistic (two aspects of the “I” in I-language) andthe external communicative aspects of natural language are purely ancillary in mostrespects, rules are norms established by the practices of linguistic communities.
To be sure, if an expression has a meaning within a linguistic community,then the speakers of the community will conceive of it in certain specific ways.However, this is not enough to establish the fact that it means what it does. Anessentially private act of conception is not capable of grounding the essentiallypublic institution of language. That people of some community mentally asso-ciate the word spider with a certain kind of animal is a fact of their individualpsychologies not capable of establishing the fact that spider expresses, withintheir language, the concept of spider ; what is needed alongside any privateassociations are some public practices that make the link between the word anda concept public and shared (Peregrin, 2015: 44).
Although the concept of rule remains central on this view, the order of explana-tion is reversed from the inside-out to a view of meaning being determined from theoutside-in, from external social normative practices to internal mental representa-tions. The target of formal semantics is then more sociological than psychological.These debates are certainly of great interest to the study of meaning in generaland the theories that are informed by such a study. However, I do not think thatthey necessarily affect formal semantics from a modelling perspective. Models areindirect representations of a target system, in this case natural language. In thisway, models are compatible with a number of divergent views on the ontologicalnature of the target and philosophical disposition of theorists. This is not to saythat modellers are in no way influenced by the intellectual crazes of the day but themodels are to a large extent independent of theories. As we have seen, semanticistsof contrasting views tend to agree on the semantic facts (or “compositional semanticfacts”) in need of explanation. Whether they think these facts stem from knowledgeof internal rule systems of a language faculty or from external social practices oflinguistic communities, the facts remain the same. The underlying theoretical targetor persuasion of the modellers in this respect is largely orthogonal to the task ofexplaining, representing and predicting compositional semantic facts through theapplication of formal methods.
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Autonomy of ModelsThere is a certain element of instrumentalism involved in the process of scientificallymodelling a specific phenomenon. The autonomy or partial autonomy of models iswell-established in the literature on the subject.
It is common to think that models can be derived entirely from theory or fromdata. However, if we look closely at the ways models are constructed we canbegin to see the sources of their independence. It is because they are neitherone thing nor the other, neither just theory nor data, but typically involve someof both (and often additional ‘outside’ elements), that they can mediate betweentheory and the world (Morrison and Morgan, 1999: 11).
This is to say that models are often constructed or built up in a piecemeal andheterogeneous fashion as argued by Suárez and Cartwright (2008) with relationto the Londons’ model of superconductivity in physics. In addition, models tend tofunction in autonomous ways as well. In the case at hand, the same instrument(semantic model) can be used for various functions and to represent various targetsboth psychological and social. For instance, Klein (1999) claims that historicallycertain chemical formulas functioned as models and affected theory change similarlyto Fitzgerald’s pulley and rubber model of aether used to correct Maxwell’s electro-magnetic theory. There are many more such examples from the history and practiceof science.The point is that models, and in this case semantic models, can be assessedindependently of theoretical targets and constraints. The view of formal seman-tic modelling developed here is one which takes no position on whether semanticknowledge or social practice is the correct theory of meaning in natural language.
Models can be used to study a single target, a cluster of targets, a gener-alized target, or even targets known not to exist. One can even engage in thestudy of a model without any target at all (Weisberg, 2013: 74).
This is not to say that, in every case, the relationship between a target system anda model can be explained independently of the modeller’s intentions. Hodge’s (2009)seems to hold the contrary view, namely that a model M and a system (or target) S“do involve a correlation linking M and S. But there is no need for them to mentionanybody intending this correlation” (667). I think that this is a mistake. Considerthe case of mathematical models with identical mathematical structures such as agiven pendulum and a particular circuit or a spring. Without some account of the“construal” or interpretation of the model, there would be no telling these modelsapart. This is the view held by Weisberg (2013), in which “we can say that these
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models share a common core mathematical structure, and what differs are theorists’construals” (72).13In Part I we discussed Lewis’ (1975) alternative to both views described here. ForLewis, a language is both an abstract object, a function mapping forms to intensions(or meanings), and a social construct used by a linguistic community. The best wayto describe the relationship between these two distinct aspects of natural languageis that the language L used by a specific community c is a model determined by theconventions, defined in terms of regularities, of that community. On Lewis’ picture,a language is comprised of both form or syntax and meaning or semantics. Thelanguage L is a function and within its domain are syntactic objects while its rangeis comprised of meanings. Once again, syntax and semantics form part of an orderedpair called a language. Higginbotham (1985) critiques this view of semantic factsbeing defined purely in terms of the range of linguistic functions. To this effect hehas a modal argument stating that nonsentences or sentences not generated by thesyntactic formalism (grammar) of a specific language should fall within the remitof semantics in addition to well-formed sentences. For Higginbotham, sentencesand nonsentences are structurally ambiguous. I think that this emendation takes ustoo far a field from tractable compositional facts such as those presented in section6.2.2.14The common thread in all of these various frameworks is the focus on interpretedform. For Chomskyans, form or syntax is the central component of the languagefaculty and our linguistic competence. Higginbotham, Glanzberg and Yalcin15 extendthis account of linguistic competence to include semantic knowledge. Semanticists ofthe inferentialist persuasion follow Dummett in the acceptance of a public languageas a legitimate focus of scientific theory. However, they do maintain that sentencesare the vehicles of semantic expression. In fact, Brandom stresses the “top-down” orsententialist aspect of semantic inferences and the reliance on compositionality, i.e.semantic analysis starts with whole sentences where the content of a sentence isdetermined by the role the sentence plays in a language game of “giving and askingfor reasons” or it is “a matter of being able to play the role both of premise and ofconclusion in inferences” (2007: 654).Thus, the target system of formal semantic models are syntactic grammars ormodels. Whether linguistics is psychology, sociology or a hybrid theory does not
13A construal is comprised of an assignment, intended scope and two fidelity criteria for Weisberg,where the latter are “the standards that theorists use to evaluate a model’s ability to represent realphenomena” (2013: 76).14For one thing, this seems to be a similar move to the UG hypothesis of syntactic theory inwhich individual variation in form is assumed to be subsumed by a more universal patterning. UGis tendentious in syntax, in semantics it is almost untenable. To say that formal semantics needs toaccount for an underlying semantic structure invariant under different natural language instantiationis not only controversial but runs against the simplifying agenda of most modelling practices.15Larson and Segal (1995) and Heim and Kratzer (1998) would also fall within this tradition.
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directly concern the modelling practices of semanticists. The only way in which thesetheoretical positions would have mattered more to the current debate would havebeen if psychological or other social scientific methods were used in the constructionof semantic models or formal grammars in general. In the next section, I aim to showthat this is far from the case.
6.2.3 Methods and Model TheoryThe methodology of formal semantics is well-documented through the means of var-ious standard textbooks on the subject from the aforementioned Larson and Segal(1995) and the more generative linguistics inspired Heim and Kratzer (1998) to themore theory neutral GAMUT (1991). The common apparatus of formal semantic the-ories is familiar from formal logic, type theory and lambda calculus. These theoriesare usually built up from the denotation of individual morphemes or words, the termi-nal elements of syntactic trees, to complex elements conjoined semantically throughfunctional application. As Dever (2012) puts it,
There is no precise delineation of what counts as formal semantics. Roughly,though, formal semantics is the attempt to give precise accounts of the relationbetween syntactic structures and semantic values, typically while making use oftools from mathematics and logic (49).
Two basic insights characterise the field, namely that the meaning of an expres-sion is provided by the conditions under which it is true (at least for declarativesentences) and that meanings are composed according to the principle of composi-tionality, a version of which is presented below.
The meaning of a complex expression is a function of the meanings ofits constituents and the syntactic rule used to combine these constituents.
There are a number of syntactic notions present in the above definition, suchas “constituent” and “syntactic rule”, each of which is defined in a myriad of waysby various syntactic theories.16 The most common way of representing the relationbetween syntactic elements and semantic interpretation is by means of a homomor-phism between two abstract algebras (one corresponding to the syntax and one to thesemantics). The above principle can then be functionally (homomorphically) definedin the following way.
For every syntactic rule σ ∈ Σ there is a corresponding mean-ing operation rµ such that if σ(u1, ..., un) is assigned a meaning, then
µ(σ(u1, ..., un)) = rµ(µ(u1), ..., µ(un)).
16In some formalisms, such as dependency grammar, there is no clear notion of constituency.
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drivesProper names and other physical objects are represented by the type e for en-tity and intransitive verbs are functions from entities to truth values 〈e, t〉 where thesemantic value of a sentence is t. Following Heim and Kratzer (1995: 17), the se-mantic value of the nonterminal V or N node is inherited from the semantic valueof its terminal counterpart. The interesting part of the analysis occurs at the non-terminal nodes which mark syntactic composition. In this case the S-node of thetree. By means of Fregean insight, the corresponding semantic rule is provided byfunctional application, where the semantic value of Sipho (indicated by the doubleline delimiters) is applied to the semantic value of drives.
• JSipho drivesK = JdrivesK(JSiphoK)








a carThe set theoretic object associated with this tree involves two levels of functionalapplication (technically three if you include the determiner phrase).18 The semantic
17The mathematics involved in the intensional variant is very much the same as the extensionaltheory with the exception of the possible world type s and functions involving it.18Most current accounts in syntax use DPs or determiner phrases instead of NPs even when there
6.2. AIMS, TARGET AND METHODS 103
value of a transitive verb has the type 〈e, 〈e, t〉〉 or functions from entities to functionsfrom entities to truth-values represented below in two steps of functional application.
• Jdrives a car K = JdrivesK(Ja carK)
• JSipho drives a car K = JdrivesK(Ja carK)(JSiphoK)
The verb drive is ambiguous between a transitive and intransitive constructions(or optionally selects for direct objects). Modelling transitive verbs sometimes seemsto require that we use more than just functional application, we might also usethe technique commonly known as currying a function in mathematics (Heim andKratzer prefer the term “Schönfinkelization”). Currying a function involves taking afunction with multiple arguments or a domain of ordered n-tuples and turning it intoa sequence of functions (or complex function), taking each argument individually. Forinstance, in the case of a ditransitive verb like give, instead of taking it to involve theCartesian product of three entities to a truth-value (or 〈e × e × e, t〉), we take eachin turn as in 〈e, 〈e, 〈e, t〉〉. Currying or Schönfinkelization, however, might not just beartifacts of the modelling. If we take semantic values as aspects of the target systemand certain kinds of functions to represent these in our models, we could allow forthe possibility that semantic values qua functions come pre-“curried” to a certainextent (I will return to the issue of direct modelling strategies in section 6.5.2).Technically, transitive constructions can be handled within the bounds of func-tional application. What does pose a problem for strict functional application isphenomena such as object position quantifiers as in the examples below.
(6.8) Kgalema likes every politician.
(6.9) Nokuthula met some people.
The problem is that there is no straightforward way to apply functional applicationin this case since the semantic value of a transitive expression is type 〈e, 〈e, t〉〉 andthe quantifier expression is of type 〈〈e, t〉, t〉. One way in which to account for suchdata is by positing quantifier raising or movement rules. In essence, every politicianor some people moves to a higher node in the tree and leaves a trace behind, therebyallowing the semantic values to be computed as before (as if the quantifiers were inthe higher position). Of course, this analysis does require something akin to LF orlogical form for surface forms to map onto. We will return to the issue of syntacticreinterpretation based on semantic considerations in the forthcoming sections. Fornow, however, the point is that unappended functional application is not enough toaccount for every syntactic combination.
is a null determiner place. I ignore these details for the sake of simplicity. Similarly for I(nflectional)P(hrase) and C(omplementiser) P(hrase) categories.
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Lastly, before concluding the present sketch, we need to mention the use of λ-notation ubiquitous in formal semantics. We have already seen that in the processof mapping syntactic structures onto set-theoretic objects, we encountered complexfunctional notation and with the inclusion of quantifiers, reflexives and traces thenotational complexity only grows. In order to limit confusion and name various settheoretic objects, we introduce λ-notation with variables from formal logic. Thus,a simple sentence like Thembie works becomes λx(x works)(Thembie) where wereplace the name Thembie with a variable x, add the name as an argument, andattach the λ-operator to bind the variable with the result that the λ-formula nowrepresents a truth-conditional function. The formula for lambda abstraction used bysemanticists is the following schema “λα : β.γ” where α is a variable place reservedfor the argument, β specifies the domain of the function and γ assigns a value for theargument α. The example in Heim and Kratzer (1995: 34) represents the successorfunction in arithmetic.
• F+1 :=[λx : x ∈ N. x+ 1]
The above definition can be read as the function which maps every x such that xis in N to x + 1. This notation proves extremely useful in denoting various complexset theoretic objects corresponding to the semantic values which in turn representsyntactic objects and their composition. With the tools of functional application, typetheory and λ-calculus, formal semantic modelling can represent the semantic valuesof a range of syntactic objects both simple and complex.The essential aspect of the apparatus described so far is that it serves to furtherestablish the scientific modelling nature of the enterprise of formal semantics. Jacob-son (2014) explains the use of the aforementioned formal techniques in the followingway.
[T]he language used to name model-theoretic objects is of no consequencefor the theory and is only a tool for the linguist (the grammar itself simply pairsexpressions with model-theoretic objects). But once the objects get sufficientlycomplex (e.g., functions with functions as their domains as well as co-domains) itis useful to have a simple way to write out these meanings without excruciatingand/or ambiguous prose, and the lambda calculus allows us to do just this [...] areminder that these name actual model-theoretic objects and that the formulashave no theoretical significance (Jacobson, 2014: 134).
Lambdas, types and variables are not found in nature.19 The semantic models weuse to represent the meanings of syntactic structures operate in (partial) autonomyfrom what we take meaningful discourse or natural languages themselves to be, i.e.
19Pronouns might be thought of as the natural language equivalent of variables. For a contraryview, see Collins (in preparation) on variable involvement in syntax. Variable-free semantics is alsoa lively research programme.
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states of the language faculty or patterns determined by social norms. In addition,the models abstract away from other linguistic data which might be connected tomeaningful discourse or interpretation, such as phonological or pragmatic information.Furthermore, semantic models are a subset of more general mathematical modelsfound in the other applied sciences such as mathematical physics and engineering.An explicit argument for the latter claim is to be presented in the subsequent section.
6.3 On the Unreasonable Effectiveness of Semantics
It might be tempting to view the current proposal as a suggestion that formal seman-tics is an exercise in formalisation or mere formal description. Whereas the theoriesdiscussed section 6.2.2. are explanatory in nature, scientific or otherwise, formalsemantics merely describes the kinds of compositional facts stated in section 6.2.1.This is the picture against which Szabó (2015) argues.
The working semanticist (who tends to be employed in a linguistics de-partment) is in the business of building what various authors have dubbed adescriptive semantics; the speculative semanticist (a philosopher, no doubt) isin the business of thinking about the foundational questions of meaning (1).
The inimical idea argued against here is that (descriptive) semantics sets itselfthe task of simply collecting systematic data, such as the compositional semanticfacts, and cataloguing this data for use in future theories of meaning. Szabó arguesfurther that cataloguing can in no way be construed as theory building as “a cata-logue remains silent about the reasons behind the classification it employs” (2015,2). This objection is redolent of similar critiques of the pre-Chomskyan AmericanStructuralist movement in which figures such as Charles Hockett claimed that lin-guistics is ultimately a classificatory science. This interpretation of the descriptiveproject is supposedly at odds with a genuine explanatory project in which semanti-cists take themselves to be engaged. I think that there is a way of avoiding theseparticular problems.By appreciating the role of mathematical modelling in the sciences, we can findan intermediary position which neither neglects explanation in semantics nor Lewis’caution against confusing formal semantic models with theoretical linguistic persua-sions.
I distinguish two topics: first, the description of possible languages or gram-mars as abstract semantic systems whereby symbols are associated with aspectsof the world; and, second, the description of the psychological and sociologicalfacts whereby a particular one of these abstract semantic systems is the oneused by a person or population. Only confusion comes of mixing these twotopics (Lewis, 1970: 19).
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Models can explain things, they can make predictions and they can even correcttheories (as was the case with Fitzgerald’s pulley model). In some cases, as in cer-tain physical applications, they can even act as experiments which test the validityof theoretical claims (this is how I have always considered intuition-based data ingenerative linguistics). It would be a mistake to equate the role of a model with ataxonomy or list of items.20 The explanatory nature of models can be brought out byappreciating the features postulated of them which are meant to capture features ofthe target domain. For instance, in the case of formal semantics, compositionality ismotivated as a tool used to capture various limitations on human cognitive capacities.Szabó states that “there are good explanations in the sciences [...] and one of thethings that makes them good is that they track objective dependencies in the world”(2015: 7). I agree with this. But this is precisely the way in which most models areset up, either by means of resemblance relations (Giere 1988) or morphisms, isomor-phisms (van Fraasen 1980) or more recently monomorphisms (Bueno and Colyvan2011) etc.The claim I wish to put forward is that understanding the explanatory nature ofsemantic models involves essentially the same puzzle as understanding the successof mathematical modelling within the empirical sciences more generally. I will firstoutline the philosophical problem of applied mathematics then offer an overview ofsome contemporary answers which I believe can be applied mutatis mutandis to theexplanatory role of formal semantics in linguistic theory.We start with a problem initially presented by the physicist Eugene Wigner(1960). There are essentially two related problems.
1. “The first point is that the enormous usefulness of mathematics in the naturalsciences is something bordering on the mysterious and that there is no rationalexplanation for it”
2. “Second, it is just this uncanny usefulness of mathematical concepts that raisesthe question of the uniqueness of our physical theories”
Another way to look at the puzzle is that mathematicians do not seem to be con-cerned with empirical application in their daily work, they are usually interpretedas being motivated by a priori considerations, and yet the theories they create (ordiscover) have remarkable relevance for empirical research. Surprisingly, philoso-phers of science (and equally, philosophers of mathematics) have had little interestin this puzzle. More recently, however, interest in the topic has been awakened. The
20I think that lists get a bad reputation. In some cases they can prove to be genuinely explanatory.For instance, consider Katz and Fodor’s (1963) account of lexical semantics in terms of semanticmarkers or lists of structures with positive or negative values. This simple but elegant theory can beused to explain various entailment relations between words. Contemporary theta-theory incorporatesmany aspects of the older view.
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most intuitive approach to solving the problem of applied mathematics is the mappingaccount of Pincock (2004a, 2007).The mapping account draws inspiration from mathematical structuralism (Hell-man 1989, Resnik 1997, Shapiro 1997). On this view, mathematics provides abstractstructures which empirical scientists match up to various empirical structures.21 Bysome miracle, the mathematical structures developed by mathematicians yield ex-planations and predictions in the natural world. “The idea is that there is somestructure-preserving mapping between the world and the mathematical structure inquestion, and that is pretty much the end of it” (Bueno and Colyvan, 2011: 347).In the same way that I could use a map of Edinburgh to plot my course from thetrain station to the airport, a scientist can use mathematical structures of say grouptheory or differential calculus to discover facts about the structure of the physicalphenomenon under study. Take the case of the Lotka-Volterra model of predation.The physical phenomenon in need of modelling was something which puzzled bi-ologists after the first world war. They noticed that there was a shortage of sealife in the Adriatic despite the fact that fishing had significantly decreased at thetime of the war. On the other hand, the number of predatory species had increaseddramatically.Not only did the purely calculus based Lotka-Volterra model shed light on thephenomenon but it also predicted that “the predator and prey populations will oscil-late indefinitely, out of phase with one another” (Weisberg, 2013: 12). The equations(below) which determine the mathematical model in this case have biological con-sequences when equilibrium values are solved for (by setting the equations to zeroand assigning values to the variables).
• dV
dt
= rV − (aV )P
• dP
dt
= b(aV )P −mP
The above set of formulas, where P and V stand for the population sizes of thepredators and prey respectively, imply what Weisberg and Reisman (2008) call the“Volterra Property”. This property states that any event which has a harmful effecton both P and V will result in an increase of the size of V , as the post-world war Ibiologists noticed. Conversely, events such as light fishing, as occurred during thewar, would result in an increase in P or predator population. Puzzle solved!Returning to the mapping account, the equations set up certain structural rela-tions between objects, these relations can in turn be mapped onto the structures ofthe physical environment, in the case above predator-prey sizes. By manipulating the
21Technically, scientists assume a structure for the natural world, replete with various abstractionsand distortions.
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mathematical structures posited by the equations we gain insights into the physicalphenomenon or the relationships between the physical objects in the target system.The process can be seen in semantics as well. Consider the puzzle of structuralambiguity. Recall that in section 6.2.1., part of the semantic explananda or semanticfacts in need of explanation were sentences such as (2).
(2) Every boy likes a toy.
The above sentence has two readings, one in which each boy (in the domain)likes some distinct toy and one in which each boy likes the same toy. Structuralambiguities like these are ubiquitous in natural language. There are two ways inwhich to account for this phenomenon in linguistic theory.22We can follow Montague (1970) and alter the syntactic model thereby producingtwo distinct semantic derivations via compositionality.
The principle of compositionality requires that every (non-lexical) semanticambiguity corresponds to a derivational ambiguity. Whenever a sentence hasmore than one meaning, there should be more than one way of constructing it(GAMUT, 1991).
In Montague Grammar, the alternative readings are generated by “rules of quan-tification” which is another method of sentence construction. Contemporary syntacticmodels, however, have more reasonable methods for deriving the requisite struc-tures. Nevertheless, representing the scope ambiguities through alternative syntac-tic derivations can lead to an explosion of ambiguity and the need for innumerablealternative syntactic configurations. Motivation for syntactic alteration is often adhoc and not well-motivated as was the case in Montague’s original account.Underspecification is another way to go. Importantly, the underspecification ap-proach does not automatically entail a departure from the principle of composition-ality. Semantic underspecification is basically an intentional omission of linguisticinformation from semantic description. The underlying idea is to postpone semanticanalysis until it can be executed in such a way that various ambiguities are resolved.As we have seen in the previous chapter.
The key idea of underspecification is to devise a formalism which allows torepresent all logical readings of a sentence in a single compact structure. Sucha formalism allows one to preserve compositionality without artfully casting puresemantic ambiguities into syntactic ones [...] (Lesmo and Robaldo, 2006: 550).
22The two logical forms of the sentences are:(1) ∀x(Boy(x)→ ∃y(Toy(y) ∧ likes(y)(x)))(2) ∃y(Toy(y) ∧ ∀x(Boy(x)→ likes(y)(x)))
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Again, this process amounts to a type of storage of interpretations without im-mediately checking for consistency or a level of representation which allows for theambiguities to be unresolved. At a later stage these interpretations are pulled outor extracted and interpreted in parallel. Whether we use Cooper Storage, or holesand labels as in Bos (1995), the formal semantic apparatus can represent ambiguitywithout complicating the syntax.Therefore, structural ambiguity can be explained in two ways, by altering thecombinatorics of the syntactic models or by accounting for it purely in terms ofsemantics as in underspecification. The mathematics involved in both approachesis supposed to do more than just represent scope ambiguity in natural languagesyntax but it is meant to explain it. Why else would there be two non-equivalentapproaches, if one did not do a better job of explaining the phenomenon than theother? This is not to suggest that one approach is the right approach and the otheris not but rather that explanation can be a deciding factor between rival models(where simplicity, elegance and parsimony might be in the service of such a goal).The idea in the case of the Lotka-Volterra model as well as the scope ambiguitycase is that the underlying mathematics can explain the phenomenon in question.Glanzberg (2014) seems to root the effectiveness of semantics in its application ofmathematics similarly. “Good explanations tend to appear where we apply model the-ory or other branches of mathematics to semantics, while mere disquotation signalsexplanatory weakness” (Glanzberg, 2014: 268). Therefore, it is when mathematicsis applied that semantic analyses become explanatory. Why is a particular sentencesuch as (2) above ambiguous? Because either it has two distinct syntactic config-urations and thus two corresponding semantic representations or because certainsyntactic objects involve complexities which require additional semantic resourcesfor their interpretation, i.e. interpretation is not immediate and can be resolved indistinct ways.The mapping account described above is meant to provide insight into how exactlythese mathematical structures explain and predict physical phenomena. There aretwo missing pieces of this account. The first is an account of what the precisestructure-preserving mapping is between the model’s mathematical structure and thestructure of the physical system, i.e. the type of morphism or resemblance relation.This omission needn’t concern us too much though and can even be approachedon a case by case basis. The second part of the picture concerns the “assumedstructure” of the target system. This is an unfortunate convenience but a necessaryone. Without the assumption of structure, the mapping account (and most others)cannot get off the ground. But the problem of applied mathematics remains. Whyshould a physical system be beholden to the strictures of mathematical equations,proofs and theories or the structures which they posit?The main problem for the mapping account is that maps do not really explainanything but merely represent or depict structures and relations between the modeland the target.
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The problem is simply that it is hard to see how a mere representationalsystem can provide explanations and yet that is the only role mathematics isallowed to play in the mapping account (Bueno and Colyvan, 2011: 351).
The weak (if any) explanatory force of disquotational semantic accounts, dis-cussed by Glanzberg, can be explained in these terms likewise. All that disquota-tional schemata do is provide mappings from sentences in the object language tocorresponding sentences in the metalanguage.Thus, defenders of the inferentialist conception of applied mathematics expatiateupon the mapping account to include a level of inferential relations. In other words,the strategy of applying mathematics, as in formal semantics, involves establishing“inferential relations between empirical phenomena and mathematical structures,or among mathematical structures themselves” (Bueno and Colyvan, 2011: 352).Unlike the mapping account, explanation, novel prediction and idealisation can beaccounted for if we conceive of the relationship between models and their targetsas an inferential one. First, we build models using mathematics, then we introducemappings between the models and the assumed structure of the target system, finallywe draw inferences from the dynamics of the models (in pure mathematical terms)to the behaviour of the target systems interpreted accordingly.23 This is somewhatdifferent from standard modelling in that we are not only attempting to model thebehaviour of the target system but impose a certain structure onto it for the sake ofdrawing empirical conclusions from mathematical ones.Formal semantic explanations and predictions can now be understood in terms ofthis framework. The explanations involve initially converting the natural languagephenomenon into systematic representations of their form through syntactic models.These models or grammars can be further represented as abstract algebras whichare homomorphically mapped onto semantic algebras. Ignoring this complication fornow, the model-theoretic apparatus (involving types and lambdas as shown in section6.2.3) structurally mirrors the target system, in this case the syntactic structure (andnot the empirical setup). The semanticist then draws conclusions from the semanticssuch as what two interpretations of a structurally ambiguous sentence might look likeor what the entailment relations of a given generalised quantifier are using logic orother tools. The final step is then to interpret the semantic conclusions back into thesyntactic formalism (this can sometimes be the inverse of the initial mapping). Hence,the explanatory nature of the process comes in at the stage of interpreting the featuresof the semantic analysis used to model the initial phenomenon. For example, whatexplains the two different meanings of a quantified sentence like (2) above is thatthere are two separate semantic representations which are interpreted by deriving
23There are some specifics involved here, namely three steps which include immersion or the initialmapping, the derivation step which is when theorists draw mathematical conclusions in the model andfinally the interpretation step in which the previous conclusions are interpreted in the empirical orassumed structure. For more details, see Bueno and Colyvan (2011).
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two distinct syntactic forms. In the case of underspecification, the application altersthe nature of the problem and subsequent explanation, from syntax to semanticsby means of a store or hole which is interpreted individually at a later stage ofsemantic processing. This is not unlike an application employed by Galileo to solvea problem in the physics of motion in which he represented the motion of bodiesdiagrammatically and solved it via the principles of geometry.
Galileo’s strategy is to take a problem in physics and represent it geo-metrically. The solution to the problem is then read off from the geometricalrepresentation. In brief, he reaches his answer by changing the question; aproblem in kinematics becomes a problem in geometry (Hughes, 1997: S327).
To sum up this section, the application of mathematics in semantics operates ina similar fashion, i.e. involving what Suárez (2004) calls “surrogate reasoning”. Wefirst formalise the target using syntactic modelling, then using model theory andother tools of mathematical logic map this result into set theoretic objects, then solvevarious ambiguities, entailments and the like in the set-theoretic structure beforeattempting to interpret the results back into the initial syntactic framework.24 Theaccount of empirical prediction runs similarly. In the next section, I investigate howformal semantic models can be used to predict the behaviour of linguistic phenomenonthrough the case of NPI licensing.
6.4 Predicting Syntactic Felicity in the Real World
The previous section set up a connection between formal semantics and appliedmathematics. It outlined how modelling generally works in the applied sciences andhow models can be genuinely explanatory in semantics. In this section, I plan toexpand on the puzzle of applied mathematics and show that one of its sub-puzzleshas an analogue in semantics as well, namely the problem of prediction.It is one thing to argue that applying mathematics to an empirical undertaking canyield genuine explanation based on either mappings or inferences or both. It is quiteanother to claim that empirical predictions can be made purely by means of consultingthe mathematical formalism. In the previous case of the Lotka-Volterra model andthe structural ambiguity problem, we used the mathematics, differential calculus andformal logic respectively, to explain the behaviour of the physical systems underinvestigation.Unlike the original statement of the puzzle or “unreasonable effectiveness ofmathematics” courtesy of Wigner (1960), Mark Steiner (1998) argues that the wonder
24It should be noted that Hughes is not arguing for an inferentialist account in the quote abovebut rather what he calls DDI or Denotation, Demonstration and Interpretation. However, the twoaccounts do have a lot in common. Nevertheless, it is not my intention in the present work to takeany specific stance on the philosophy of applied mathematics.
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of applied mathematics involves not one puzzle but a family of puzzles. Colyvan(2001) considers the puzzle of prediction to be particularly intriguing, “where themathematics seems to be playing an active role in the discovery of the correct theory”(267). A canonical case of this in the natural sciences is how Maxwell’s equationspredict electromagnetic radiation (this is Colyvan’s test case).The case I would like to present in order to display the predictive powers ofsemantic models is the modelling of NPI licensing environments. There has beena wealth of linguistic literature on the topic of Negative Polarity Items (NPIs) inthe past few decades. Part of the reason that these particles have been so widelystudied is that they exhibit strange hybrid characteristics. When they are unlicensedin a particular context (cannot be appropriately used or generally not found) we areleft with an infelicity akin to violations of syntactic rules . However, the linguisticsituations in which these items are licensed are generally explained purely in termsof semantics (Rothschild, 2009). This is interesting for a number of reasons. For onething, the NPI phenomenon was never considered to be semantic data before certainentailment relations were noticed with relation to it. Thus, we saw a shift in whatcounts as data for semantic theory as discussed in section 6.2.1.A precise definition of NPIs is hard to find since these particles are usually foundin various contexts and do not always contribute to the meaning of those contexts.However, according to Hoeksema, “[p]olarity items are words or idioms which appearin negative sentences, but not in their affirmative counterparts, or in questions, butnot assertions, or in the protasis of a conditional, but not in the apodasis”(1997).25Common NPIs are words such as ever, any (the so-called free choice any will not beconsidered here), at all which appear felicitously in sentences such as (6.10), (6.11)and (6.12) below (but not in their pairs):
(6.10) Xoliswa didn’t ever see soccer balls.*Xoliswa ever saw soccer balls.(6.11) Mandla doesn’t want any birds.*Mandla wants any birds.(6.12) The witness never told them what they asked at all.*The witness told them what they asked at all.
The first sentences in these pairs all have something in common, namely theyall contain negations. As Ladusaw eloquently put it “NPIs live under the shade ofnegation”. However, the matter is not this simple. As indicated by Hoeksema’s quoteabove, there are many other instances of NPI licensing which do not seem to involvenegation. Consider (6.13) below:
(6.13) Every person who ever visited South Africa, loved it.
25Latin grammar school words for antecedent and consequent of conditionals.
6.4. PREDICTING SYNTACTIC FELICITY IN THE REAL WORLD 113
The above example involves the quantifier every and seems to license the NPIever without issue. What is needed is a model which not only predicts what negationand quantifiers like every have in common but also can explain and predict whenNPIs are licensed elsewhere. Standard accounts proceed via a notion of downwardentailment or DE on predicative contexts. A DE context is one in which you canreplace a predicate with a stronger predicate (or more exclusive) without altering thetruth of the sentence. All sentences involving negation and universal quantificationare DE contexts. Consider the pairs in (6.14) and (6.15) below.(6.14) Xoli didn’t ever see soccerballs.Xoli didn’t ever see blue soccer balls.(6.15) Every person who ever visited South Africa, loved it.Every American who ever visited South Africa, loved it.Thus, we can affirm the principle “a predicative context is NPI licensing iff itis DE” in our model (or the Fauconnier-Ladusaw Hypothesis). Job done. Actually,not so fast. DE contexts fail to predict the felicity of NPIs in non-monotonic con-texts (neither upward nor downward entailing). Once again, consider the followingexamples.(6.16) Most workers enjoyed any job which they were offered.(6.17) Most people who have ever been to South Africa, loved it.These contexts are not downward entailing nor upward entailing since if wesubstitute a stronger predicate or weaker into (6.16) we are no longer guaranteed ofthe truth of the sentences.(6.18) Most workers enjoyed any harmful job which they were offered.(6.19) Most workers enjoyed any activity which they were offered.Similarly, adverbs, “only” constructions and the antecedents of conditionals seemto offer counterexamples to previous logical constraint on our models. A more success-ful approach makes use of tools from model theory to better predict NPI licensingand capture the data so far described. Rothschild (2009) introduces a notion ofdomain-sensitivity (DS) to model the phenomenon. The logical arsenal necessary isthat of a model which is classically defined as containing a set of individuals (andindividual events) and an interpretation function which maps predicates and namesin the object language to those individuals and sets, M =< D, I >. “We’ll idealizeand suppose that a given sentence S is either true or false relative to any model
M” (Rothschild, 2009: 14). The informal definition of domain-sensitivity applies topredicates if a sentence is true in a model then adding more objects from the domainwhich satisfy the predicate can make it false in that model.Formally, DS is defined in terms of conservative extensions of the domain:
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Conservative Extension - A modelM ′ is a conservative extension of a model
M if M ′ contains all the individuals and events in M , and at least one moreindividual or event not in M , and the predicate-extensions in M ′ are the sameas in M in so far as they apply to entities of M alone.
Domain Sensitivity itself is then defined as:
Domain-Sensitivity - Given a predicative context c, with a 1-place predicate
P in it, a sentence S is a domain-sensitive context if and only if for every model
M such that S is true in M there exists a conservative extension of M , M ′, s.t.1. S is false in M ′.2. For each i ∈ [M ′ −M ], Pi (Rothschild, 2009: 15).
Without too much toil, we can see that this analysis accounts and predicts allof the above occurrences of NPIs (and more). Thus, by applying model theoretictechniques to the syntactic phenomenon of NPI licensing, our semantic models areable to predict a range of data previously unaccounted for.26 Here as before, it isthe mathematics doing the predictive work, a characteristic of applied mathemat-ics. But again, mere mappings do not seem to be enough. It isn’t enough to saythat English and set theory or model theory have a common structure (or structuraloverlap) but we also need to explain why the inferences from the formal domainare relevant to the natural one. In fact, there are cases in the history of sciencein which aspects of the model thought to be artefactual proved to have empiricalsignificance. For instance, as reported by Bueno and Colyvan (2011: 364), multiplerevisions, in terms of physical interpretations, of the same mathematical formalismin classical mechanics led to the discovery of the positron. Dirac initially thoughtnegative energy solutions was merely features of the mathematical model and notphysically realised but later, after finding physical interpretations of these solutions,it caused him to revise his entire theory and predict the existence of a novel particle.In general the mathematical structures applied scientists use are much richer thanthe physical structures being modelled and this can lead to predictions based onlogical extensions of the mathematics or merely interpreting “unused” mathematicalstructure.27 Importantly, although the literature on NPIs is sometimes presented asa project in falsification, the progress made in this area is not progress by counterex-ample. Rather, as Williamson (2016) puts it (in a different context), “[w]hat defeats amodel is not a counterexample but a better model, one that retains its predecessor’ssuccesses while adding some more of its own”. I cannot think of a better way ofdescribing the research paradigm in NPI licensing.
26Nothing I have claimed so far rests of the definitiveness of Rothschild’s analysis. If anothermodel does a better job at the end of the day, the point remains the same.27Sometimes the opposite is also the case, where a modeller chooses an impoverished mathematicalmodel to isolate a specific aspect of the target system much richer in reality. The Ising model offerromagnetism in statistical mechanics is an example of this. See section 4.3.
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Solving the puzzle of prediction is not my task in the present work but rather myclaim is that this puzzle for applied mathematics is shared by its formal semanticcounterpart. The central claim remains, in the same way that an engineer uses andapplies mathematics as diverse as algebra, trigonometry and calculus to physicalproblem solving tasks, the semanticist uses model theory, lambda calculus and for-mal logic to interpret syntactic formalisms or models for the task of explaining andpredicting natural language data as in the case of NPI licensing.
6.5 The Syntax-Semantics Interface
So far, we have implied a lot about the relationship between syntax and semantics.I suggested a strong analogy with formal semantics and applied mathematics. Iargued that semantic modelling involves setting up systematic mappings betweenthe syntactic formalism or structure and semantic model and then drawing purelymathematical conclusions which are to be translated or read back into the syntacticmodels under study. One thing that remains to be shown is how exactly to accountfor what is known in the literature as the syntax-semantics interface. I mentionedbefore that the precise relationship between model and target can be determined ona case by case basis. The present case is in need of such precisification.Before addressing the issue of the syntax-semantics interface, there might beone preliminary problem the solution of which can shed light on the overarching goalof this section. The details of applied mathematics discussed in the previous twosections suggest that mathematics is somehow effectively applied to an empiricalor real world target system. I have attempted no such thing in my exposition offormal semantic modelling. Now, as previously mentioned, most accounts of appliedmathematics (especially mapping accounts) are forced to impose a structure on theempirical domain. But this is different. I was not assuming that generative syntax(or categorial grammar or whatever) is the “assumed structure” of the target system.In fact, I do not believe that it is. Syntax involves many distortions and idealisationswhich simplify and ignore linguistically relevant aspects of natural language (seePart II.4 of this thesis). In addition, natural languages also involve phonological andmorphological structure. The key to appreciating the analysis of formal semanticsas applied mathematics presented here is that applying mathematical models (muchlike syntax) is a recursive endeavour. The procedure I outlined above, of mappingthen derivation then interpretation (reverse mapping sometimes), can be applied toother mathematical models taken as the target or empirical setup which in turn canundergo the procedure again. In effect, formal semantics, as I view it, is the processof applying mathematics to other mathematical models, namely syntactic models.We can see this when we consider the varieties of semantic models offered onthe basis of different syntactic formalisms. Montague himself modelled his semanticson a categorial grammar formalism but the initial syntactic rules used in derivations
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were critiqued for being ad hoc and purely driven by the semantics. A more sobercategorial syntax-based semantic model is offered by Jacobson (2014) within herdirect compositionality programme. The idea behind direct compositionality is thatunlike standard approaches to semantics (such as found in Heim and Kratzer (1995)),semantic interpretation is not merely epiphenomenal or some sort of a logical form(LF) of an otherwise autonomous syntax.
The hypothesis of Direct Compositionality is a simple one: the two systemswork in tandem. Each expression that is proven well-formed in the syntax isassigned a meaning by the semantics, and the syntactic rules or principles whichprove an expression as well-formed are paired with the semantics which assignthe expression a meaning [...] It is not only the case that every well-formedsentence has a meaning, but also each local expression (“constituent”) withinthe sentence that the syntax defines as well-formed has a meaning (Jacobson,2014: 9).There is a strong rule-to-rule mapping between the syntactic formalism and thesemantic model on this view. In light of this, categorial grammar seems to workwell since the formalism posits functional syntactic composition rules which seemto match up nicely to the functional type constructions of the semantics. Jacobsonof course insists that the use of categorial grammar is a mere convenience and herproject is compatible with various syntactic formalisms. I do not doubt this, but thereare features of categorial grammar that seem to make it more amenable to the kindof mathematical structures used in formal semantics (see section 6.2.3.). There isat least a choice point here. Either we model syntactic phenomena with somethingmore akin to generative syntax (along the lines of Government and Binding theory(1981)) or we model natural language syntax with later semantic modelling in mindas in the case of formalisms such as categorial grammar. The choice is not trivialbut it is a modelling choice which can take a number of considerations in mind, e.g.computational complexity, fidelity to the target system, even machine learning ortranslation applicability.The point is that models can be applied to other models ad libitum. The behaviourof the empirical system can sometimes be buried under heaps of applications each onemodelling the dynamics of the previous formalism with the hope that the dynamics ofthe models percolate up the process from the underlying empirical structure and thetarget system is not completely lost.28 The picture I am presenting might be obscured
28This picture resembles some accounts of serial, as opposed to parallel, processing in computerscience. Given the division of labour in most science and linguistics department, I do not think thatthis is an unrealistic depiction of the situation. However, there might be exceptions to the currentview of mathematical application in linguistics. Perhaps, Jackendoff’s parallel architecture constitutesmulti-directional or parallel modelling aimed at the same target. I am not sure about this though. SeeJackendoff (2002) and Jackendoff (2007) for an overview of his approach to generative grammar. Evenif we do not take this option, the apparent temporal order of mathematical application is a feature ofthe exposition not the phenomenon itself.
6.5. THE SYNTAX-SEMANTICS INTERFACE 117
somewhat by the fact that many semanticists make use of very impoverished syntacticrepresentations for the purpose of their analysis. This sort of abstraction, however,is common practice in scientific modelling. The use of simple trees (of which I myselfam culpable in section 6.2.3) is merely an explanatory convenience and when a moredetailed semantic model is called for, representing the syntactic structures moreaccurately becomes pertinent.29The point about the recursive nature of mathematical application can perhapsbest be appreciated by considering cases within mathematics itself. It turns out thatmany areas of mathematical investigation which are considered “pure” mathematicsare often applied in the sense I have been stressing above. Consider Hilbert’s earlywork on relative consistency proofs. For instance, in Grundlagen der Geometrie[1899], he attempted to show that geometry could be reduced to real analysis andthe consistency of the latter is enough to ensure the consistency of the former.Thus, real analysis was applied to geometry and features of analysis (such as itsconsistency) were then meant to be interpreted or translated back into geometry.The entire Logicist programme of Frege, Russell and Whitehead can be seen as anexercise in the application of formal logic to mathematics. Granted, reduction andmodelling are not the same thing. Nevertheless, contemporary mathematicians aremuch less interested in the foundational questions of the early 20th century (or thesearch for a one true stable foundation for all of mathematics), yet they still applyvarious mathematical theories to one another with fruitful results, such as algebra totopology, set theory to arithmetic and so on. Not all theories under the banner ofpure mathematics aims at describing mathematical reality (whatever that is) directly.We do not have to go to mathematics to find examples of the embedded mod-elling paradigm. Morrison (2015) offers an example from population genetics whichutilised vast amounts of mathematical apparatus in modelling real world populationsso much so that a similar characterisation (as the one I am offering for semantics) isappropriate in this domain.
Instead of the natural or “real” populations studied by field biologists, pop-ulations are now often mathematical constructs that can be manipulated usingsophisticated mathematics. In this context, the model, rather than the real-worldenvironment or system (that is, populations of living things), becomes the objectof inquiry (Morrison, 2015: 23).
Returning to the issue of the precise relationship or morphism between the syntac-tic and semantic models, there are a number of worries. For one thing, isomorphismsand even homomorphisms seem to impose too strong a constraint. To see this, let
29Even very different semantic formalisms such as Discourse Representation Theory (DRT), whichis intended to be interpreted cognitively, presupposes a complete syntactic model. This is broughtout by one of the chief problems with DRT, namely that it has been argued not to capture theincremental nature of semantic parsing (hence the move to frameworks such as Segmented DiscourseRepresentation Theory). I thank Hans Kamp for pointing this out to me.
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us consider a related problem for the mapping account in the philosophy of appliedmathematics, the problem of idealisations. As we have seen in Part I.3.1 and PartII.4, scientists often use non-veridical models to reflect features of the target sys-tem at hand. In other words, models are not always meant to truthfully representthe target system. They involve many distortions and purposes other than truthfulrepresentation. What is Fisher’s three sex biological model “mapping” in the realworld, or natural language as denumerably infinite in Chomsky? We have surveyedsome of these models in the previous subpart and part I. The point is that not all ofthe features of the model can receive realisations in the physical target system as astrong morphism would require.Similarly, strong morphisms between syntactic and semantic structures seem toostrong. Syntactians posit many features which do not seem to make it to a level ofsemantic interpretation. For example, obligatory subjects in English as in sentencessuch as It is raining are usually explained by means of what is known as the extendedprojection principle (EPP). The principle states that subjects are mandatory in DPor NP clauses even when there is no semantic subject or agent in the surface form. Inaddition, some syntactic objects are covert as in PRO and traces and other membersof the empty categories or the category of linguistic objects with null phonology. TakePRO for instance. PRO is a pronominal object postulated in the subject position ofnon-finite clauses as in 6.20.
(6.20) Noluntui wants PROi to meet up.
Szabó (2015) argues, in accordance with Frege’s context principle, that emptycategory words or items cannot be semantically interpreted on an individual basis.These sub rosa syntactic elements are context-sensitive and emergent phenomena.
This is exactly why it could not be a semantic primitive: just like the mean-ings of ‘the’ and ‘is’, the meaning of PRO is not the sort of thing we couldexplain without relying on other expressions with which it is in construction(Szabó, 2015: 27).
If some syntactic elements cannot receive individual semantic treatment, then wehave a problem for accounts such as direct compositionality and any strict morphismbased mapping in general. Furthermore, semantically null elements such as thoseposited by EPP militate against the idea of a complete mappings from syntax tosemantics as strongly if not more.30 There are a number of possible solutions tothis problem, the inferentialist conception of Bueno and Colyvan (2011) for applied
30On the other side, Stanley and Szabó (2000) argue from semantic theory to hidden elements inthe syntax in order to explain quantifier domain restriction. On this view, NP s have covert argumentplaces for domain restriction in contexts. This is an excellent example of semantic modelling beinginterpreted back into the syntactic formalism as discussed in the previous section.
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mathematics and Suárez (2004) for scientific representation in general are two.31Compositionality itself might just be an inferential relation on this view. Anotherapproach could be the partial structures framework of Bueno, French and Ladyman(2002), in which partial homomorphisms allow for some elements of the the relevantdomains to remain undefined. These options, however, are not available to a linguistwho does not appreciate the applied mathematical nature of her enterprise.The first step to recovery is admitting that you have a problem. In this case,the problem of the syntax and semantics interface can be resolved by appreciat-ing that syntactic modelling involving empty categories and other covert operatorsare essentially scientific idealisations. This explains why they pose a problem formapping-based accounts of the interface such as direct compositionality.32 And onlywhen we admit that these idealisations are in need of explanation at the level ofthe interface, can we make use of inferentialist or partial mapping accounts of thephenomenon.Accepting that covert syntax is idealisation can go a step further in resolvingsome philosophical disputes concerning the ontology of natural language. An allegedproblem for Lewis’ conception of natural language, reignited by the recent heatedcorrespondence between Devitt (2006, 2008b) and Collins (2007, 2008c), is that thenotion of convention and (nominalism in general) cannot explain various unvoicedsyntactic elements such as PRO. What corresponds to PRO in a linguistic commu-nity’s convention establishing behaviour? Chomskyan mentalism is usually profferedas the only theory capable of accounting for these postulates since it assumes a levelof syntactic representation beneath the surface syntax. External languages, on theother hand, have recourse only to overt elements of speech and communication.From the modelling perspective advanced here there is nothing difficult to explain.Idealisations in the syntax can be approached from various angles as convenient dis-tortions or falsehoods introduced for the purpose of tractability of the target systemwhether this is an external language or an internal mental one. The semantic mod-els are then applied to the formalism or scientific model used to model syntacticphenomena. The syntax-semantics interface is accounted for purely in terms of theapplication of one mathematical formalism to another which is in turn mapped ontothe assumed structure of the empirical target system. These mappings are generallypartial in nature allowing for elements in either or both relata to be undefined forsome elements (the same can be applied to phonological and pragmatic models atthe interfaces). This picture dovetails with Glanzberg’s recent analysis of semantics.“When it comes to explanatory force, our semantic theories are for the most part par-tial. Where they rely on mathematics, they are explanatorily substantial, but wherethey rely on disquotation they fail to be” (Glanzberg, 2014: 277).33
31Interestingly, Brandomian inferentialism, in its rejection of the denotational truth-conditionalsemantic orthodoxy, would be similarly immune to these context-sensitivity worries.32Jacobson does address these elements and offer a way of capturing them within her framework.33His account does, however, rely heavily on the posit of linguistic competence and the faculty of
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6.5.1 Semantics without Semantic ValueEarlier, I discussed Lewis’ (1975) view in the context of it being an intermediateapproach compatible with various takes on the ontology of natural language (ortarget of linguistic models). There is, however, a stronger reading of Lewis on whichmentalism (and subsentential semantics) does not find a natural home as we saw inPart I.3.1. For Lewis, a language can be captured by a list of pairs of forms andmeanings. The notion of language or the function which pairs sentences with theirintensions (the function accessed by linguistic communities) is not very fine-grained.The semantic values which our models describe, on this view, are at the sententiallevel which might be considered to distance them from the compositional semanticdata of section 6.2.1. Yalcin describes the point in the following way.
Lewis expressed no interest in accounting for productivity. On the contrary,he explicitly expressed skepticism that semantics could be supplied with deter-minate foundations at the level of subsentential expressions. He offered only toground the notion of a population’s using a language, where ‘language’ in hissense refers just to a function which pairs sentences with meanings, not the farricher object assumed above. This limited set of facts of ‘semantic value’ were tobe grounded in certain conventions—on Lewis’s analysis, in certain regularitiesin belief and action prevailing in a given population, owing to some commoninterest in communication (Yalcin, 2014: 39).
This discussion brings in an important aspect of the picture I have been pushingthus far. The concept of semantic value of an expression or subsentential expressionis of core interest to any account of semantic modelling. On my view, semanticvalues are offshoots of syntactic wellformedness, thus they do have subsententialsignificance contra Lewis.34 However, the embedded applied mathematical frameworkdepicted here, takes no stance on whether there is anything in the world of naturallanguages (or empirical setup) which directly corresponds to these semantic values.They could be artifacts of the models or emergent phenomena at the level of interfaceor many other options. I argued that semantic modelling is indirect (perhaps multiplyso) and the functions, types, lambda formulas used to describe the models have nodirect bearing on the target system of linguistic models generally, namely naturallanguage phenomena, but rather bear relations to the more circumscribed target ofsyntactic models. Typed lambda terms map onto syntactic constituents which inturn model utterances or meaningful discourse (even the notion of a ‘sentence’ istheoretical to an extent).
language as being the ultimate goal of a linguistics and linguistic semantics.34In other words, Lewis might have been taking semantic models to be applied indirectly to thelinguistic target, i.e. conventions of communities. However, on my view, this is not the whole picture butrather semantic models are applied to syntactic models (which are usually hierarchical and productivein Yalcin’s sense). At the end of the day, we might still be in the business of accounting for linguisticregularities in various communities but via a far more indirect methodology.
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This leaves the question of the ontological status of semantic values open. Onmy view, there could be something in nature which indirectly corresponds to seman-tic value and percolates up from the syntactic formalisms to the level of semanticmodelling. Of course, the reverse could also be true and there could be no naturalphenomenon at the base of the embedded modelling, or at least no natural individ-ual feature beyond the general phenomenon of “meaningful discourse”. Rayo (2013)embraces such a paradigm by endorsing both Semantic localism and a “Grab BagModel” of linguistic competence. The former is a position which assesses the accep-tibility of an assertion purely in turns of local context or more specifically “a localistwould claim that all that is required for an assertion to be in good order is for it tosucceed in dividing the possibilities that are relevant for the purposes of the assertioninto verifiers and falsifiers” (Rayo, 2013: 650). The Grab Bag Model, as opposed tothe “Specialised-Knowledge Model” of generative linguistics, states that there is noindependent module comprised of general semantic rules but rather a hodgepodgeof mental entities such as memories, images, dictionary entries, personal anecdotesetc. associated with lexical items. Importantly for our purposes, Rayo holds that thecorrect picture of semantic interpretation is somewhat as follows.
It would be better to imagine that your companion hand you the grab bagplus a bit of ‘syntax’: an explanation of how the grab bags should be combinedto render one of the relevant possibilities salient (2013: 649).
Syntax still has a role to play in semantic interpretation. The individual grabbags different people might possess could contain distinct mental entries for thesame lexical item but I would opine that the syntactic combination principles wouldhave to remain rather constant among individuals in a given linguistic community inorder for their grab bags to be useful at all. In other words, we could allow for somevariation among language users in terms of lexical items and their meanings but ifwe all meaningfully combine these items differently we would be at a linguistic loss.Rayo’s view is similar to other usage based accounts which take communication to bethe primary linguistic explanandum as well as motivation but he is forced to admit thatin order to be understood, your interlocutor “hands you some syntactic information”(2013: 649). Thus, the model is still that of given some syntactic information youare expected to attach semantic significance, perhaps just more incrementally.One difference between this view and traditional semantics is that semantic sig-nificance is not a global or complete set of semantic rules but a motley assortmentof cognitive and contextual information based on relevance to particular situations.It is, therefore, unsurprisingly that Rayo eschews of traditional linguistic meaning infavour of a more Stalnakerian account in terms of contextual tracking and updatesas well as general cooperation principles (such as his Principle of Clarity (654)).Neither compositional semantic facts, as I have described them, nor truth-conditionsseem to receive explicit treatment on this view. However, as I have stated, on the
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view of formal semantics as applied mathematics there is no direct commitment toindividual semantic values or linguistic meaning as such. Rayo’s rejection of invariantlinguistic meaning is compatible with the model of semantics presented thus far. Themathematics he employs to interpret syntactic information is indeed distinct but thetarget he is aiming to explain need not be so radically different. In order to appre-ciate this point, I will mention three related types of targetless modelling strategiesdiscussed in Weisberg (2013), namely generalised modelling, hypothetical modellingand actual targetless modelling.
One type of investigation involves the construction of models in order tostudy general phenomena such as parasitism or sexual reproduction. A secondis when theorists construct models to study nonexisting phenomena. A third typeof investigation involves studying a model with no target at all (2013: 114).
The first kind of modelling occurs when the target of the model is a generalisednot specific one. This would be like trying to explain natural language simpliciterwithout isolation into specific modules or subfields (Clark (1996) has a view alongthese lines). The second modelling strategies involves collapsing the lines betweenreal and unreal systems such that knowledge of the former can be gained by insightsinto the latter. Fisher’s three-sex model of sexual reproduction falls into this category.One could imagine a linguist similarly constructing “impossible grammars” in orderto test a particular framework. Some work has in fact been conducted on this topicin order to illuminate UG under the principles and parameters banner.35 Lastly, thefinal type of modelling is related in many ways to pure mathematics. When theoristsengage in this sort of practice, they tend to describe the models for their own sake orfor the sake of mathematical manipulation.36 Weisberg cites simulations associatedwith the field of cellular automata as being studied “perhaps for the sake of what theytell us more broadly about computation” as an example of this targetless category.It is easy to see that Rayo’s proposal does not fit with the last subcategory oftargetless modelling since there is a clear target of his approach. However, thetarget is not a specific system such as the compositional semantics of the previoussections, rather it is a generalised target or phenomena connected with meaningfuldiscourse generally, i.e. the first type or generalised modelling. Indeed, if this werethe case, it would mark a departure from the syntactic target directed modelling ofthe previous sections.37
35“Similarly, knowing something about UG, we can readily design languages that will be unattain-able by the language faculty.” (Chomsky 1991a: 40)36Perhaps one way to succour Platonism (or at least methodological Platonism) in linguistics couldbe to say that it is targetless modelling in the last sense. This is not a line I will pursue here.37But I think that this is rather the point of Rayo’s alternative.
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6.5.2 Direct ModellingOn the other end of the spectrum, there is a more direct kind of semantic theorisingin the contemporary research, one which places semantic values at the forefront ofthe target system directly. A recent proposal advocated in Szabó (2015) stands incontrast to the view of semantics as applied mathematics presented above. Szabó ad-dresses the folly of assigning type theoretic semantic values to syntactically definedparts of speech and the idea that grammatical notions intervene in such a way as toprevent grammatical categories receiving purely semantic treatment. The orthodoxyin linguistics aims to define parts of speech such as noun, verb, adjective, adverbetc. in terms of syntactic distribution as opposed to the more intuitive semantic de-scriptions (such as noun=object, verb=event etc.). In my view, the original divisionof labour stems from the strong claim of the autonomy of syntax within early gen-erative grammar. Nevertheless, formal semantics then provides a logical translationfor these categories in terms of type theory, lambda calculus and so on, as I haveargued above. Thus, there appears to be a disconnect between grammar and logic,at least at the lexical level. Szabó, however, thinks that this detour to the semanticvalue of lexical categories is an unnecessary (and problematic) one.A few preliminaries are needed in order to appreciate the proposal on offer here.First, the distinction between open and closed classes of lexical categories. Althoughthis distinction is a staple of contemporary linguistics, its precise definition is sur-prisingly hard to pin down. One way to attempt a characterisation is via the notion oflanguage change. For instance, prepositions tend to remain somewhat constant overthe lifetime of a given natural language whereas nouns and verbs undergo frequentchanges and additions.
Closed categories tend to be small; their members tend to be short. Closedcategories are more stable: we easily coin or borrow new nouns or verbs butwhen it comes to complementizers or inflections, change is slow and gradual. Inaddition, open categories do but closed categories don’t participate in deriva-tional morphology (Szabó, 2015: 7).
The project aims to model the major lexical categories directly in terms of openclass constants with the result that the gap between grammar and logic is reduced. Sonouns become not types corresponding to distributionally defined syntactic objectsbut rather open lexical constants used for reference such that the semantic clauseonly needs to involve a universal quantifier and a variable specified in terms ofreference. Verbs, on the other hand, are constants which purport to predicate. Formore specific details, see Szabó (2015).One thing to appreciate is the radical nature of this proposal. Not only is typetheory otiose on this view but the semantic modelling is of a direct nature. In a sense,the juxtaposition of Szabó’s account with the standard accounts lends credence to theinterpretation of the latter modelling paradigm described in the previous sections.
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What Szabó is proposing is a direct modelling strategy for semantics, i.e. one thatmaps semantic models onto the empirical target directly. Semantic values are part ofthe assumed structure of the world and we, as semanticists, directly represent thesevalues with our theories.The direct strategy employed within this suggested framework is related in manyways to what Weisberg (2007a) calls Abstract Direct Representation or ADR. Anexample of ADR in the natural sciences is (allegedly) Mendeleev’s construction ofthe periodic table.
Mendeleev decided to focus his attention on finding trends in the proper-ties of valency, isomorphism, and, most importantly, atomic weight, abstractingaway from all of the other properties [...] When the elements were properly or-dered, Mendeleev argued, one could see the periodic dependence of elementalproperties on their atomic weight (Weisberg, 2007a: 212).
The difference between Mendeleev’s construction and Volterra’s is that the formeraims to represent real properties on the target system directly. No separate modelor surrogate reasoning via a model was involved with Mendeleev’s theorising. Fur-thermore, the periodic table was not just a device for classification but the basis uponwhich fruitful predictions were made, predictions which led to the discovery of newelements (e.g. gallium, scandium, and germanium). In the same way that chemicalelements are real features of the world, for theorists such as Szabó, semantic valuesare real features of actual linguistic reality.Another semantic framework which employs more direct methods of investigationis distributional semantics. The slogan for this kind of semantic analysis is “youshall know a word by the company it keeps” (Firth 1957:11). The idea here is thata comparison of linguistic contexts can yield insights into the meanings of individuallinguistic units. Naturally, distributional semantics fits well with corpus linguisticsand statistical methods. Once again, semantic values are directly attributed to thelinguistic contexts or to be “found in nature”. One aspect of this framework is knownas the distributional hypothesis presented below.
The degree of semantic similarity between two linguistic expressions A andB is a function of the similarity of the linguistic contexts in which A and B canappear (Lenci, 2008: 3).
Thus, the semantic value of words and expressions is a “collocation” functiondirectly computed on actual linguistic contexts. This picture does not dovetail withtraditional formal semantics and the modelling practices which it involves. But inthe same way that Szabó’s proposal explicitly stands out as a departure from formalsemantics with type theory, so too does distributional semantics stand out fromstandard semantics as applied mathematics.
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The tradition that started with Frege and Russell, based on compositionality,formal logic and type theory is a different animal from statistical or distributionalapproaches to semantics. In addition, it is this tradition against which Szabó’salternative is set. It is certainly the case that more direct theorising methods arepossible with relation to semantic explanations and predictions, however, it is mycontention that the dominant approach can best be philosophically accounted for bythe applied mathematical analogy I have put forward in this chapter.
6.6 Subconclusion
In this chapter, I have attempted to shed light on the nature of modelling in formalsemantics. I have argued that semantics is a form of applied mathematics whichindirectly models syntactic formalisms by means of model theory and other mathe-matical tools. I further argued that semantic models correspond to structures whichthemselves are involved in the modelling process.In the same way as an engineer might use geometry to draw conclusions and makepredictions about physical structures in the world where there are no pure geometricshapes, the accounts I sketched involved mappings between the empirical domainor the target of the model (which might be yet another model), and inferences orinterpretation of some sort. Thus, syntactic models can influence semantic predictionsand explanations based on their own structures and semantic models do not directlyapply to empirical reality whether this reality is semantic knowledge or communalcommunicative conventions.The view espoused here is that formal semantics is parasitic on syntactic mod-elling. This is not necessarily a novel insight. What is novel about my analysisis that it can account for the explanatory and predictive power of formal semanticsin a way consonant with contemporary views in both the philosophy of science andthe philosophy of applied mathematics. Additionally, I extended the notion of ide-alisation in scientific modelling to cases of supposed mismatch between syntax andsemantics at the interface. I showed that various puzzles concerning covert material,conventions and external or public language can be resolved by the adoption of thisperspective. The idealisations of syntactic theory can in turn be accommodated byvarious proposals involving partial mappings and inferential relations currently onoffer in the philosophy of applied mathematics.Overall, the picture of formal semantics as applied mathematics can be viewed asa renewal and marked development of a philosophical account of linguistics initiallyproffered by Lewis (1975). Semantics, on this view, genuinely explains and predictsand the problems which have traditionally beset its philosophical underpinningswith relation to these goals are part of a larger goal of explaining the unreasonableeffectiveness of mathematics in the empirical sciences.
Chapter 7Part Conclusion: Structural Realism
The foregoing chapters were written with an explicit focus on methodology. Theoverarching purpose was to establish a viable modelling paradigm in linguistics. Thereasons for this stance were informed by the general discussion in Part I concerningthe first grade of mathematical involvement for linguistic grammars. This grade urgeda separation between methodology and ontology. The discussion mostly involvedvarious possibilities for the scientific and philosophical interpretation of grammarsin terms of formal mathematical models and their appropriateness within the contextof linguistic theory.However, the aforementioned discussion and subsequent chapters left open a fewquestions about which a philosopher of science might be concerned. These questionspertain to the overarching framework, in terms of the philosophy of science, to whichlinguistic modelling belongs. Does the view entail a thoroughgoing instrumental-ism? Anti-realism? Is the view informed by van Fraasenian constructive empiricism?Should we be realists about mathematical models? I think that a plausible storycould be told for all of these possibilities. Nevertheless, I will opt for a form ofrealism in this short chapter in keeping with both the discussion and resolution ofPart I and the forthcoming ontological claims of Part III. In other words, this sectionwill be a suggestion as to the scientific import of the modelling perspective withinthe larger context of this work. It is not meant to be a decisive nor a particularly indepth examination but it serves rather to suggest a position on these matters which Ibelieve to not only be consonant with the rest of the thesis but in many ways a nat-ural theoretical setting for it. Therefore, the following will be somewhat speculativeand exploratory.1If nothing else, this chapter serves to offer an alternative to the instrumentalismwhich might otherwise be suggested by the first grade of mathematical involvementand Part II. This summary note should not be taken as a detailed or meticulousargument in favour of structural realism but merely a consistent suggestion of how
1The necessity of such a chapter was impressed upon me by the seminar participants of a talk Igave at the School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science at the University of Leeds in 2015.
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to possibly unify the various parts of the present work.One problem with instrumentalism is that it makes a miracle of the work of models.Modellers are not taking blind shots in the dark and chancing upon useful models.They are informed practitioners guided by their knowledge of formal techniques andsophisticated observations of their target systems. Linguists are no exception to this.Just as we might ask why computational models work for a given task, we can askwhy explanatory linguistic models explain anything (if they do)? My simple answeris that it is because they indirectly pick out real structures of natural language.
A Structural AlternativeWhen caught between the pull of realism and the rational scepticism of anti-realism,structural realism has often be considered a happy medium (the “best of both worlds”strategy). I want to sketch some of the reasons for this alternative within the context oflinguistic theory in this conclusion before moving on to the philosophical implicationsof the view in terms of ontology in the final part.It is well-known that traditional realism in the philosophy of science faces aserious challenge often referred to as pessimistic meta-induction or the problem ofradical theory change. This problem relates to explaining progress in science. If ourtheories are true of the world (or even approximately so), then how can we explainscientific progress in cases in which theories have radically altered (as in the movefrom Newtonian to Relativistic physics)?One answer to these sorts of worries is scientific anti-realism. On views under thisframework, scientific theories need only be empirically adequate (get the observablesright). Van Fraassen (1980) is one case of this view. Interestingly, this latter workhas led to much of the focus on modelling in contemporary philosophy of science.Although this might be a viable option, it does lead to similar worries to that ofinstrumentalism in rendering the success of our models or grammars inexplicable.There is, however, more modest alternative in views under the banner of structuralrealism. As Ladyman (1998) puts it,
Rather we should adopt the structural realist emphasis on the mathematicalor structural content of our theories. Since there is (says Worrall) retention ofstructure across theory change, structural realism both (a) avoids the force ofthe pessimistic meta-induction (by not committing us to belief in the theory’sdescription of the furniture of the world), and (b) does not make the success ofscience [...] seem miraculous (by committing us to the claim that the theory’sstructure, over and above its empirical content, describes the world) (410).
Contemporary linguistics faces a similar situation to that of the various paradigmshifts in the history of science. The dominant tradition, generative grammar, is meet-ing with increased resistance and alternative frameworks such as Dynamic Syntax,HPSG, Construction Grammar abound. Understood in structural realist terms, this
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does not entail abandoning many of its insights or successes. Linguistics, like thenatural sciences, does not begin de novo with every theory change, if we maintainthe continuity of structure. Seen in this light, Part II.4 and 5 argued for structuralrelations or similarity between not only different strains of the generative traditionbut also across other frameworks such as DS.2The structures in question are the mathematical models of the theories or thegrammars.3 In Weisberg (2013), he describes a third kind of model besides theconcrete and mathematical ones, namely computational models. To a certain extent,it is not clear how distinct computational models are from mathematical models (asWeisberg seems to admit when pressed). Nevertheless, computational models havea distinctive procedural or algorithmic element. This aspect allows them to trackor represent dynamics of systems (in terms of states and transitions between them).I believe that the models of generative grammar (and dynamic syntax) are of thisvariety.4The model in DS still involves tree structures and relations on nodes but it ex-tends this analysis beyond the constraints of the generative picture. We have seen(in section 5.2) that the model base in DS also includes multi-person dialogues.However, extending the generative models in line with GB and other frameworksmight also be possible and would then cover the same data (be empirically equiv-alent). Thus, the idealisations would be similar (operations and relations on trees),both would involve procedural computational models and both would cover the samedata (as opposed to say the “flat structures” of dependency grammars). The idea, ofcourse, cannot be that the models are identical since they are not (how else wouldthere be progress if there in fact is). But rather the claim was that generative gram-mar and dynamic syntax make use of similar structures, here conceived of as familiesof computational models.
2There is precedent for the extension of the structural realist analysis beyond the natural sciences.See Kincaid (2008) for such an account for the social sciences.3Taking the models themselves to be the structures of a structural realist account is also not un-precedented. On Morgan and Morrison’s (1999) account, models are (partially) independent of theoryand the target system as discussed above. Autonomy of models is also argued for in Cartwright andSuárez 2008 with relation to the Londons’ model of superconductivity. In addition, some philosophersof science, such as van Fraasen (1980), take theories to be collections of models.4Here might lie another difference between derivational and non-derivational or model-theoreticgrammars, in that the former and not the latter can be considered to be computational (where com-putational is understood as a proper subset of mathematical models). Chomsky (2000) seems tohave something similar in mind when he discusses the difference between the derivational approachand the representational approach, the former is meant to be understood as a genuinely algorithmicconstrual of the brain’s actual design vis-á-vis generating linguistic expressions and the latter is tobe understood as a “direct recursive definition” or conditions on expressionhood (as in the model-theoretic case). Despite claiming that the differences might be overstated or merely intertranslatable,he goes onto adopt a derivational approach under the assumption that it does hold unique insightsinto language (and additional questions concerning it). The first two chapters of this part can be seenas an account of wherein this difference lies exactly, i.e. modelling strategies.
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The above situation is similar to the case of the Londons’ model of superconduc-tivity. The previous model was limited in explanatory power and scope. For instanceit could not account for the Meissner effect which is the expulsion of magnetic fieldsfrom superconductors during the transition to the superconducting state. In order toaccount for this effect, the Londons took superconductors to be diamagnets as op-posed to ferromagnets, a modelling choice independent of theory (or so it is arguedby Suárez and Cartwright 2008). In the same way that the Londons’ model is claimedto have borrowed piecemeal from other models and theories, DS too borrows fromother models, some generative some model-theoretic, and theories, some static andothers dynamic, in order to account for anaphoric relations beyond the sentence andperson boundary (as well as effects such as those in (1)). The model structure orscaffolding (via trees and relations and constraints on subtrees) remains constant.By appreciating the concept and use of models, we gain a clearer picture of theorychange and theory comparison which helps to forge a closer tie with the structuralrealist position in the philosophy of science thereby providing potential answers tothe questions of progress and change in linguistics.This situation is, however, dissimilar from some of the usual conclusions drawnfrom the recent flurry of formal proofs as to the weak equivalence of various grammarformalisms (i.e. they generate or produce the same sets of expressions/sentences).The idea being that Minimalist Syntax (MS), Phrase-Structure grammars (PSG),Tree-substitution grammars (TSG), Head-Driven Phrase Structure grammars (HPSG)or Dependency grammars (DG) are all really just “notational variants” of one anotherwith little empirical consequence (as in Chomsky’s (2000) example of 25 = 52 vs
5 =
√
25). To a working linguist qua modeller, I argue, these proofs mean littleto nothing. For instance, dependency grammars posit structural relations whichdiffer significantly from phrase-structure grammars (in fact, DG is flat structurally asopposed to hierarchical, i.e. argument form trumps dominance relations). Similarly,TSG’s lack a mechanism for deriving rules such as adverbial modification (easilyspecified in PSGs) since they do not possess an adjunction operation as in laterTree-adjoining grammars. Yet many of these formalisms can be shown to be weaklyequivalent. As Rambow and Joshi themselves note, these equivalences are of littleconsequence to the syntactians working in a given syntactic framework who stillgo about their daily business in very different ways. “The result is a dependencytree, CFGs and TSG are weakly equivalent. However, to a linguist, they look verydifferent” (1997: 3).Structurally, the models are quite distinct, i.e. they differ in strong generativecapacity. By appreciating the roles and operations of the models themselves, we canarrive at a more nuanced account of theory similarity and dissimilarity in linguistics,as I hope to have shown.Thus we can be realist about the structures indirectly picked out by the modelsand at the same time be instrumentalist about the models themselves. In the next partI will attempt to find ontological grounding for the structural realism suggested here.
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In light of what we have seen in this part, theories cannot just be collections of models,since we have seen that models operate in partial autonomy from theories. Models,however, could still inform theory construction. Cases such as Dirac’s discovery ofthe positron, where an assumed artefact of the model was found to be ontologicallysignificant to the target system, show that it is possible that the structures indirectlyrepresented by models can eventually be described directly by theory.
Part IIILanguages and Other AbstractStructures
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The dominant picture of the foundations of linguistics and the ontological statusof linguistic objects is provided by the conceptualism founded by the generativemovement of Chomsky (1965). On this account, languages are mental states, or I-languages, of the individual language users. To ‘cognise’, or more controversially toknow, a language is thus to be in a particular cognitive state of the language faculty.This is a physicalist view. All talk of the mind or mental states is just physicaltalk about the brain at a different level of description (see Chomsky 1986). Hencelinguistics is really biolinguistics and is eventually to be subsumed by neuroscienceor biology itself.In the wake of this picture of the foundations of linguistics, linguistic Platonism orrealism emerged. Drawing strength from the analogy with mathematics (specificallyarithmetic and set theory) and issues within ontology that proved difficult for aphysicalist account of the science (in its current form at least), Katz (1981), Katz andPostal (1991) and most recently Postal (2003) offer a radically different account ofthe objects of linguistic theory and the place of its science. As is the case with manyparadigm shifting or challenging notions, the view of linguistics as a formal sciencedid not hold much sway among contemporary practitioners. However, I believe that itdoes hold genuine insights and approaches the field with bold honesty in interpretinglinguistics as it is rather than as we hope it to be.In this last part, I will not mount a direct attack against conceptualism (seepart I.3.3 for an argument to that effect). Rather I will take seriously the challengepresented by Platonism while (hopefully) developing a novel account which makesuse of some of its core features to better effect. In many cases, I think the words ofKatz and Postal lend themselves to my account more so than to naive Platonism (seesection 10). Another way of putting my agenda is that I hope to divorce the notion oflinguistic realism from that of its Platonist counterpart.5 Specifically, the strategy Iplan to employ will be to identify three essential desiderata or properties of naturallanguage for which any realist theory of linguistic foundations and ontology oughtto account. These properties stem from critiques of the biolinguistic or generativeprogramme offered by Platonists such as Katz and Postal (and nominalists suchas Devitt). I will then show that Platonism offers an approach to dealing withthese desiderata at too large a cost. Finally, I shall provide a non-eliminativestructuralism for the foundations of linguistics in its stead in accordance with asimilar interpretation of mathematics (Shapiro 1997, Resnik 1997), thus maintainingan analogy with the formal sciences.In many ways my project can be seen as an attempt to provide a more viablerealist alternative to the mainstream mentalism or conceptualism of the generative
5As pointed out to me by David Pitt, the Platonism of Katz and Postal is by no means theonly game in town. I could call the Platonism I plan to argue against KP-Platonism (as in Katz-Postal Platonism) as opposed to, say, a minimally Platonic view (such as Linsky and Zalta’s accountdiscussed in 4.3) but since the former is the standard Platonist position in linguistics, I will just referto KP-Platonism as Platonism for simplicity.
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programme without the pitfalls of Platonism. For instance, I will maintain the claimthat linguistics concerns sentences as types and not physical tokens. In so doing, Iaccept that a central question to the discovery of the true foundations of linguisticsconcerns the appropriate “level of abstraction” of linguistic objects (á la Katz 1996).I will also assume that there is some kernel of truth to the popular infinity claim orrather that the posit of linguistic infinity is not easily escapable for a realist, despiteit being potentially irrelevant for the more desirable property of linguistic creativity.Lastly, I will argue that linguistics is indeed distinct from the study of linguisticcompetence. However, I will not go as far as to identify it with the study of abstractmind-independent objects as per Platonism.6In terms of the overall aim of the thesis, this chapter serves as a necessaryprecisification of the notion of “structure” thus providing an account of the realismaspect of the “structural realism” which was advocated as an interpretation of theprevious part.In the next section, I draw from the Platonistic (and nominalistic) critiques of gen-erative grammar in identifying the essential characteristics of a given realist theoryof linguistic foundations. In section 9, I hope to show that Platonism cannot meetthis challenge. In section 10, I describe an alternative view which can meet theserequirements and in addition offer a more naturalistic account of the foundations oflinguistic theory and its objects. This account offers a mathematical structuralistfoundation for linguistic theory in which linguistics is a science of natural languagesconceived as quasi-concrete structures (in terms of Parsons 1990). In order to tailorthe mathematical structuralism of Shapiro (1997) and Resnik (1997) to linguistics,viewed here as a semi-empirical enterprise (or semi-formal, depending on your per-spective), I will have to banish the dogma of abstract objects, in the form of thetype-token distinction, currently pervasive within the philosophy of language andlinguistics. This is the primary task of section 10.4.
6However, in section 8.3 I will endeavour to clarify the notion of “mind-independence” to a certainextent.
Chapter 8Three Desiderata
In this section, I shall outline three important properties of natural language thatany realist theory of linguistics should respect. Most of these properties are familiarfrom various critiques of the generative or biolinguistic programme. The first arguesfor a central place for the concept of linguistic infinity, despite being potentiallyirrelevant for linguistic creativity. The second concerns the so-called correct “levelof abstraction” for the objects of linguistic theory, namely sentences. Lastly, thefinal property deals with the relationship between a grammar as theory of linguisticstructures and a theory of competence and while it denies their identification (in linewith Platonism), it also argues for a particular account of their interaction (in linewith Devitt 2006), namely that linguistic competence has to respect aspects of thestructure rules of the grammars and vice versa.
8.1 Linguistic Creativity and Infinity
CreativityOne of the most discussed properties of natural language is that of linguistic creativ-ity. Despite being assumed to be a universal component of cross-linguistic compe-tence, the notion has not always been clearly described. Part of the problem is thatthe phenomenon of creativity has not always been separated from the concepts andterms used to model it, such as “linguistic infinity”, “discrete infinity”, “generativelyenumerable” etc. This is a mistake and has led to much of the confusion behind theconcept of creativity and its place in linguistic theory.Infinity issues have dominated the foundations of linguistics debate and ofteninformed the rejection or acceptance of various frameworks. For instance, as Searlenotes “[w]ithin structuralist assumptions it is not easy to account for the fact that lan-guages have an infinite number of sentences” (1974: 4). For years, Chomskyans haveplaced the need for a computational system with recursive elements at the forefrontof their syntactocentrism and the generative programme on the whole. Katz (1996)
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argued that due to the infinity of natural language, both Bloomfieldian nominalismand Chomskyan conceptualism fail as interpretations of linguistics because thereare simply not enough concrete tokens to capture the generalisations of grammaticaltheories (essentially restaging the debate between nominalists and Platonists withinthe philosophy of mathematics). Langendoen and Postal (1984) produced a proof tothe effect that the cardinality of natural language exceeds generative capacities, andthus standard accounts of competence, in being of the same magnitude as a properclass (see section Part I section 2.2 for details).It seems that paradigms rise and fall at the feet of this central linguistic ex-planadum. However, it is not at all clear what linguistic creativity is or even if itrequires linguistic infinity (and in fact the contrary has been convincingly argued byPullum and Scholz (2010)). I will not rehash this entire debate here, I will howevertry to make sense of the creativity claim and determine to what extent it goes hand-in-hand with the theoretical posit of infinity. My conclusion will be that infinityshould in principle be accommodated within an account of the science of linguisticsfor reasons other than those usually offered for creativity, but only if one is to be arealist.What is linguistic creativity? To say that the literature is unclear would be anunderstatement. However, a natural starting point to this discussion might be foundin the comments of Chomsky who placed special significance on this property in thediscipline. For instance, consider Chomsky (1964) and (1966) respectively.
The central fact to which any significant linguistic theory must address itselfis this: a mature speaker can produce a new sentence of his language on theappropriate occasion, and other speakers can understand it immediately, thoughit is equally new to them (Chomsky, 1964: 50).
The most striking aspect of linguistic competence is what we may call the‘creativity of language’, that is, the speaker’s ability to produce new sentencesthat are immediately understood by other speakers although they bear no phys-ical resemblance to sentences that are ‘familiar’ (Chomsky, 1966: 74).
There are a few things to notice about the above quotations. The first is that thereis no mention of the concept of infinity in either. Given that the expressions whichlanguage users actually encounter can only constitute a finite magnitude, the abovecharacterisations potentially allow for an upper bound on the capacity to producenew sentences i.e. a limit to creativity. The second thing to note is the idea thatcreativity so conceived involves the cognitive ability to interpret novel expressionswithout prior analogy. Note the emphasis of “new” or unfamiliar sentences here.Part of the reason behind this insistence is to block Hockett-like accounts involvingcreativity by analogy. Hockett (1968) attempts to cast doubt on the ubiquity oflinguistic creativity by suggesting that corpus data indicates that most sentencesencountered in daily life are merely variations of a more commonly used/heard set of
136 CHAPTER 8. THREE DESIDERATA
sentences (perhaps a precursor to contemporary Construction Grammar accounts?).Chomsky, however, is careful to distinguish the creative “use” of language from the“creative aspect of language” itself. The former may indeed be constrained by variouslimitations but the latter allows for much more freedom of expression, at least inprinciple (see Chomsky 1982 for discussion). Nevertheless, freedom of expressionstill puts us quite significantly shy of infinity claims.Consider a statement from Chomsky (1972) in which the concept of “indefinite-ness” of size surfaces.
Having mastered a language, one is able to understand an indefinite numberof expressions that are new to one’s experience, that bear no simple physical re-semblance and are in no simple way analogous to the expressions that constituteone’s linguistic experience” (Chomsky, 1972: 100).
Again in the above quotation, empiricist or analogy-based accounts of creativityare explicitly blocked but the idea of an “indefinite number” of expressions is alsointroduced, which amounts to a denial the possibility of a fixed upper bound oncreativity. It is at this stage that one may be tempted to introduce infinity into thepicture. However, we are still some distance from requiring linguistic infinity for thenotion of creativity under discussion.Consider the example, presented in Pullum and Scholz (2010), of a standardhaiku. A haiku typically involves 3 lines with a maximum of 17 syllables (5 in thefirst and last lines and 7 in the second). The possibilities for haiku creation areclearly finite, yet seemingly “indefinite” in the required sense (somewhere in theregion of 1034 in Japanese). As Pullum and Scholz note, “the set is large enoughthat the competitions for haiku composition could proceed continuously throughoutthe entire future history of the human race [...] without a single repetition coming upaccidentally” (2010: 127). This is meant to be a case that shows that infinity is nota necessary condition for creativity. We can see that if we relax the parameters oncomposition, the cardinality of the creative capacity increases dramatically, yet weare still well-within the bounds of the finite.1A similar sentiment on the separation between creativity and infinity is suggestedin Evans (1981).
It is unfortunate that Chomsky’s writings have led people to equate thecreativity of language use with the unboundedness natural languages display.Linguistic creativity is manifested in the capacity to understand new sentences,and the speaker of a finite language such as the one I have described canmanifest it (327).
Evans provides us with a simple language (with 20 axioms linked to a finite vo-cabulary and a composition axiom) which (similar to a haiku case) allows for a wide
1Cf. Hockett (1968) for a similar example involving base-ball scores.
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range of combinatorial expression (100 sentences) and a disposition towards the un-derstanding of novel expressions. So far, we seem to have a few core componentsof an account of linguistic creativity, of which infinity is not one. These componentsinclude, genuine novelty in terms of non-analogy, indefiniteness in number and flex-ible composition.2 It seems to me that all of these features can be comfortablyaccommodated by means of the principle of compositionality.We have seen the principle in previous chapters, but it essentially states that thesemantic value of a complex expression is determined by the semantic value of itsparts and their syntactic combination.3 Clearly creativity is an important property ofnatural language and any theory of linguistics, realist or otherwise, should be ableto account for it.So at which point does infinity enter into the picture? The usual story is linkedto recursion, iteration and merge. However, I think it goes deeper than these specificmechanisms to the very idea of rule-following in linguistics and the philosophy oflanguage.
Rule-following and InfinityIn this section, I hope to show that realism places an added burden on linguistictheory in terms of infinity claims than do strictly physicalist frameworks. The ideathat the theories of natural language are provided by rule-based grammar formalismshas held sway since the seminal Syntactic Structures (1957). Two related ideasinformed both the inception of formal language theory and the centrality of syntaxwithin the generative tradition in general. The first is that a language can be seen asa collection of sentences of finite length over a finite vocabulary and secondly that agrammar (viewed as a theory of language) generatively enumerates the sentences ofthat language. Chomsky (1959) goes on to add “[s]ince any language L in which weare likely to be interested is an infinite set, we can investigate the structure of L onlythrough the study of the finite devices (grammars) which are capable of enumeratingits sentences” (137). The rules or functions which we specify for a given languageare informed by the specific constructions of the natural language under study.Natural languages such as English notoriously allow for iterative constructionssuch as those involved in conjunction, subordinate clauses and adverbial modification.Consider the examples from Pullum and Scholz (2010: 114) below.
It is evident that I exist is a declarative clause, and so is I know that I exist,and so is I know that I know that I exist ; that came in and went out is a verbphrase coordination, and so is came in, turned round, and went out, and so is
2Technically, “indefiniteness” is not a property of Evans’ example or the Haiku case.3The literature on compositionality is much too vast to go beyond a quick statement here. Sufficeto say that almost every aspect of its definition is up for grabs. See Shieber and Schabes (1991) fora promising account in terms of synchronous grammars.
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came in, saw us, turned round, and went out ; that very nice is an adjectivephrase, and so is very very nice, and so is very very very nice; and so on formany other examples and types of example.
The idea is that at no non-arbitrary point can we stop the chain of grammaticalconstructions or rather at no stage in the sentence production can we say ‘this is nolonger English’. Thus, natural language seems to be “closed” under recursive rulessuch as the rules characterising the constructions mentioned above. In this way, weare confronted with a parallel of the Sorites cases in the philosophy of language.Given the nature of certain vague predicates such as bald or tall, we cannot de-termine the point at which the predicate disapplies to an object (which can haveeffects on the validity of rules such as modus ponens or principles such as bivalencein certain systems used to model the phenomenon).4 If indeed we are dealing with“closure” principles as in first-order logic (FOL), then the generated set (or ‘theory’in the logical sense) would be unproblematically and denumerably infinite. However,in the case of natural languages, things are generally not this precise. The recursiverules of formal languages do not perfectly capture the nature of natural languagesand their constructions. If they did, then there would be no difference between formaland natural languages, but there clearly is such a difference.5 Natural languagesare sloppy and imprecise, their rules are malleable and violable. More controver-sially put, there might indeed be a point at which a further iteration of very yieldsan ungrammatical sentence (to borrow a phrase from David Pitt, we might “gener-ate ourselves out of the language”). Nothing I am saying here depends on taking‘grammatical’ to be a vague predicate (although I think ‘acceptable’ certainly is).6The point is that recursion might indeed be a useful element of the grammars weuse to model natural language constructions but it is not a necessary feature of thelanguages themselves, mutatis mutandis for infinity.An important element of the above characterisation and connection with Soritesseries is that of natural languages as concrete objects and linguistic rules as mod-elling something in the messy physical world. However, if we accept that linguisticsis in part a formal science, concerned with some type of abstract objects, similar tomathematics and mathematical logic, this limitation is lifted. On this account, the
4I thank Henk Zeevat for suggesting this possible connection to me.5Indeed, some theorists, such as Montague, embrace this claim. But this view is far from generallyaccepted nowadays.There is in my opinion no important theoretical difference between natural languages and the artificiallanguages of logicians; indeed, I consider it possible to comprehend the syntax and semantics of both kindsof language within a single natural and mathematically precise theory (1970: 398).
6It is interesting to note that Boolos (2000) entertains this possibility for the axioms of set theoryand the existence of large cardinals, when he writes of the subset axiom in ZFC “[b]ut it does notseem to me unreasonable to think that perhaps it is not the case that for every set, there is a setof all its subsets (267)”. Thus, mathematics itself may not immune to these cardinality worries andvagueness might seep into our notions of even the most precise of sciences.
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rules of our grammars specify not only model the features of our natural languages,much like the syntactic rules of, say, propositional logic (PL) specify the wff ’s it gen-erates. If sentences are not constituents of mental states or concrete tokens, then weare free and indeed required to treat the rules of our grammars as determining thestructures of our languages. Generativists themselves often make use of this formalanalogy, for instance consider Pinker (1994: 86).
By the same logic that shows that there are an infinite number of integers -if you ever think you have the largest integer, just add 1 to it and you will haveanother - there must be an infinite number of sentences.
As Pullum and Scholz correctly counter, the case for the discrete infinity of thenatural numbers is established by the axioms of Peano arithmetic which include asuccessor function (and an induction axiom schema), and there is no analogy of thisoperation in the case of natural languages. But a die-hard Platonist (or realist) couldinsist that there are other mathematical avenues available to arriving at the requisitecardinality (denumerable infinity or ℵ0). Perhaps one could avail oneself of the ideaof weak limit cardinals which do not require anything like a successor function toarrive at denumerable infinity. Postal (2003) has a somewhat nuanced argumentfor the connection between natural numbers and natural languages. He argues, byreductio, that if one assumes an upper bound on an iterative series of sentences inEnglish, then one can show that its logical implications (that the iterations stop atsentence m rather than m+1 or m−1) cannot be met. The above reasoning is meantto show that the posit of an upperbound on the set of sentences is to be rejected (thisis compatible with my suggestion above that such constructions are vague not infinite,if we are to be naturalists).7 Nevertheless, the realist has no principled reason forrejecting the idea of closure operations in natural language nor that of languages assets or collections of expressions (as Chomskyans genuinely adherent to the conceptof ‘I-languages’ are wont to do). The original ‘vastness result’ of Langendoen andPostal (1984) is testament to the limits of logico-linguistic reasoning. Returning toKatz (1984),
[G]rammars are theories of the structure of sentences, conceived of as ab-stract objects in the way that Platonists in the philosophy of mathematics con-ceive of numbers [...] They are entities whose structure we discover by intuitionand reason, not by perception and induction (18).
7I am not sure that this argument necessarily entails infinity. Following Hockett (1968), considerthe rules of any baseball game (which include time constraints). It is easy to see that for any realgame, the ultimate score could always have been higher or lower than it in fact was but this doesnot mean that the score of any baseball game is potentially infinite. I think the analogy here is notwith the denumerable infinity of the natural numbers but rather with their ‘countability’ which can befinite in set theory (i.e. a finite subset of N). In addition, it assumes that no sequence of sentenceshas a maximal length.
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On this view, natural languages themselves are systems of these sentences andthe rules of the grammars governing their interaction are proven in the same way aswe would prove theorems in number theory such as Fermat’s last theorem.8 Thus,linguistic infinity should be an element of any realist account of linguistic ontologyand the foundations of the science, notwithstanding its relation or lack thereof tocreativity. If recursion is an aspect of our best linguistic theory (grammar) thenrecursive structures are aspects of linguistic reality. If the set of sentences of a givennatural language is closed under conjunction or other recursive operations, then muchlike the case for formal languages such as PL or FOL, NL is discretely (and trivially)infinite. In section 9.1. I will discuss how a realist might escape a strict reading ofthis infinity requirement while maintaining the rule-following commitment.
8.2 Of Tokens and Types
Another core component of the realist persuasion in linguistics is the emphasis onthe correct “level of abstraction” for the interpretation of its theories. Originallypresented in Katz (1984), it has undergone some variation and revision in Katz(1996) and Postal (2003, 2009).9 Thus there are a number of related strands to thisline of reasoning and I hope to do them justice in this section.The idea can be summarised as follows. The same species of problem that befellthe nominalist or American structuralist project affects the biolinguistic or conceptu-alist one, namely they were pitched at an insufficient level of abstractness.
Thus, with conceptualism [mentalism], as with nominalism, there is a pos-sibility of conflict between a demand that grammars satisfy an extrinsic, ide-ologically inspired constraint and the traditional demand that grammars meetintrinsic constraints concerning the successful description and explanation of thegrammatical structure (Katz, 1984: 195)
In order to correctly meet the “intrinsic” constraints such as infinity, recursion andstructural hierarchy, the psychological level (or “extrinsic ideology of mentalism”) isinadequately abstract on this view (another way to understand the quotation aboveis that grammars do not need to go beyond ‘descriptive adequacy’). Therefore, weneed to ascend to a higher level of abstraction to capture these linguistic properties.In the absence of a systematic correspondence between the formal structure andthe physical system, an extreme interpretation of this problem could be expressed
8For example, proving that an + bn = cn is true for any positive integers where n > 2 might bea similar task to proving anbncndn where n ≥ 1 is a string not accepted by a context-free grammar.But the former is certainly a different task from showing that Swiss-German is not such a language(see Shieber 1985 for details).9The question of the correct level of abstraction has also received an innovative treatment inBromberger (1989). More on that in section 10.4.
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as a charge of a category mistake at the heart of the biolinguistic movement (or“incoherence” in Postal (2009)). Thus, a physical system (a human brain) is notsomething capable of possessing properties such as infinity (or capable of veridicaldescription in terms of the set-theoretic merge operation). Mental states and physicaltokens cannot be recursive or infinite, only sets and other mathematical objects areamenable to such description.The problem does not disappear with the limitation of structure either. In theminimalist program (1995), Chomsky investigates the minimal structural requirementsneeded to explain the gulf between the child’s initial state and the adult’s latercompetence, as well as language evolution. This marks a departure from the oftencomplex linguistic architectures of the Extended Standard theory (circa 1970) andGovernment and Binding (1981) which posit various levels of representation andinterfaces between these levels. Once again, the central desiderata of linguistics is toaccount for the perceived discrete infinity of linguistic expression and the hierarchicalnature of syntactic organisation. According to minimalism, in order to explain thesefeatures, one need only posit a binary merge function which takes two syntacticobjects and outputs one. Technically, there are two merge operations, external mergewhich takes two distinct objects as input and internal merge which allows embeddingand thus allows for recursion. Furthermore, internal merge involves duplicating itemswithin the operation. For instance, if we merge syntactic objects α and β to form theunordered set {α, β} and there is a γ such that γ is a member of α and we merge thisobject with {α, β}, we would have two copies of γ in the resulting structure. In thisway, we are supposed to be able to account for all the usual movement operationswith very minimal apparatus in the syntax (and various constraints on the operations).Merge, however, is set-theoretic in nature. The universe of set theory (nonde-numerably captured by the universe V ) generally takes sets to be outside of spaceand time, finite or infinite and abstract. Before continuing, it is important to clear upone potential confusion here. The objection is not supposed to be that mathematicalmodels are being used to describe a physical system. This is a commonplace prac-tice in science and does not presuppose that all mathematical modelling generatesincoherent ontologies (as I have shown in the previous chapters). The reason forthe specific problem in the biolinguistics tradition can be couched in terms of thelack of a systematic correspondence between elements of the model and elementsof the target system, i.e. we have no idea how elements of the set-theoretic oper-ation of merge correspond to neurophysical structures. On the one hand, we wantto explain discrete infinity, recursion and syntactic hierarchy through the all encom-passing set-theoretic operation of merge. On the other hand, we want to provide anaturalistic explanation of language in terms of the human brain and biology. Postal(2009) believes that these requirements pull in opposite directions and thus cannotbe met in the same object simultaneously, namely an I-language. Thus biolinguisticsis stuck with an untoward or “incoherent” ontology (at least at its current stage). Oras Postal (2003: 242) puts it “[t]he received view claims that an NL is something
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psychological/biological [...] a state of an organ [...] And yet it has been unvaryinglyclaimed in the same tradition at issue that NL is somehow infinite. These two viewsare not consistent”.10The move made by Platonists then is simply to raise the level of abstraction ofsentences to that of sets and other abstract objects, thereby proffering a coherentontology for the interpretation of linguistics. Returning to Katz (1984),
Sentences, on this view, are not taken to be located here or there in physicalspace like sound waves or deposits of ink, and they are not taken to occur eitherat one time or another or in one subjectivity or another in the manner of mentalevents and states. Rather, sentences are taken to be abstract and objective”(18).
Postal (2009) presents a similar argument to this effect. However, he followsKatz (1996) in availing himself of the type-token distinction. If linguistic theory orgrammars were indeed about brain-states etc. as the biolinguist would have it, thenthe sentences of these theories would have to be at the level of tokens, not types(which are here conceived of as abstract objects). There are two issues with this po-sition, he claims. For one thing, it seems out of touch with linguistic practice in whichgrammars usually deal with “island constraints, conditions on parasitic gaps, bindingissues, negatively polarity etc.” (Postal, 2009: 107). Importantly, these accounts arerarely, if ever, informed by evidence from neuroscience or psychology (as one wouldexpect if they were truly concerned with brain-states). Therefore, he concludes thatthese accounts are concerned with sentence types conceived abstractly.11
Sentence tokens exist in time and space, have causes (e.g. vocal movements),can cause things (e.g. ear strain, etc.). Tokens have physical properties, arecomposed of ink on paper, sounds in the air [...] Sentences have none of theseproperties. Where is the French sentence a signifie quoi? - is it in France, theFrench Consulate in New York, President Sarkozy’s brain? When did it begin,when will it end? [...] Such questions are nonsensical because they advance thefalse presupposition that sentences are physical objects (Postal, 2009: 107).
10I have shown this reasoning to be deeply flawed in Part I.11For Katz (1996) the abstractness concern in linguistics is a special case of the general problemof abstractness in the formal sciences. An account such as the strict finitism or “inscriptionalist nom-inalism” characterised by the Hilbert programme, for instance, failed as an appropriate interpretationof mathematics according to Katz. In order to capture the infinity of mathematics via the empiricistscruples of nominalism, only reconstructed language about the infinite is permitted, “mathematics isabout mathematical expressions” (Katz, 1996: 273). The objection is simply that to make sense ofsuch talk, we need either expression types, which take us back to abstract objects, or expression to-kens, which need to allow for unactualised possibilia which in turn are no less metaphysically suspectthan abstract objects. Katz, however, neglected the vast literature on actualist reinterpretations ofquantified modal logic, some varieties of which posit contingently nonconcrete objects in an attemptto avoid commitment to possibilia.
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These considerations lead Platonists to conclude that linguistics is concernedwith sentences on the level of abstract objects, in the sense of non-spatio-temporallyextended entities. Truth in linguistic theory or in its grammars is then determined bycorrespondences between the sentences of the theory and these objects. I think thislatter leap is not required and in fact rather inimical in light of better options andtamer ontologies, both of which I shall present in sections 10 and 10.4. However,suffice to say that there is some kernel of truth to the notion that linguistic grammarsand the theories they inform do possess a formal and abstract level of descriptionthrough the analysis of sentence types (or whichever type of basic unit with which onebegins). Furthermore, a realist account of linguistics should provide an appropriateinterpretation of this aforementioned level of abstraction and linguistic practice as itis. We will return to this issue in some detail in section 10.4.
8.3 Realism and Respect
So far, I have not said much about what I take “realism” to be exactly. This was asomewhat intentional move on my part. The properties or desiderata of the previoussections stemmed mostly from Platonist critiques of mentalism. Thus, they pusheda specific agenda and ontological attitude. The next series of arguments stem froma very different ontological approach to linguistics, similar in its focus on concretato conceptualism but in line with Platonism in its rejection of representationalismor the idea that speakers of a language represent/know/cognise the grammar rulesof their language. The chief proponent of what is called the “linguistic conception”(as opposed to the “psychological” of generative grammar) is Michael Devitt in hisbook Ignorance of Language (2006). Devitt is a realist but certainly not a Platonist.Hence, by appreciating his stance and its intersection with those of Katz and Postal,I think, we may be able to carve out the realist position in more detail.Given what I have said above, we might be tempted to consider realism to benon-ontologically committing. And in so far as we would be tempted to do so, I thinkwe would be correct. Linguistic realism, as I conceived of it, is simply the positionthat linguistics is about something outside of psychological reality. Theories ormodels of language, i.e. grammars, tend to describe this extra-mental reality and notthe linguistic competence of speakers. It is in saying something more precise aboutwhat exactly this non-psychological reality is that realists diverge. Platonists holdthat it is an abstract extra-physical reality, while nominalists, such as Devitt, prefera physicalist account (my own account will draw from aspects of both ontologies).Another way of putting this point is that both Platonistic and nominalistic realistshold that language qua object of linguistic inquiry is not in the brain but where theysay it is differs quite drastically from one view to the next.At this juncture, some distinctions between different mind-independence claimsmight be helpful (I follow George (1996) here, although the thrust of his distinctions
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is more epistemic than ontic). Let us consider three options and their interrelations.
MI1 The subject matter of the field is constituted by “entities distinct from minds”(George, 1996: 297).
MI2 There are truths of certain elements of the domain that are (in principle) un-knowable.
MI3 Elements of domain do not depend for their existence on minds.Disciplines which exemplify the first kind of mind-independence are general phys-ical theories such as cosmology, astronomy, biology, chemistry etc. MI1 is compat-ible with the epistemic claim of MI2. This is how George cashes out Chomsky’sclaim that settling all the facts about the mind will settle all the facts about natu-ral language, namely by denying MI1 while allowing for the possibility that suchcomplete knowledge is inaccessible to us. MI3 is a distinct claim from MI1. Forinstance, Platonists affirmMI1,MI2 andMI3 while Devitt and nominalists of a sim-ilar persuasion only affirm MI1. It seems then that realism only requires adherenceto something like MI1.So given the above characterisation of realism, unsurprisingly, part of the nextdesideratum of a realist account of linguistic foundations will be the rejection of com-petencism or the view that linguistics concerns the psychological states of languageusers (what Devitt calls “the psychological view”) or what I have calledMI1 above. Iwill follow Devitt one step further in adding another aspect to this desideratum andthat is a notion of respect between the posits of the grammars and the processingrules of competence.
[A] theory of a competence must posit processing rules that respect thestructure rules of the outputs. Similarly, a theory of the outputs must positstructure rules that are respected by the competence and its processing rules.(Devitt, 2006: 23).
This is what Devitt calls the “Respect Constraint”. A few things before we considerit more carefully and why it belongs within a realist conception of language. One ofDevitt’s favourite examples is that of von Frisch’s theory of the “waggle dances” ofbees. He uses the theory to make three general distinctions (in the spirit of realism).Von Fisch observed that bees use a form of communication called a “waggle dance”to indicate the direction and distance of food sources to other bees in the hive. Forexample, if a bee returns from a food source over 100 metres away, it will employa “waggle dance” (a “round dance” if less than 100). The angle at which the beearrives in the hive reflects the angle with relation to the sun of the bee’s path fromthe food source while distance is indicated by the speed of the dance.Devitt uses this example (and others) to distinguish between (1) the theory of thewaggle dance (a snapshot of which I provided above), i.e. the behavioural outputs of
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the bee, and the theory of the bees’ competence in its execution. Von Fisch’s theoryclearly only provides insight into the former. Another distinction is between (2) thestructure rules of the dance, which can be diagrammatically presented easily, and thestructure of the processing rules of the individual bees themselves (i.e. what’s goingon when they compute various distal and directional parameters for communication)of which we have no conception. Last is (3), the respect constraint or the claim that“the bee’s state of competence, and the embodied processing rules that constitute it,must “respect” the structure rules of the dance in that they are apt to produce dancesthat are governed by those rules” (Devitt, 2008: 205). It seems clear that von Frisch’stheory of bee dances, grammar of their language if you will, is concerned with thestructures of the dance itself as per (1) and not the structures of their competenceor performance of it ((2)) of which we know nothing except that it respects the rulesof the theory in the sense of (3).From the above distinctions, Devitt claims that grammars of linguistics are trueof linguistic reality and not human psychology (where English, French or isiZuluare our waggle dances). From this conception of grammars he defines his minimalposition (M) below.
A competence in a language, and the processing rules that govern its exer-cise, respect the structure rules of the language: the processing rules of languagecomprehension take sentences of the language as inputs; the processing rules oflanguage production yield sentences of the language as outputs (Devitt, 2006:57).The onus is on the generativists or conceptualists to prove that we need morethan this minimal posit, i.e. prove that representationalism is correct. This has beena notoriously difficult task, in most cases representationalism was merely assumed(compare Fodor’s (1981) glib term for the mentalism of Chomsky as simply ‘the RightView’). In addition, early psycholinguistics was initially meant to determine theconnection between the processing rules of performance and the grammar rules ofcompetence. This was generally considered to be an unsuccessful venture (even byits own proponents at the time). Nevertheless, it is not my concern here to challengeDevitt’s position from a conceptualist or mentalist perspective (see Collins 2007,2008a, 2008b; Lawrence 2003; Rey 2006b, Slezak 2007 for such arguments).The central question with relation to this research is ‘if we are realists, why notstop with Devitt’s linguistic conception?’ Unfortunately, there are some problemswith the view in light of the other desiderata I consider and general issues aboutwhich a realist might be concerned. For one thing, in this chapter (and Devitt’s book)a lot is said about what linguistics is not about but so far we have not delved intothe question of what linguistics is about and here lie the problems for the realistposition I take in this part of the thesis.In the preface to Ignorance of Language, Devitt describes both his initial fasci-nation with and initial resistance to linguistics. He states (of his thoughts during his
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graduate years) “[s]urely, I thought, the grammar is describing the syntactic prop-erties of (idealized) linguistic expressions, certain sounds in the air, inscriptions onpaper, and the like [...] It rather looked to me as if linguists were conflating a theoryof language with a theory of linguistic competence” (Devitt, 2006: v). This thoughtis apparently the seed out of which the main ideas of the book grew. Now mostrealists would agree on the last statement, in fact Katz (1981), (1984) and Postal(2003) stress the fallacy of conflating the knowledge of language and language itselfallegedly present in generative linguistics. It is the first claim, that grammars areabout “sounds in the air” and “inscriptions on paper”, that seems to be at odds withrealism. Once again, we seem to be at the wrong level of abstractness. Concretetokens are insufficiently abstract for the interpretation of most of what linguists do.We saw in the previous section that there is some kernel of truth to the type talkof Platonists and in so far as “idealised token” means type, we are fine but I doubtthat this is what Devitt has in mind.12 To reiterate, grammars, on this view, describestructure rules which constitute representational systems outside of internal mentalrepresentational systems (but are respected by them). As we saw with the abovecharacterisation of (M), sentences are supposed to be inputs for processing and sen-tences are also outputs of processing, but what are sentences? Are they physicaltokens, “inscriptions on paper” or “sounds in the air”, surely not since this would notsufficiently interpret the practices of actual linguists as per Postal’s objection in 8.2.At this point, I think realist and conceptualist objections converge to a certainextent. Ludlow (2009) claims that “while Devitt purports to be offering a proposal thatis faithful to linguistic practice, the range of linguistic phenomena and explanationhe surveys is limited” (394). This limitation cannot, for instance, deal with postulatesof covert material in syntax (which have no phonological expression), such as PRO(also see Collins 2007, 2008a). If our structure rules concern physical tokens (sounds,writings etc.) then elements which do not overtly appear through these media posea problem. Much of linguistic practice and methodology involves the use of assumedentities or items (See Parts I.3 and II.4). Katz (1971) linked the Chomskyan revolutionin linguistics to the Democritean revolution in early scientific thought in that it aimedto expose the underlying reality behind appearances.Let us consider another example from contemporary (generative) linguistics. Inthe literature on negative concord (NC), where the meaning of a negated expres-sion involves a balance of negative elements, covert material tends to show up quitefrequently in the analysis. Compare the following sentences, one from English (adouble-negation language) and the other from Spanish (a negative concord lan-guage).
12Devitt (2008) writes “according to my “linguistic conception” a grammar explains the nature oflinguistic expressions. These expressions are concrete entities external to the mind, exemplified bythe very words on this page” (249). In section 10.4, I will offer some alternatives which might capturethis intuition more adequately.
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(8.1) I didn’t not go to work today.DN: I went to work today.13
(8.2) María no puede encontrar a nadieMaria not can find to nobodyNC: Maria can’t find anyone.
In order to account for NC in a way that offers a unified analysis of negation,Zeijlstra (2004) starts with the claim that “NC is analyzed as an instance of syntacticagreement between one or more negative elements that are formally, but not seman-tically negative and a single, potentially unrealised, semantically negative operator”(Biberauer and Zeijlstra, 2012: 345). More specifically, Zeijlstra defines negativeconcord as a type of agree relation between a formally semantically interpretable[iNeg] feature and at least one uninterpretable [uNeg] feature. Thus, NC languagescan contain elements which only look negative but actually bear the [uNeg] fea-ture. In other words, some negative elements on the surface can be semanticallynon-negative in reality. In addition, this agree relation is a Multiple Agree relationwhich means that multiple [uNeg] elements can be c-commanded by one elementbearing [iNeg] in the feature checking. Finally, it is argued that in grammaticallyjustified situations, a covert [iNeg] can be assumed to c-command any overt [uNeg]and “of course, language-specific properties determine whether this non-realisationpossibility is actually employed” (Biberauer and Zeijlstra, 2012: 349). Therefore, theNC agreement is between one formally and semantically negative operator (which isoften covert) and one or more overt non-semantically negative elements. Now lookat an example from Czech in which it is argued that no overt negative elements areat play in the negation (of the surface syntax).
(8.3) Dnes nikdo nevoláNC: Today nobody calls[DnesOp¬[iNEG][TPnikdo[uNEG]nevola[uNEG]]]
In (8.3) nothing in the surface form of the sound and written tokens in Czechproduces the negation by itself (according to this analysis at least).14 The grammarthen assumes a covert operator to generate the negative meaning. Thus, linguisticgrammars have to be about something other than the physical tokens and their
13English speakers do make use of a form of understatement called “litotes” which also involvesdouble negation but not always for the sake of retrieving a strong positive reading as in the exampleabove. Litotes is largely pragmatic.14This analysis is supported by the impossibility of double negation in Czech (and similar lan-guages) and the cross-linguistic typology of possible negative configurations put forward by Zeijlstraand others.
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structural relationships in order to account for this and similar research. Remember,Devitt is not aiming to provide a revisionist conception of the foundations of linguisticsand therefore his account needs to square with contemporary practice.15On a related note, in section 8.1, I argued that realists have to take posits of thegrammars (and their consequences) to be actual features of linguistic reality. Suchposits include recursive structure rules and closure principles which seem to leadto infinity claims. Thus, either we need to be able to ascend beyond the level ofphysical tokens which fail to interpret such claims or provide a naturalistic accountof infinity claims in linguistics (I attempt to do both below).Lastly, despite the issues with the nominalism of this proposal, we will incorporatean element (or two related elements) from its realist core, namely that linguistics isthe study of language not the study of linguistic competence (or knowledge) directlyand that the study of language and the study of competence needs to be connectedby a respect constraint (the latter is the specific contribution of Devitt’s account).After all, we do produce and understand natural languages and it would be strangeif we could not account for this aspect of the human experience in linguistics, evenif it is the independent study of language systems conceived of in a realist manner.In other words, the study of natural language does have an empirical element whichneeds to be addressed. More on this dilemma in the next section.
8.3.1 Taking StockSo far, I have been attempting to determine the key aspects of a realist account oflinguistics. I have argued that although potentially unrelated to creativity (whichrequires compositionality), linguistic infinity cannot be ignored by realists (as it canpotentially be jettisoned by linguists of other persuasions). I affirmed the need toascend beyond a level of physical tokens or mental ones in the interpretation ofgrammatical theory. Lastly, I accepted that linguistics is the study of a competence-independent (mind-independent1) linguistic reality but I restricted this claim by in-sisting (with Devitt 2006) that this reality be linked to linguistic competence via astructural respect constraint. For clarity, I provide the list below as a guide for theensuing discussion.
1. A realist interpretation of linguistics ought to (a) account for creativity in terms
15Devitt’s (2008b) response to these worries is to dismiss them as “highly theoretical” and “ab-stract” objects of syntactic theory distinct from the convention fixing (communicative) intentions ofspeakers. In addition, he claims that PRO and the like are not likely to be determined by innatecognitive constraints or UG (he vacillates somewhat on this position later). I have two issues withthis response. One is that, as realists, we should care about theoretical posits of grammars (seesection 8.1) and the practices of linguists as they are if we are truly to be interpretationalist (andnot revisionist). Then secondly, the issue over whether such covert structure is determined by innateelements of UG is beside the point for a realist. If it is in the grammar then we should be able toexplain it.
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of novelty, compositionality etc. and (b) account for the potential infinity (de-numerable or otherwise) of natural language(s).
2. Linguistic theory is a theory of sentences at the level of types or more generallyrealism needs to pitch linguistic theory at the correct level of abstraction.
3. (a) Linguistics is the study of natural language, not the study of the knowledgeof or competence in that language, and (b) grammatical structures (and rules)need to be respected by the structures of competence and vice versa.
What remains to be shown is that Platonism is not the best way of capturingthese three conditions on a realist account of linguistic foundations. This is the topicof the rest of the paper. In the next section, I will show that Platonism fails on counts(1) ((a) and surprisingly (b)) and (3b). Its failure on count (2) will have to wait untilsection 10.4 for explicit treatment.
Chapter 9Against Platonism
In this section, I will be rather brief since my argument is straightforward (andadditional arguments against Platonism can be found in Part I, section 3.3 and insection 10.4). Simply put, Platonism is not the best way of capturing the threedesiderata or conditions on a realist account of linguistics as described above. Iwill start with an argument to the effect that Platonism cannot account for eithercreativity or the kind of infinity usually associated with linguistics. Then I will argueon the basis of Benaceraff’s famous dilemma for mathematical truth (1973) that therespect constraint cannot be met by Platonists in any plausible way and thereforeas with mathematical Platonism a gulf is created between the truth of our linguistictheories and our knowledge of this truth (competence). Lastly, I will make a generalclaim (following Soames (1984)) that mathematics (as well as logic) and linguisticsare conceptually distinct and if indeed linguistics is a formal science, it is a suigeneris one.Before we get to this task, however, let us review what the Platonist positionis. Essentially, Platonism is an account of linguistic foundations which holds thatlinguistics is the study of abstract mind-independent objects. The Platonist takesall of the syntactic and semantic structure posited by grammars not merely as usefultools for describing mental states or physical tokens (i.e. models of linguistic reality)but as constituting an independently existing linguistic reality directly. A naturallanguage, like a formal language, is an abstract object in the sense of being non-spatio-temporally extended and comprised of sets of sentences. On the view wehave been considering (that of Katz and Postal), sentences are ontologically similarto numbers, sets and geometric figures.1 Natural languages are simply systems ofthese sentences, describable by us through reason and intuition a priori.
1Postal (2003) states that “an NL is a set-theoretic object, a collection, in fact, a bit moreprecisely, a collection of sets, where each set is a complex object composed of syntactic, semantic,and expression objects. The traditional term for these sets is “sentence,” so that it is appropriate tosay that an NL is a collection of sentences” (237).
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9.1 The Right Kind of ‘Wrong View’
An important aspect of the linguistic Platonist position (dubbed the ‘Wrong View’ byFodor (1981)) is that it contends that there is a static universe of natural languages(and the sentences of which they are comprised) already existing independently ofhuman beings and language users. We discover languages, we do not create them.Much like numbers and sets exist independently of mathematicians who study themor the bean counters who use them, if there were no speakers or users of naturallanguages, there would still be natural languages and sentences.Once this metaphysical point is appreciated, I think Platonism’s incompatibilitywith the type of creativity discussed previously can be gleaned. In section 8.1. welooked at creativity in language and its role in linguistic theory. I argued that it in-volved the use and appreciation of novel sentences (to the user), the manipulation ofcomposition rules and the indefiniteness of the number of expressions for which it al-lowed. The problem is that according to Platonism every sentence of every languagealready existed (or exists in an atemporal sense) before they were used or thoughtof. The mere instantiation of existing objects through production or comprehensionis surely not to be considered novelty? A child counting to a previously uncountednumber might be performing an impressive feat but it would not be deemed ‘creative’in the sense that the term is used in linguistics. The number existed prior to thechild’s recitation and the child was merely its mouthpiece.We should pause to appreciate the depth of this Platonist idea. Every sentenceof Ulysses or the Odyssey of Homer (or every other book in every language whichhas ever existed) existed in a very definite way before Joyce or Homer ever set pento paper (or voice to word). Perhaps they were the first to pluck these particularsentences from the heavens but this activity can hardly be called creativity. Andif we are redefining creativity in light of this view, then we should at least admitthat the subject has changed from the concept discussed by Chomsky, Evans andothers. Certainly, Platonism can accommodate an impoverished notion of novelty-to-a-speaker similar to the new number-to-a-counter but the stronger notion (involvinggenuine creation) would be inaccessible on this ontological account.Platonists might want to bite the bullet on this one. But I think that it is relatedto a more pervasive misinterpretation of linguistic methodology as is evinced by thewholly unexpectedly problem of linguistic infinity. Part of the motivation for linguisticPlatonism was to better capture infinity claims and the ‘vastness of natural language’.In fact, Katz (1996) argues that without Platonism, the vastness result of Langendoenand Postal (the Cantorian proof that the cardinality of natural language is the sizeof the continuum or a proper class discussed in section 2.2) does not go through asan objection to generativism or competencism. It seems as though Platonism andinfinity go hand-in-hand conceptually. So how then, can I claim that Platonism isat odds with linguistic infinity?My contention is that the infinity with which linguistic Platonism provides us is
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the wrong kind of infinity for linguistics, which is usually underpinned with a rathermore constructivist approach to infinite expression. Before I present my case, it isimportant to remember that we are in the interpretation game not the revision one. Itis in the spirit of that aim that I argue that linguistic infinity is not to be understoodstatically, as per Platonism, but rather dynamically, as per constructivism (or evenstrict finitism).A brief history of the foundations of mathematics might be in order here. Con-structivism, or intuitionism, starts with the idea that mathematics is the product ofhuman thought and therefore should be accessible to human mental capabilities.Iemhoff (2015) describes Brouwer’s initial conception as follows.
The truth of a mathematical statement can only be conceived via a mentalconstruction that proves it to be true, and the communication between mathe-maticians only serves as a means to create the same mental process in differentminds.
A famous example of intuitionist thinking is the rejection of rule of double-negation in classical logic which states the following equivalence: ¬¬p ≡ p. In-tuitionistic logic rejects this rule because the proof of the negation of a negatedsentences is not the same as a positive proof of the sentence or as Heyting put it“a proof of the impossibility of the impossibility of a property is not in every case aproof of the property itself” (1956: 17). One consequence of the above reasoning isthe failure of the law of excluded middle in intuitionistic logic. The reasoning goesthat since there are statements in mathematics (such as the Continuum hypothesis orthe Riemann hypothesis) for which there is neither a positive proof nor a refutation(nor a clear path to either), and since having a refutation means being able to showthe positive proof false, the principle cannot hold in every case. The underlyingintuitionistic move responsible for the various departures from classical logic men-tioned above (and beyond) is the link between truth and knowability present in theframework.2The notion of proof and construction appear within this redefinition of mathe-matics through the relocation of the human mathematician to the subject role in themathematical process. For example, in Hilbert (1899) the claim “one can draw” ingeometry is taken to be synonymous with “there exists”. Here again we see whyclassical principles such as excluded middle fail. Existence claims in intuitionismare equivalent to the production of exemplars and there are certain claims (such asthe Continuum hypothesis etc.) for which we cannot do so (nor produce refutations).3This is in turn coupled with a mentalistic approach to construction. As Heyting notes,
2George (1996) describes this connection in terms of MI2 above or “Brouwer, and the construc-tivists generally, do affirm the mind-dependence2 of mathematics” (297). That is, settling all the factsabout the mind might indeed answer all of the questions of mathematics.3I am indebted to comments and emendations provided by Bernhard Weiss for this section.
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Isolating an object, focusing our attention on it, is a fundamental functionof our mind. No thinking is possible without it. In isolating objects the mind isactive. Our perception at a given moment is not given as a collection of entities;it is a whole in which we isolate entities by a more or less conscious mental act(1974: 80).
Naturally, much of the philosophical motivation behind constructivism and in-tuitionism centered around the concept of infinity. The idea of an infinite seriesincapable of comprehension in its entirety by a human mind was contrary to thecore precepts of this position. For instance, instead of starting with the successorfunction and the axioms of Peano arithmetic, for the intuitionist the natural numbersstart with the process of counting. According to Heyting, this is the mental processof isolating perceptions of entities and then creating more of these entities in one’smind (and in time, importantly). A fuller survey of intuitionism in mathematics isunfortunately outside the scope of the present work. I do, however, want to draw acomparison between this picture of mathematics and the initial idealisations of thenature of linguistics as a science. Shapiro offers us a helpful way of thinking aboutconstructions.
I propose that we think of the constructions as performed by an imaginary,idealized constructor, obtained in thought by extending the abilities of actualhuman constructors. Then we can sharpen dynamic language and the various“construction problems” by articulating exactly what abilities are attributed tothe ideal constructor (1997: 184).
The idea is that we can interpret dynamic talk of “constructing” mathematicalobjects, or following mathematical rules, in terms of these ideal mathematicians notlimited in the same way as actual mathematicians are. Thus, certain moves mightstill not be permitted by intuitionists (such as inferring p from ¬¬p) but we are alsonot stuck in the very literal readings of such talk (bound by actual performance).Compare this to the much quoted opening lines of Chomsky’s Aspects of a Theory ofSyntax.
Linguistic theory is concerned primarily with an ideal speaker-listener, ina completely homogeneous speech-community, who knows its (the speech com-munity’s) language perfectly and is unaffected by such grammatically irrelevantconditions as memory limitations, distractions, shifts of attention and interest,and errors (random or characteristic) in applying his knowledge of this languagein actual performance. (Chomsky, 1965: 4).Indeed, much of the talk surrounding the concept of generative grammars, recur-sively enumerable sets and discrete infinity is constructivist in linguistics. An idealspeaker is capable of expressing an infinite number of sentences of her language(has a generative grammar in her mind), but the infinity in question is a constructive
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not an actual one.4 It is the product of mental competence, it is a mental activitylike counting is for intuitionists such as Brouwer and Heyting.5 The ideal speakeris following a procedure set out by the rules of her grammar or “the language, inthat sense, provides instructions to performance systems” (Chomsky, 2000). In addi-tion, with this understanding of infinity, novelty can also be rescued. We, as humanlanguage users, genuinely create the structures of our languages as we produce andcomprehend them. Thus, new sentences can be produced by following certain rules(the rules of the grammar of our language). The sentences do not exist prior to theseconstructions. In this way, linguistic infinity is understood as an infinite capacity toproduce sentences of the language (as it should be) rather than mysterious accessto an (atemporally) existing infinity of objects as Platonism seems to suggest.
9.2 Benacerraf’s Dilemma and Respect
The failure of the respect constraint, I argue, is due to another larger issue withPlatonism in the philosophy of mathematics. The problem was famously identifiedby Benaceraff (1973) and has significantly altered the landscape in the foundationsand philosophy of mathematics since. The dilemma posed by Benacerraff makes theclaim that the quest for mathematical truth pulls in two opposing directions withrelation to a uniform semantics and a(n) (causal) epistemology. The argument takesthe form of placing two demands on any theory of our knowledge of mathematics.Namely, that
(1) the concern for having a homogeneous semantical theory in which se-mantics for the propositions of mathematics parallel the semantics for the rest ofthe language, and (2) the concern that the account of mathematical truth meshwith a reasonable epistemology (Benacerraf, 1973: 661).
Benaceraff held that all (or most) accounts of mathematical truth fail to find theappropriate balance between these two demands, in fact more than that, the demandsseem inversely proportional in these accounts. Consider Platonism. In providing astandard truth-conditional semantic account which dovetails with the semantics forthe rest of language, Platonists avail themselves of reference to abstract objects. Inother words, the truth of mathematical statements about numbers, sets and the likeis determined by their correspondence to abstract entities, non-spatio-temporallyextended, in a similar way to how reference to physical objects is supposed to be
4In the spirit of the previous parts and grade one of mathematical involvement, one might saythat a constructivist model of mathematics does a better job of reflecting mathematical reasoning thandoes a Platonist one.5Pylyshyn (1973) makes similar comparisons between Chomsky and intuitionists like Heyting.Chomsky himself states that “[o]ne could perhaps take the intuitionist view of mathematics as beingnot unlike the linguistic view of grammar” (1982: 16).
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fixed (in a Tarski-style semantics). However, in providing such a semantic account,we cannot begin to make sense of our causal contact with the former objects (bydefinition) and thus are left with no (causal) account of our mathematical knowledgethe likes of which we have for ordinary physical objects. In the opposite direction,empiricist accounts of mathematical knowledge tend to root it in the familiar physicalcausal world (the Hilbert programme or Devitt’s analysis for linguistics) but failto then specify how the necessary truth of these objects is obtained in a uniformsemantics for ordinary discourse.This is not the place to go into too many details about Benacerraf’s dilemma, butsuffice to say that by endorsing Platonism for linguistics, Katz and Postal essentiallyaccept its lot.6 Postal (2003) admits that “[a] formal, abstract object-based view oflinguistic ontology, of course, faces the classic epistemological problem often raisedin connection with mathematics and logic of how knowledge of abstract objects canbe obtained” (251). He defers discussion, however, to Katz’ Realistic Rationalism(1998). We will get to a discussion of some of these ideas below but for the sakeof this dialectic I would like to recast Benacerraf’s dilemma in terms of the “respectconstraint” discussed in the previous section.In the previous section, in accordance with Devitt (2006), I advocated for the needfor a realist condition on the relationship between the structure rules of grammarsand the structures of linguistic competence (whatever these may be). This move wasmade in part to “ground” realist accounts of linguistic theories (of the outputs oflanguage comprehension and production) in the mental activities of language usersand vice versa. In relation to this point, I further argued for an interpretation of alltalk of infinity and generative grammars in terms of constructivist mathematics. Ina sense, this condition was suggested (imposed) to prevent language from gettingaway from us, if you will.The issue with Platonism in linguistics is that, much like the Benacerraf problemsfor Platonism in mathematics, its ontology pulls in an opposite direction vis-á-visthe respect constraint. More precisely, if the structure rules of the grammars des-ignate objects in a Platonic realm, i.e. abstract objects without spatial or temporaldimensions, then how are we to account for their relationship with the physicalcompetence of language users in their use or acquisition of such objects? In otherwords, how does the abstract ontology of linguistic Platonism account for our knowl-edge of language, i.e. our linguistic competence? Furthermore, if we take linguisticconstructivism seriously, there might indeed be mathematical structures which areincapable of being comprehended by a human mind but surely there are no such
6Katz’s (1995) response to this dilemma utilises what I call an argument from linguistics, todismantle Benacerraf’s case. He argues that surface form is not always a guide to deep structure(by means of the famous eager to please versus easy to please case) and that causal theories ofknowledge are not the only game in town. His idea is that Platonism needs neither a uniformsemantics for countenancing its objects nor a causal theory of knowledge. Unfortunately, in theabsence of concrete proposals on either side, this position is hard to evaluate.
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linguistic structures (so called impossible grammars are not part of human languageby definition). We cannot impose the condition that competence respects the struc-tures of linguistic reality if it is possible that this reality completely outstrips humancomprehension. In the other direction, why would linguistic grammar rules or thestructures they posit qua abstract objects need to correspond in any way to realworld constraints any more than higher-order set-theoretic entities should respectour abilities to conceive of them? In this way, intuitionism in mathematics can beinterpreted as the attempt to establish a respect constraint on mathematical theoryand the mental competence from which it is spawned. In addition, Lewis (1975) canbe viewed as attempt to establish a similar constraint between grammars and con-ventions of linguistic communities.7 Nevertheless, whatever the status of Platonismis for mathematics, it poses a particular problem for understanding or respecting therelationship between natural languages and the speakers (or knowers) of these lan-guages. From the rather tame realist separation of linguistic reality from linguisticcompetence or knowledge of language, Platonism effectively creates a gulf betweenthem.
9.3 Conceptual Distinctness
In the previous subsections, I aimed to show that Platonism cannot meet my firstand last desiderata of a realist theory of linguistic foundations. In this section, Iwill briefly concern myself with another corollary of the Platonist view of linguisticobjects. This is the view that given realism, linguistics itself must be a formal scienceon par with mathematics and logic. In order to show this reasoning to be fallacious,I will apply a similar (realist) strategy employed by Soames (1984) to the effect thatlinguistics is not cognitive psychology (i.e. my first desideratum).The strategy proceeds in the following way. In order to establish that two typesof theories are conceptually distinct, one has “to show that they are concerned withdifferent domains, make different claims, and are established by different means”(Soames, 1984: 155).8 Challenge accepted.I think the first two requirements are relatively uncontroversial (although poten-tially question-begging against Platonists), namely that linguistics and mathematicsare concerned with different domains and make different claims. Linguists are con-cerned with natural languages such as English, Swahili and Tamil. They care aboutthe structures of these languages, their cross-linguistic similarities and differences
7In fact, respect and the idea of “well-modelling” are not entirety distinct in my view.8Soames also uses the tool of what he calls empirical divergence, i.e. linguistic structures areunlikely to be isomorphic to psychological structures, which on the face of it seems to be in contrastto my respect constraint. Empirical divergence, however, is a much stronger claim on the relationshipor lack thereof between linguistic theory and the theory of competence, and respect certainly doesnot require anything as strong as a morphism or structure-mapping to hold.
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and how they change over time. When linguists write grammars for specific lan-guages or attempt to model certain formal properties of various constructions, theyare constantly required to make sure that their grammars and properties correspondto actual languages spoken (or signed) in the world. This is accomplished sometimesby means of checking linguistic intuitions (their own and those of other native speak-ers) or corpus data. To put the point somewhat differently, the linguistics practicedon a planet of speakers cognitively and socially distinct from humans, might lookvery different from our own, or at least the grammars and constructions might (thelinguist’s job might still be the same though). Linguists might ask the same questionsbut the content of their answers would be different. On a standard Platonistic ac-count of mathematical theory, this is not the case. Set theory on earth looks exactlythe same as set theory on Pluto or Mars (even if they were populated with differentsorts of creatures).9 I think that this is generally the case because the two typesof theories are “established by different means”. Mathematicians consult their intu-itions a priori while linguists are bound by certain contingent linguistic phenomenaand behaviour (at least in part).Linguists, like empirical scientists, might use mathematics (as in formal languagetheory and truth-conditional semantics) as tools or even essential tools but this isdifferent from mathematics as method. Even in its strongest form, the disanalogypersists. Without sets, functions, morphisms etc. linguists might not be able todescribe linguistic reality (or competence). But there is a difference between saying“we can’t describe-without-mathematics linguistic reality” and “we can’t describelinguistic reality-without-mathematics”. This is the Berkeley fallacy, mentioned byYablo (2013), that statements like “we can’t imagine a tree non-perceptually” do notentail statements of the form “we can’t imagine an unperceived tree” (1016). I wouldopine that linguistic research constitutes, at most, the use of (perhaps essential)mathematical tools but not necessarily mathematical methodology.Furthermore, mathematical methods are different from tools. The methods ofmathematics involve things like postulation, induction, implicit definition, impredica-tive definition and construction.10 Such methods are generally absent from linguistictheorising and grammar construction. The linguist’s job is not done after postulatinga mathematical possibility, the possibility only becomes linguistic if it is instanti-ated by some real world language. For decades, research into finite-state grammarswas abandoned due to Chomsky’s claim to have shown that such formalisms did notconcern natural language constructions in any significant way (see Pullum (2011)for the falsity of that claim). For instance, following optimality theoretic phonology,
9Of course, these creatures could have a different logic and this might affect the mathematicalstructures they discover or postulate. But certain structural relations seem to be ubiquitous. Considergroup theory which deals with a basic notion of symmetries. By studying the symmetries of structures,we shed light on the nature of these structures themselves whatever they may be.10See chapter 5 of Shapiro (1997) for an overview of the place of these methods in the history ofmathematics.
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we see that certain sequences of syllables are not realised by any human languagessuch as (C)VC (see Hammond 1997 for discussion). Once this is deemed the case,phonologists are no longer interested in such patterns, i.e. they are not linguisti-cally interesting. The task of a mathematician has no such empirical restriction. Inopposition to this, Postal (2003) claims that there are natural languages for whichno knowledge exists. To be a natural language is just to obey certain constitutivelaws and if we can specify an object that obeys these laws and is unlearnable, thenthere are unlearnable natural languages. This is an implicit definition and a corol-lary of the Vastness theorem. Still, it is not clear to me why learnability is not oneof the constitutive laws of natural languages as formalisability might be for theirformal counterparts. “Learnability” here, I mean “first-language acquirable” sinceit is quite possible to learn non-natural languages (perhaps formal languages orprogrammes).11 In addition, allowing for such unrestricted uses of implicit definitionviolates the respect constraint.Linguistics certainly seems to use mathematical tools in identifying the propertiesof its objects (as do many sciences) but it does not seem to mathematically definethe objects of its inquiry a priori or rather use mathematical methods. In Lewisianterms, linguistic and mathematical objects seem to be orthogonal to one another oras I have put it (following Soames), the fields are “conceptually distinct”. Of course,one could argue that not all formal sciences are alike and linguistics is unique (asimilar line is taken in Katz (1981)). In the rest of the chapter, I aim to lend somecredence to this idea.
11On the distinction between acquirable and learnable, or first language acquisition versus second-language, recent studies focused on a linguistic savant named “Christopher”, who otherwise impairedmentally has the miraculous ability to learn numerous languages with remarkable fluency, by Smithand Tsimpli (1995) and Smith, Tsimpli, Morgan and Boll (2010) is particularly interesting.
Chapter 10Ante Rem Realism
So far I have argued that Platonism (and nominalism) failed to capture certain con-ditions or desiderata of a realist interpretation of linguistic theory. I proffered thesedesiderata in accordance with arguments presented for these very positions. Whatremains to be shown is that there is a realist alternative to Platonism that can ac-count for (1) linguistic creativity and infinity, (2) the appropriate level of abstractionpresent in current linguistic accounts or grammars and (3) both the separation oflinguistic reality from competence and the mutual respect constraint between them.In the following sections I will describe a view of the foundations of linguisticsin terms of a non-eliminative structuralism similar to that offered for mathematics byShapiro (1997) and independently by Resnik (1997), I call this view ante rem realism.I hope to show that the ontology that this position brings with it is coherent in thespirit in which Platonism was offered but does not suffer from the same problemsas described in the previous section such as Benacerraf worries. Furthermore, thisaccount allows for a more naturalistic interpretation of linguistics as an empiricalscience with formal aspects by debunking the various misconceptions associated withabstract objects and the corresponding type-token distinction.
10.1 Mathematical Structuralism
The motivation behind mathematical structuralism can be traced back to Benacerrafand the dilemma he presented (see section 9.2). The core idea of this foundationalpicture in mathematics is that mathematics is a theory of structures and systems ofthese structures. In this way there is a shift from the traditional (perhaps) Fregeanconcept that numbers, sets and other mathematical entities are abstract objects, un-encumbered by spatial or temporal properties. The core insight is that it is structuresand not objects which are the vehicles of mathematical truth (and knowledge). Thispresents an entirely different conception of the nature of the enterprise as well asthe concept of a mathematical object itself. Structuralism is a broad framework with
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historical antecedents ranging from the Bourbaki group and Dedekind to Hilbert andeven Benacerraf himself. Thus, there are a number of varieties of the idea at workwithin the contemporary philosophy of mathematics. I will try to stay as broad aspossible for the moment, although I do plan to endorse and develop a particular vari-ety of what is referred to as ante rem or non-eliminative structuralism for linguisticsin the next section.In order to understand this view on the foundations of mathematics, we need toanswer a few preliminary questions. Firstly, what are structures on this view? Andhow do they relate to traditional objects of mathematics? Secondly, whatever theyare, how do we come to know about them? Then finally how does understandingmathematics as a theory of these structures get us out of Benaceraff-types worries?I hope to provide some potential answers to these questions in this section.Shapiro starts his book with the slogan “mathematics is the science of structure”.He continues by way of example,
The subject matter of arithmetic is the natural-number structure, the patterncommon to any system of objects that has a distinguished initial object and asuccessor relation that satisfies the induction principle. Roughly speaking, theessence of a natural number is the relations it has with other natural numbers(1997: 5).This holds true for groups, topoi, euclidean spaces and whichever mathematicalstructure is studied by mathematicians. Let us focus on the natural-number structurefor a moment and consider its objects. What is a number on this view? Essentially,it is nothing more than a place in a natural-number structure. The only way to talkabout the number 2 or 5 or 4892001 is with relation to other places in that structure,i.e. 2 is the successor of the successor of 0 or the number 2 is the third place (if westart from 0 as Frege did) of a natural-number structure, it is in the second place ofan even-number structure and the first place of a prime number structure and so on.The same holds for other mathematical objects, the idea being that these objects areonly interpretable in accordance with some background theory. As Parsons puts it,“the idea behind the structuralist view of mathematical objects is that such objectshave no more of a ‘nature’ than is given by the basic relations of a structure to whichthey belong” (2004: 57).The concept of a group is often taken as a canonical example of a structure. Agroup G consists of a finite or infinite domain of objects and a two-place functioncalled the group operation. This function satisfies four properties (or axioms). It isassociative (associative property), there is some identity element (identity property),it is closed (closure property), and every element in the domain must have a reciprocalor inverse (inverse property). Now there are many different types of groups whichmathematicians may wish to study. We could look at finite groups (groups with finitedomains) or Abelian groups (groups whose elements are also commutative). The basicgroup structure is the same and the structure is given to us by the relations its objects
10.1. MATHEMATICAL STRUCTURALISM 161
have to one another (according to the four properties). The objects themselves are ofno importance to us, they might as well be point-particles, martians, jelly-beans orrice-crispies, it doesn’t matter.1 What matters is the structural relations one object(whatever it is) has to another in the group, we only care about the structures. In fact,we can even talk about structures in isolation from any objects. Shapiro characteriseshis own position in the following way.
The first [ante rem structuralism] takes structures, and their places, to existindependently of whether there are any systems of objects that exemplify them.The natural-number structure, the real-number structure, the set-theoretic hi-erarchy, and so forth, all exist whether or not there are systems of objectsstructured that way (1997: 9).
The other versions of structuralism offer similar accounts. They differ, however, inimportant respects. For instance, the question of whether or not structures can them-selves be considered mathematical objects. For set-theoretic structuralists, inspiredby model theory, the answer is yes. Structures are set-theoretic entities themselves.For modal structuralists, structures are not objects of study. Hellman (1989) utilisesthis framework to avoid reference to individual mathematical objects all together (byreplacing such talk with talk of possible mathematical objects or number-systems inhis case), it is thoroughly eliminative. The point is that there is no one answer to thequestion of the nature of structures themselves, different structuralists will provideradically different accounts. Another question concerns the background logic, whichvaries from first-order with identity to second-order and modal logic given differentaccounts of structuralism.We have looked at the question of what structures are and what traditional math-ematical objects are within them, i.e. merely places-in-structures devoid of individualmeaning or importance. The last question to confront in this section is how this frame-work aims to avoid Benacerraf’s dilemma. Recall that Benacerraf’s claim was that themore uniform the semantics, i.e. the more the objects of mathematics were treated onpar with the objects of ordinary discourse, the further we get from a tractable episte-mology. The semantic problem was that we were forced to the treatment of abstractobjects as singular terms referring to non-spatio-temporal entities. This created anontological gap untraversable by standard causal accounts of knowledge. But withstructuralism, there is no such reference since there is an ontological difference be-tween an object and a place in a structure. Neither numbers nor sets commit us toindividual abstract objects (as with Platonism),2 but merely to places-as-objects in
1Compare this to the desciption of a category in category theory. “A category is anything sat-isfying the axioms. The objects need not have ‘elements’, nor need the morphisms be ‘functions’ [...]we do not really care what non-categorical properties the objects and morphisms of a given categorymay have (Awodey, 1996: 213).2Although they are referential in a manner consonant with ordinary discourse as I will show inthe next section.
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natural-number structures or set-theoretic structures. The existence of these kindsof objects is provided by the axioms (as we saw with group theory) or relationalproperties of the structures. These axioms and structural relations, in turn, can beknown by us in a presumably more sound epistemic manner.3 I shall leave mattershere for now and more details will follow when we consider a specific structuralistproposal for linguistics in the next section. But before getting to that, I think a briefdetour into the metaphysics of structures is in order.
Ontological DependenceSo far I have described the beginnings of the structuralist interpretation of mathe-matics. I suggested that some of the answers to ontological questions within its remitare specific to individual structuralist frameworks. I think we can do a bit better thanthis. Therefore, in this section, I will discuss one particular ontological claim thatserves to provide further insight into an essential element of various structuralistapproaches and perhaps even separate talk of structures from talk of ordinary ob-jects. In section 10.2, I will argue that this core aspect of the structuralist programmein mathematics, namely the specific notion of dependence (as described by Linnebo2008), can be found in the linguistic project in both syntax and semantics as well.Structuralism is often characterised in contrast with Platonism, especially interms of its treatment of objects. For a Platonist, abstract objects are analogous toordinary physical ones in that they are ontologically independently of one another.My toaster no more relies on my backpack than my carpet relies on my desk chairfor its existence. Mathematical objects, on the other hand, have no such indepen-dent existence according to structuralists. These objects qua positions in structuresdepend on other positions for their very existence and on the structures as a whole.For this reason, Linnebo (2008) distinguishes between two notions of dependence.
ODO Each object in D [domain of some mathematical structure] depends on everyother object in D (67).
ODS Each mathematical object depends on the structure to which it belongs (68).
The difference between ODO and ODS is that the former just says that the objectsin a structure depend on other objects such as some natural numbers depending
3Of course, knowledge of axioms also results in further epistemological questions but of a muchdifferent order to knowledge of Platonic objects. For example, for Gödel, the truth of axioms of settheory “force themselves upon us” so much so that “despite their remoteness from sense experience,we do have something like a perception of the objects of set theory” (Boolos, 2000: 266). Boolosattenuates this extreme claim somewhat to suggest that perhaps only certain axioms have the desiredeffect (e.g. extensionality and pairing). Parsons (1980) attempts to pick up on the “perception”analogy for mathematical intuition and claims that there is indeed a phenomenon which answers toit.
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on other natural numbers while the latter adds that the existence of one object ina structure ensures that the structure itself exists or is ensued by the existenceof the structure as a whole. Another way to think of ODS is that structures areontologically prior to positions (which explains Shapiro’s quote above stating thepossibility of uninstantiated structures). Linnebo goes on to argue that requirementssuch as non-circularity (cashed out in terms of well-foundedness) militate againstODO straightforwardly and (perhaps) ODS to a lesser extent. Notwithstandingvarious difficulties with either or both of these dependence relations, it is importantfor my purposes that (ante rem) structuralism incorporates a strict notion of upwardsdependence.4 Upwards dependence is the relation in which objects depend on theoverarching structures as opposed to depending on their own constituents.5The ubiquitous and dominant definition (or family of definitions) of composition-ality in philosophy of language and linguistics relies on both ODO and ODS. Itusually takes the form of something like the following.
The meaning of a complex expression is determined by the meaning of itsconstituents and their method of combination.
In this picture, the meaning of linguistic objects is a function of the meaningsof their constituents and the overarching syntactic structure in which the expressionfinds itself.6 Although, the principle of compositionality is usually not understood in
4As Linnebo suggests, this might be a fundamental difference between the realm of the mathe-matical and the realm of the physical. In keeping with this distinction, the view of linguistic realityadvocated here endorses a hybrid ontology of linguistic structures.5Of course, ODO might be deemed necessary in cases in which the dependence on the entirestructure might lead to contradiction such as ordinal set theory, in which the dependence on thetotality of sets is notoriously problematic. I thank Stephen Read for pointing this out to me.6Contemporary inferentialism challenges this claim. Instead of an atomistic view of composition-ality as the one cited above, it proposes a holistic view essentially based on the concept of implicitdefinition. Atomism (and standard compositionality) presupposes that individual constituents havemeaning independently and these meanings combine to yield the meanings of the complex expres-sions in which they are contained. This is directly analogous to the mathematics case. In fact,standard compositionality is based on the compositionality of formal languages such as propositionaland predicate logic (which have straightforward homomorphisms between the the algebras constitutedby the rules of the syntax and semantics respectively). However, the compositionality of inferential-ism is different. In a particularly illuminating passage, Peregrin describes an important aspect ofinferential rules.
Thus roles are given merely through an ‘implicit definition’, and just as Quine (1969, p. 45) claims that‘there is no saying absolutely what the numbers are, there is only arithmetic’, we can claim that there is nosaying absolutely what inferential roles are, there are only rules of inference (and compositionality) (2015:53).Here we see that, just as in the mathematical structuralist case, the inferential roles which determinethe meanings of sentences and words are upwards dependent on the linguistic structures (or social-normative networks) in which they are found. Thus, ODS holds. It seems that the top-down orsentential approach of which Brandom (2007) speaks is equivalent to the upwards dependence ofante rem structuralism.
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terms of existence of meanings but rather meaning or semantic value individuation. Inthe next section, I will argue that despite certain departures from pure structuralismsyntactic and semantic structures generally rely on something akin to ODS.
10.2 Linguistic Structures
Linguistic Structures and RealismPreviously, I described a general framework, neither obviously Platonist nor nomi-nalist in nature, which confronted Benacerraf’s dilemma by eliminating the need forreference to ontologically occult abstract objects. Importantly for our purposes, theante rem structuralism of Shapiro and Resnik is a realist theory of the foundationsof mathematics. As Shapiro states, “as articulated here structuralism is a variety ofrealism” (1997: 6). He distinguishes between two kinds of realism within a model-theoretic semantics (such as Tarski’s). ‘Realism in ontology’ or the idea that singularterms in the language of mathematics denote mathematical objects which genuinelyexist and ‘realism in truth value’ which states that grammatical sentences in mathe-matics have definite truth values (either true or false). He claims that his version ofstructuralism is realist in both senses.In order to appreciate the realism of this proposal, one has to delve into thenotion of an “object” -as a position in a structure- which it incorporates. The claimis that natural language provides as with two uses of the concept. In the one morefrequent case, we treat positions as offices or roles, which are multiply realisablein terms of entities. For instance, some uses of President or rook are examples ofthese cases. They do not denote individual objects as in The President has theright to overrule the senate or The rook can move three places. Shapiro calls this‘places-as-offices’. There is another sense of the term in which we treat positions notas the offices or roles they occupy but as genuine singular terms denoting objects.Examples are sentences such as The President had lunch with the Dalai Lama todayor The rook ate the queen at d7. This is the ‘places-are-objects’ perspective. Anterem structuralism takes this latter concept as primary. Of course, as Shapiro notes“[w]hat is an office from one perspective is an object -and a potential officeholder-from another” (1997: 11).Now from the above, we can see how this form of structuralism is realist inontology and realist in truth value. In arithmetic or number theory we take numbersto be objects, but in set theory they are offices. Consider the number 2, “[i]n onesystem, [finite von Neumann ordinals] {∅, {∅}} occupies the 2 place, and in the other[Zermelo numerals] {{∅}} occupies that place” (Shapiro, 1997: 11). In either case, thenumeral 2 is a name picking out an object qua position in a structure and statementsinvolving the numeral are true or false but in neither case are we committed to anindividually existing number in the Platonic sense. All we need is for the structure
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to exist (and there are various ways of ensuring this, see chapter 3 of Shapiro (1997)and section 10.1 below). In fact, this example presents one of the advantages of thistheory over Platonism. According to Platonists, numbers are individual mathematicalobjects and mathematical objects are sets. If this is the case, then there is a fact of thematter as to which sets constitute the natural numbers. But von Neumann ordinalsand Zermelo numerals have different set-theoretic consequences for numbers, sinceon the former account ‘2 ∈ 4’ is true while on the latter it is not. How do wedecide which theory is correct? With structuralism we don’t have to decide, sinceboth theories are true in virtue of being concerned with the same natural-numberstructure, not the individual numbers and their correspondence to specific abstractentities or individual sets.
10.3 Quasi-Concreteness
The account I offer essentially makes use of the same claim to realism as in themathematics case. If “mathematics is the science of structures”, then linguistics isthe science of linguistic structures. Ante rem realism is the position on the ontology oflanguage that states that linguistics is concerned with abstract patterns or structuresand grammars are theories or rather models of those structures. My account does,however, depart from that of Shapiro (and Resnik) in significant ways. Consider thefollowing remark made by Resnik concerning linguistics.
“Take the case of linguistics. Let us imagine that by using the abstractiveprocess [...] a grammarian arrives at a complex structure which he calls English.Now suppose that it later turns out that the English corpus fails in significantways to instantiate this pattern, so that many of the claims which our linguistmade concerning his structure will be falsified. Derisively, linguists renamethe structure Tenglish. Nonetheless, much of our linguist’s knowledge aboutTenglish qua pattern stands; for he has managed to describe some pattern andto discuss some of its properties. Similarly, I claim that we know much aboutEuclidean space despite its failure to be instantiated physically (1982: 101)”
In linguistics we seem to be concerned with a specific class of structures, thosewhich are instantiated in the real world. These are the structures that are producedby human linguistic competence, i.e. the outputs of competence. In this way, I amendthe structuralism of Shapiro to include what Parsons (1990) calls quasi-concrete ob-jects. These objects or positions-in-structures, in my view, are comprised of a mixedontology. Parsons offers the existence of such objects as an objection to pure struc-turalism but I see no serious reason for why this cannot be compatible with it forthe case of linguistics (Shapiro himself takes this concept as a friendly amendment).Parsons states that there are “certain abstract objects that I call quasi-concrete, be-cause they are directly ‘represented’ or ‘instantiated’ in the concrete” and he includes
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as an example of such an object “symbols whose tokens are physical utterances orinscriptions” (1990: 304). The idea is that there is an additional relation to theaxioms of certain structures that goes beyond pure structuralism, a ‘representational’(or instantiation) relation. The problem is that these sorts of objects require a rep-resentation (or instantiation) relation which cannot be accommodated in the purelystructural picture involving nothing additional to intra-structural relations. Or rather
What makes an object quasi-concrete is that it is of a kind which goes withan intrinsic, concrete “representation,” such that different objects of the kind inquestion are distinguishable by having different representations (Parsons, 1990:34).
I will return to this point in section 10.4.3. For now, suffice to say that I think thatthis third kind of ontological category merely marks the boundary (which is vague)between the structures of pure mathematics and those of applied sciences in whichI place linguistics.In Realistic Rationalism (1998), Katz offers a similar account for what he calls“composite objects”. Examples of objects like the equator or impure sets (which havephysical objects as members) push him towards accepting a third metaphysical cat-egory of objects. These are not just objects with dualist parts or feet in both worldsbut they stand in a “creative” relationship with one another, i.e. their compositioncreates a new object distinct from either part.7 For instance, the equator is neithera perfect circle nor a line that exactly bisects the circumference of the earth, since“[i]t didn’t exist before the earth was formed and will cease to exist when the earthceases to exist” (Kaufman, 2002: 219). In terms of impure sets, in Skeptical Linguis-tic Essays (2003), Postal identifies classes of sentences, involving direct discourse,whose ancestral elements actually include physical objects.
This entails that the sets that comprise NL sentences must be able to containas members or submembers something that can instantiate the endlessly distinctphysical properties involved in direct speech. The only way I see that this canbe the case is if direct speech segments involve sets that contain the physicalproperties themselves and not, as in the case of more standard (regimented)linguistic elements, symbols that represent instructions (to a fixed physical ap-paratus) to produce physical things (Postal, 2003: 193).8
My account in some ways corresponds to the position Katz and Postal suggestat times despite differing significantly from the one they endorse. Furthermore, I
7This creation relation vastly overgenerates and thus in the end fails to maintain the concept ofa concrete object since concrete objects stand in indefinitely many relations to abstract objects. SeeKaufman (2002) for details.8Impure sets so defined are redolent of ur-elements in set theory.
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think that this is a very intuitive picture of the science of linguistics. The idea ofquasi-concrete objects is also not necessarily metaphysically occult. We seem toencounter these objects on a daily basis. Consider Boolos’ comments to that effectbelow.
Numbers do not twinkle. We do not engage in physical interactions withthem, in which energy is transmitted, or whatever. But we twentieth-centurycity dwellers deal with abstract objects all the time. We note with horror ourbank balances. We listen to radio programs: All Things Considered [...] Someof us write pieces of software [...] And we draw triangles in the sand or on theboard. Moreover bank balances, reviews, palindromes, and triangles are “given”to us “in experience,” whatever it may mean to say that (2000: 265).
What Boolos calls “abstract objects”, I call quasi-concrete. And “what it meansto say that” they are “given to us in experience” is just to say they have eitherinstantiation or representation relations in the concrete.9 The difference betweenBoolos’ list and linguistic (and some mathematical) objects is that many of the ab-stract objects on his list are fully determined by the physical objects to which theyrelate whereas linguistic objects, as I conceive of them, have a generally structuralnature in addition to concrete instantiation or representation.
Linguistic Structures and DependenceWhat after all is syntax, if not the study of the structural relationships betweensentences and their subphrases? Of course, these structures should be additionallyexemplified by real world languages but this is merely the addition of the respectconstraint for which I argued earlier. The syntax of a particular language is anabstract object much like the University of St Andrews. Following Ryle, we cannotask where the university is exactly since it is the organisation of different ever-changing units, it is a quasi-concrete structure. The positions various buildingsoccupy could change, the chemistry building could house the biology faculty atsome stage and thus change its assignment, some buildings can be removed andothers erected. If the entire structure is destroyed, then it no longer exists in toto.But it existed once in a temporal and partially physical sense. The syntax (andsemantics) of a particular natural language is similarly abstract, it is the organisationof linguistic units or sentences in terms of their structural relationships to one another.If the language dies, so do the systems (physical instantiations of structures) whichgoverned it. Of course through records we could still study the language on a moreabstract/formal level as with the University blueprints, we could even resurrect the
9Within the context of linguistics, Stainton seems to describe a similar class of objects. “There isanother sense of abstract, however –namely, things that are not inside the mind yet are not concreteparticulars either. They are neither fish nor fowl. Let me coin the term abstractish for these” (Stainton,2014: 6). Within this list he mentions objects very similar to those found in Boolos’ catalogue above.
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language based on the structures as in the case of Hebrew. Hale (1987) assumesthat natural languages, like mental states, have temporal parts notwithstanding theirlack of physical dimensions.In terms of section 10.1, the above reasoning culminates in the claim of upwardsdependence for linguistic structures (or adherence to ODS). Individual nodes in asyntactic tree are dependent on the structural configuration of the entire tree anddefined in terms of it. Take for instance, the adjunct-complement distinction in syn-tax. What makes a constituent an adjunct versus a complement is determined bythe position it takes in the structure. Adjuncts are usually iteratable and positionedexternal to the head or main clause while complements are limited in number andfollow the head directly (or are included in the phrasal structure of the head). Fur-thermore, empty categories, as discussed in Part II.4., are defined purely in terms ofthe overall structure of the expression or constituent.However, ODS cannot capture the fact that intrinsic features of lexical categoriescan affect the syntactic and semantic structures in which they are present. In otherwords, linguistic objects cannot be defined in purely structural terms. Hence, themove toward quasi-concrete structures. An example of this phenomenon in semanticsis selectional criteria for lexical items. In syntax, subcategorisation picks out thisphenomenon. The idea is that some words or phrases require specific structuresor arguments for their completion by features of their internal “nature”. Predicatesexemplify selectional restrictions and certain verbs require certain kinds of categoriesfor completion. Consider the examples below.
(10.1) # Alude is rusting. 10
(10.2) *Thabo works the car.
In (10.1), the predicate “is rusting” cannot take human agents but usually takesonly (metallic) inanimate objects as a subject. Otherwise, it is syntactically well-formed (i.e. the structure is fine). In (10.2), the verb work requires a prepositionalphrase (optionally, since the sentence is felicitous without a complement too). Thus,the nature of the specific word places requirements on the syntactic structure itselfcontra pure ODS.11 In order to succour pure structuralism, it might be tempting toexploit ODO to account for selectional restrictions and the like. However, ODO isgenerally interpreted globally and it thus a much stronger relation requiring inter-connection between all the objects of a relevant domain.Quasi-concrete objects project features of their internal makeup onto the overallstructures in which they partake. Thus, their ontology cannot be captured in terms
10The hash-tag is meant to convey semantic anomaly. In many cases, such as literary contexts,these sentences can receive interpretation.11So-called defective verbs, such as beware which only exists in the imperative, are also interestingviolations of ODS.
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of purely external relations (such as axioms or implicit definition). The way in whichthis works for linguistics will be the topic later sections.
Taking Stock AgainWe can now see that this account can meet all of the desiderata of a realist theoryof linguistics. Linguistic creativity and infinity are easily represented as there areno size limits to the linguistic constructions we employ. In addition, we can availourselves of the dynamic discourse of constructivists, as the linguistic structureswhich we create as language users could be conceived of as direct products of ourmental faculties, despite being amenable to study independent of those faculties.Much like the natural-number structure could have been created or constructed byinitial counting procedures of human agents through abstraction (see Shapiro (1997)chapter 4 for a suggestion and Resnik (1982) for a more speculative account), naturallanguage patterns or structures could have been created by the dual need for thoughtand communication among human cognisers. The rules of either activity leads to apotential or constructive infinity.12 In terms of the appropriate “level of abstraction”,we have an arguably more sound account than Platonism offered us. After all, anterem structuralism drew inspiration from the classical position on universals and par-ticulars (as Hellman calls structures on this view “sui generis universals”). Unlikethe previous dualist picture, we have a potentially naturalistic picture available tous. Linguistic grammars are concerned with sentences as positions-in-linguistic-structures. Immediately, we do not run into Benacerraf-type worries about how weas physical beings use abstract objects like sentences if they are not extended inspacetime. Sentences, like numbers, have purely relational and structural compo-nents, c-command, governance, scoping relations etc. But unlike numbers, I argue,sentences are part of quasi-concrete structures which include representation rela-tions. In the same sense as the non-eliminative or ante rem structuralism discussedabove, sentences on this account are bona fide objects (in the places-as-objectssense) and linguistic statements concerning them have definite truth-values. Thus,sentences are not to be taken as tokens or “words on a page” and “sounds in the air”or mental states for that matter but abstract objects conceived as places or positionsin linguistic structures which are in turn represented or instantiated by those tokens.Once again, the emerging picture seems rather intuitive in light of actual linguis-tic practice. Consider a determiner phrase (DP). On most syntactic accounts, it isa structurally designated linguistic item in a hierarchical structure or tree and any
12The research of Simon Kirby is especially interesting with relation to this point. Kirby (1999)designed a series of experiments to computationally test the emergence of structure in a populationover time with the result that “[t]he simulation results [...] show that compositional, recursive languageemerges in a population which initially has no language [...] Purely through the process of beingrepeatedly mapped from an internal form as a grammar to an external form as utterances and backagain, language evolves” (Kirby, 1999: 14).
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word or object (sometimes nothing as in the case of null determiners) can satisfy theposition. And whatever is in that position is a DP. In addition, the much-discussedpostulation of covert material is usually supported by structural reasoning in lin-guistics, i.e. something must be there since this structure requires it or it stands ina structural relation to something else (recall the negative concord example above).The UG hypothesis itself can be considered structuralist in that it aims to discoverthe underlying structures of the human faculty of language, the particular items orobjects of various languages are rendered inconsequential (this is often a criticismof the claim). Furthermore, consider Jackendoff’s Parallel Architecture (discussedin Part II.5), a highly modularised account of the language faculty which consistsof various individual generative systems with interface principles or relations be-tween them. On this view, the syntax is not the only generative system (as it iswith traditional generative accounts) but semantics and phonology are systems (or“a collection of objects with certain relations” (Shapiro, 1997: 73)) in their own right.The interfaces are concerned with the structures, i.e. the systems at a higher levelof abstraction, where non-relational elements are ignored. In addition, the model-theoretic perspective in both syntax and semantics is explicit about the structuraltreatment of natural language. As Pullum states in the case of syntax,
The grammatical expressions of a human language such as English, togetherwith their syntactic structure (and recall that I regard them as actually existingobjects with inherent structure), can be idealized mathematically as relationalstructures [...] We could ask: What is the simplest and most elegant set ofaxioms that is satisfied by those structures that are appropriate representationsfor grammatical English sentences, and thus in effect characterizes grammaticalwell-formedness for English? (2013: 497).
With relation to realism, one significant advantage of this foundational frameworkis that it can provide an answer to Quine’s (1972) famous challenge to Chomskyconcerning equivalent grammar formalisms. Quine’s challenge was initially posedto a conceptualist framework, i.e. if two grammar formalisms are weakly equivalent(generate the same set of sentences) then how can we divine which one is cognitivelyrealised in the human mind/brain? Similarly for the Platonist, if sentences are setsand two weakly equivalent grammar formalisms pick out the same sets of sentences(sets of sets), how can we tell which sets constitute the language in question? This isessentially a parallel of the arithmetic case involving the finite von Neumann ordinalsand the Zermelo numerals (and also Benacerraf’s (1965) objection to Quine’s versionof Platonism). The answer for the ante rem realist is analogous, they both pick outthe same natural language structure and thus we have no reason to decide betweenthem.Another related aspect in favour of this view over its Platonist alternative is thelevel at which languages themselves are pitched. As previously mentioned, sentencesare abstract objects for Platonists. But so too are languages as they are defined as
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‘systems of sentences’. As Carr put it, “while it is perfectly reasonable to assumethat sentences are linguistic objects and thus susceptible to such Platonic inter-pretation, it is rather novel to argue that particular languages [...] should be takento be objects of linguistic theory” (1990: 123). Generally, the boundaries betweenexternal languages like Dutch, English and German are not sharply defined. Like-wise, the Platonic claim is that there is a fact of the matter as to which distinctabstract objects (or sets) Serbian and Croatian correspond to respectively. However,languages in this sense are often politically defined and classified (hence Chomsky’sinitial reservations about E-languages). In general, these types of languages arewithin the realm of sociolinguistics and not objects of grammatical theory. On theante rem realist account, Serbian and Croatian, Urdu and Hindi and other such caseshave structural overlap. The systems of sentences to which our grammars of theselanguages correspond are the same or similar natural language structures, they neednot be identical to achieve this end nor need there be a fact of the matter as to whichstructures they correspond to exactly.For the last desideratum, one way in which to satisfy this condition is to treat therepresentation or instantiation relation of our quasi-concrete linguistic structures asthe respect constraint itself. I will present an argument which is compatible withthis proposal in section 10.4.3. Thus, one way in which our linguistic structuresor patterns could be represented in the physical world is by respecting the rulesof our competence and by those same rules respecting the rules of the structuresin turn. This could be achieved by persisting with the idea that the quasi-concretelinguistic structures are comprised of sentences which are the output of our linguisticcompetence but distinct from that competence, like the waggle dances of Devitt’sbees. I think that on this view we have even more options than these available tous for capturing the interdependence of structure and mind while maintaining theirdistinct natures. Furthermore, if linguistic structures are the outputs of competenceand competence is within the evolutionary order of things in the physical world,then given the respect constraint, our linguistic structures are also related to anaturalistic story of language evolution.
10.4 Banishing a Dogma
In section 8.3.1, I promised that I would show that Platonism failed to capture theproper type-token distinction and thus failed to place linguistics at the correct levelof abstraction. In the previous section, I suggested a less impoverished notion of thisdistinction in terms of quasi-concrete structures in which “the relation of linguis-tic types to their tokens (and in general of quasi-concrete objects to their concrete‘representations’) is not an external relation” (Parsons, 1990: 337). I claimed thatthis account of the requisite abstraction level was more in line with the ante remrealism I proposed for the foundations of linguistics as well as some comments and
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accounts suggested by Katz and Postal themselves. Despite the fact that a mixedontological attitude towards abstraction is well-supported in the literature (Hale,Parsons, Stainton etc.), a hard-line Platonist could insist that there is no indepen-dent justification for jettisoning the clearer traditional account of types as abstractobjects and tokens as their physical instantiations. The claim that quasi-concretestructures seem to “go better” with the ontology I propose is not independent reasonfor accepting these structures nor it is sufficient justification for my earlier claim thatPlatonism fails to do abstraction justice. In this final section, I will make the casefor abandoning the traditional view of types as non-spatio-temporal abstract objectsoutside of the causal order. First, however, consider these passages cited in bothKatz (1996) and Postal (2009).
There will ordinarily be about twenty thes on a page, and of course theycount as twenty words. In another sense of the word word, however, there is butone the in the English language; [...] it is impossible that this word should lievisibly on a page or be heard in any voice (Peirce, 1958: 423)
ES IST DER GEIST DER SICH DEN KÖRPER BAUT: [S]uch is the nineword inscription on a Harvard museum. The count is nine because we count derboth times; we are counting concrete physical objects, nine in a row. When onthe other hand statistics are compiled regarding students’ vocabularies, a firmline is drawn at repetitions; no cheating. Such are two contrasting senses inwhich we use the word word. A word in the second sense is not a physicalobject, not a dribble of ink or an incision in granite, but an abstract object.In the second sense of the word word it is not two words der that turn up inthe inscription, but one word der that gets inscribed twice. Words in the firstsense have come to be called tokens; words in the second sense are called types(Quine, 1987: 216-217).
Characterisations of objects such as those presented in the quotations aboveaim to establish a distinction between abstract and ordinary objects. Once thisdistinction is in place, there are two options for describing the relationship betweenthese respective types of objects. We could go the traditional Platonist route ofremoving abstract objects from the causal order by stripping them of physical andtemporal parts. This is inimical for the reasons we saw in section 9.2. and a host ofothers. Bromberger’s account in section 10.4.1 shares features with this approach.Another option is adopting a position called ‘Naturalised Platonism’ (Linsky andZalta (1995)). This position makes the empiricist claim that properties and sets andother abstracta are well-within the causal order and knowable a posteriori. Kaplan’sview in section 10.4.2 is consonant with this option. In some ways, Quine too fallswithin this camp by constraining abstract objects through the same principles (suchas Ockam’s razor) that constrain other theoretical entities. Still we are left in someconfusion as to how we come to know these entities in the first place.
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In order to offer a genuinely naturalised account of Platonistic underpinningsand abstract objects, Linsky and Zalta (1995) propose what they call ‘PlatonisedNaturalism’. The aspect of the project that has particular significance for the currentdiscussion is their identification of the genesis of the issues with the Platonisticpositions mentioned in the previous paragraph.
We believe that there are two mistakes in that conception: (i) the model ofabstract objects as physical objects, and (ii) the piecemeal approach to theorizingabout abstract objects (Linsky and Zalta, 1995: 9).The first prong of this analysis is particularly important here and I think themain issue with the erroneous accounts of the type/token distinction as presentedby Quine and repeated by Katz (1996) and Postal (2009) above. Most Platonists(and many other philosophers) take abstract objects to be analogous to physicalobjects. If physical objects are ‘sparse’ or discoverable piecemeal, then so are theabstract objects to which they correspond, if physical objects are ‘complete’ as in havemore properties than we know and are entirely physically determinate, then abstractobjects are knowable in their entirety and determinate in detail (either true or falsefor all properties) and lastly if physical objects have ‘backsides’ or underlying hiddenstructures, then abstract objects are similarly complex. In some sense, this pictureis natural since abstract objects are often determined by ‘abstracting’ from physicalobjects. But this dichotomy brings with it serious problems. Linsky and Zalta goas far as to assert that it is the root of Platonism’s conflict with naturalism and Iwould suggest that it lies at the root of various confusions in linguistic Platonism.In fact the analogy with physical objects is responsible for the defective type/tokendistinction presented by Platonists, specifically by forcing a singular denoting termreading of abstract objects analogous to that of physical objects.If we persist in modelling the type/token distinction with this problematic defini-tion of abstract objects as abstract physical objects, we will be stuck with an disjointontology and an epistemological conundrum as to how we can know the latter in thefirst place. Ante rem realism does not possess this particular drawback, among otherthings. For instance, if types are on the level of offices (in the sense discussed above)the analogy with physical objects is dropped, since these offices are not complete(do not have determinate truth values for all properties), do not have hidden naturesand are certainly not sparse (offices can be created ad infinitum independently ofentities discovered to fill those positions). For instance, for Millikan (2005) twosemantic tokens are of the same type only if they are copied from the same poolof linguistic patterns or ‘reproducing conventions’ within a given community. Oncethe dogma of abstract objects is appropriately abandoned, the alternatives can befavourably illuminated. In the following subsections, I will discuss some of thesealternatives and argue that at least one of them naturally dovetails with the exis-tence of quasi-concrete structures as I have been describing them, specifically thelast option.
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10.4.1 Types as ArchetypesThe following proposal, courtesy of Bromberger (1989), rejects the model of abstractphysical objects discussed in the previous section but rescues a version of what iscalled the Platonic Relationship Principle in order to ground the type-token distinc-tion in linguistics.Bromberger valiantly attempts a reconciliation of three independently plausibleviews on the foundations of linguistics. (1) Linguistics is a theory of types, (2)information about these types are empirically grounded, i.e. in terms of physicaltokens and (3) linguistic types are psychological in nature. The relationship between(1) and (2) directly concerns the type-token distinction while (3)’s connection to (1) isrelated, in my view, to wherein lies the intrinsic nature of our quasi-concrete objects.My focus will be on the relationship between (1) and (2) which Bromberger offers. Ihope to show that it does not do justice to the type-token distinction we need.On this view, (1) and (2) above are in principle grounded by the Platonic Re-lationship Principle or the principle that allows us to “impute properties to typesafter observing and judging some of their tokens” (Bromberger, 1989: 62). There arevarious elements of this proposal set within an interrogative framework and I willdiscuss the most important ones for the purposes of the current topic. Firstly, tokenson this view are modelled in terms of natural kinds or “quasi-natural kinds”. To be aquasi-natural kind is to satisfy three conditions.The first condition is a “modelling” condition, close in many ways to the picture Ipresented for grammars in the previous parts. To be a model here is to allow certaininferences from one random member of a class to properties of other members. It isa (dyadic) resemblance relation.
The notion of model on which I rely here is the notion of model appropriatefor artefactual models. An artefactual model is an object so designed that, byfinding the answers to some questions about it, a competent user can figure outthe answer to questions about something else (Bromberger, 1989: 62).
The rhetoric then becomes familiar. A model of water can allow us to figure outfacts about the number of hydrogen and oxygen atoms in a given water molecule.A map can tell us about the distance between two points in a real landscape fromquestions about the specific points on the map (and the scale of the map). In theparlance of previous chapters, by asking questions about the model, we can arrive atanswers about the target system. He goes on to say “[n]o pair of objects stands (orfails to stand) in the model/modeled relation absolutely, but only relative to specificsets of questions, pairings of questions, and algorithms” (Bromberger, 1989: 63). Thealgorithm relates questions from the model to the modelled via a pairing relation suchthat not all answers to questions about the model are relevant to questions aboutthe target (and it is closed under the “correctness” of answers). So, we can ask thesame question and expect the same answer in terms of the boiling point of a given
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sample of some chemical substance c and c in general (Bromberger has a conventionof “Related Questions” to generalise this idea). The idea is that there are somequestions aimed at the model with share an answer with the modelled such thatthere is no reason to distinguish the answer. There are of course questions whichare not “projectible” in this way and pertain only to the model such as ‘What kindof paper is the map made of?’ or ‘In which test tube was the sample of chemicalsubstance c kept?’ Projectible questions are thus the set of questions which receivethe same answer for every member of the kind.The next condition on quasi-natural kinds is the explainable differences condi-tion. The condition states that differences among members of these kinds are to besystematic and law-governed.
So, for instance, samples of mercury differ in temperature, but the tempera-ture of each at any given time is accounted for by laws and kinds of boundaryconditions common to all samples of mercury at all times (Bromberger, 1989:65).
This condition is couched in terms of the common presuppositions of the (nonempty)set of questions which receive slightly different answers for each member of the quasi-natural class. In other words, we need a way of tracking the differences of samples ortokens in a nomological and systematic way, what he calls “w-projectible questions”.The cases in which these differences cannot be thusly tracked are then considered tobe cases of presupposition failure. Asking for the boiling point of the word “mercury”results in a presupposition failure but samples of mercury all have w-projectiblequestions as to their boiling points on a specific occasion (but different answers tothem).13Lastly, we have the individuation condition which stands in contrast to the pre-vious condition. The set of questions associated with this condition are those whichhave common presuppositions which are neither projectible nor w-projectible. Forinstance, one can ask of any word token when or where it was tokened or uttered(written etc.) but the different answers one would receive for different words wouldnot be determined by law-like or systematic principles, they would be unrelatedcontingent matters.With these three conditions in place, we can attempt to describe Bromberger’stype-token distinction. Tokens are members of a quasi-natural kind and types arearchetypes of those kinds. Types are not the kinds themselves.
Instead he views the type as what he calls the archetype of the kind, definedas something that models all the tokens of a kind with respect to projectiblequestions but not something that admits of answers to individuating questions.
13Interestingly, Asher (2011) offers a very similar account in terms of presupposition failure ofsemantically anomalous sentences and category mistakes.
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Thus for Bromberger the type is not the kind itself, but models all the tokens ofthe kind (Wetzel, 2014).
Thus, to be an archetype of a quasi-natural kind is to be a model (in the sensesabove) of only the projectible questions pertaining to that kind. Whatever it isthat determines the “correct” answers to the projectible questions of the membersof the kind also determines the archetype (the “determinables” of the questions asBromberger puts it). But we have presupposition failure when either w-projectibleor individuating questions are asked of archetypes such as “Where is the sentence‘All men are mortal’?” or “Who tokened the sentence ‘All men are mortal’ on June29th 2016?”The Platonic Relationship Principle is justified in the case of quasi-natural kindssince answers to projectible questions are informed by the same physical empiricaldeterminables (truth-makers?) directed at both the archetypes and the normal mem-bers of the quasi-natural kinds. Therefore, linguistics is indeed a theory of types(as Katz insisted), (1) and (2) above are perfectly compatible and the type-tokendistinction is vindicated.
ObjectionsThis framework might seem compelling at first glance. However, upon further inspec-tion it leads to untoward consequences and unclear resolutions.Bromberger does do an admirable job of defending the intuition behind Platonicabstraction (or the Platonic relationship principle) without failing prey to the worriespresented by Linsky and Zalta above of modelling abstract objects directly on thebasis of ordinary objects. But there is an extent to which projectible questions donot fully describe the properties we often associate with types. Consider the firstdesideratum of a realist account of linguistic ontology advocated in sections 8.1 and9.1 above, namely that we need to be able to account for the (potential) infinityof sentences of natural language. Questions of the cardinality of natural languageand more importantly the answers to those questions will generally not be part ofthe projectible question set, since no token sentence or member of the quasi-naturalkind of sentences will have a related answer. ‘How many centre embeddings arepossible in this sentence type of English?’ is a very different question from ‘Howmany centre embeddings does this token sentence of English have?”. In addition,Wetzel (2014) claims that “generally there are no such properties had by all and onlytokens of a type, at least in the case of words—not same phonological structure, norsame sense nor same spelling”. Some tokens just do not have Bromberger’s naturalprojectible properties. If the only route to the vindication of the Platonic relationshipprinciple is via questions which have the same answers for both types and tokens,then formal properties or abstract rules of natural language types will not receiveany characterisation. There seems to be an inference from tokens to types which is
10.4. BANISHING A DOGMA 177
missing (perhaps an induction step?). Another way to put the point is that naturallanguages have formal properties which will not receive any treatment if we employthe “bottom-up” Platonism of Bromberger.In the opposite direction, we might have projectible questions which seem inap-propriate to ask of types. Imagine a scenario in which all the members of a particularendangered species of wild animal, let’s call it a jorra, were in captivity. At somestage, in order to ensure the survival of the species, they are injected with a vaccinefor a particular disease d. Let us further assume that their numbers are so few thatit was possible to inject them all concurrently and in the same general location. Insuch a case, we would have a set of projectible questions such as “When were thejorras inoculated?” or “At what time was this jorra inoculated?” receiving the sameanswer for each individual animal in the species, let’s say “the 30th of June 2016at 5pm”. In such cases, contingent facts about tokens seem to respect the relatedquestions convention and thus pertain to the types or archetypes as well. But thereis something amiss about this consequence for linguistic types. One could of courseinsist that these questions are not projectible or result in presupposition failure forarchetypes but doing so would require a prior notion of archetype distinct from themere interaction of tokens. Wetzel (2009) discusses a similar worry when she writes,
[T]here has to be much more to the story than “we know about a typeon the basis of interaction with its tokens,” because there are uninstantiatedtypes—some very long sentences, for example—about whose properties we cantalk perfectly well (38).
The above concern is related to a larger one, namely that it is not easy to readoff the ontological commitment of these questions and thus the ontological status ofarchetypes of quasi-natural kinds remains unclear. Bromberger’s account requiresthat the properties of types are exhausted by answers to the projectible questions oftheir tokens or quasi-natural kind. He states that “each archetype is characterized bya set of question-answer pairs, namely the set of projectible question-answer pairsof some quasi-natural kind, and is therefore exhaustively described” (1989: 69).But if the above arguments show anything, it is that there are properties of typeswhich are not so characterised and thus require some additional characterisation,from the top-down if you will. It is unclear how to resolve the problems cited abovewithout resorting to such a strategy and yet this tactic would surely be inimical tothe proposal set out by Bromberger.14
14At this stage one might respond that (3) or psychological facts determine the answers to theseprojectible questions. Bromberger holds that certain classes of quasi-natural kinds form categoriesjust in case they share common w-projectible and individuating questions but differ in their answersto projectible questions. Linguistic objects then share a category with psychological objects. But aPlatonist could argue that linguistic types could similarly form a category with mathematical objectsby the same reasoning.
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Lastly, there is a problem with the definition of the modelling condition in termsof “correct” answers to questions. As we have seen, there are many different linguis-tic frameworks which generate the same sets of sentences (are weakly equivalent).Bromberger considers questions as to the S-structure (or tree form) of sentence typesto be among the projectible questions of a given sentence type. Correctness seemsto suggest that there is one unique structure which determines the answer to a ques-tion posed of its sentence type. In this thesis, I have urged against this picture forlinguistics. This objection can be thought of as a variant of Quine’s problem of equiv-alent mental grammars with which we dealt in adopting the structuralist framework.We would not want to give that benefit up without a fight.Correctness also militates against the possibility of tokens misrepresenting theirtypes. It seems that there is no room for members of a quasi-natural kind failing toshare projectible questions with the archetypes of that kind. Yet there are cases oftokens misrepresenting their types. Take the example of national borders (modifiedfrom Szabó (1999)). A given fence or wall could fail (due to contingent factors)to accurately represent the (abstract) border between two countries since certainquestions as to its length could fail to project or have a different answer to the samequestions posed of the abstract border. Similarly, individual uses of words could beout of sync with the types they are meant to exemplify (as in Szabo’s “inverted wordargument”, see section 10.4.3 below).15 We would ideally like to be able to explainthis phenomenon within our account of the relationship between types and tokens.Unfortunately, these and other issues make Bromberger’s approach unappealing.
10.4.2 Types as WholesSo far we have seen a proposal in the spirit of a somewhat Platonic resolution to thetype-token distinction (albeit bottom-up). In this section, I will review a radicallydifferent approach rooted firmly in physicalism. Kaplan’s project in ‘Words’ (1990)is to offer an alternative framework to the Platonic type-token distinction in termsof what he calls the common currency conception. Kaplan sets himself the target ofword individuation but what applies to word types will presumably have significancefor how we deal with other expression types such as sentences.On the standard type-token distinction (exemplified by the quotations of Pierceand Quine at the beginning of this section), word types are physically instantiatedby their tokens in the form of utterances and inscriptions of various sorts. Kaplanbelieves that this conception stems from the logician’s tool-kit and might be appro-priate for algebra or a type-setter’s task but fails as an appropriate conception for anaturalistic account of words and language. He states that,
I propose a quite different model according to which utterances and inscrip-
15What of malapropisms? They seem to be tokens of word types which would receive differentanswers to projectible questions such as those pertaining to phonological structure.
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tions are stages of words, which are the continuants made up of these inter-personal stages along with some more mysterious intrapersonal stages (Kaplan,1990: 98).
One apparent immediate advantage of this new framework, over its Platonisticrival, is that it can account for the fact that tokens of types often do not share verymany properties among themselves. Word tokens notoriously differ in their writtenand spoken forms. “Even the spoken tokens of a given word will exhibit a range ofpronunciations due to accents” (Wetzel, 2009: 38). Writing conventions are similarlydiffuse (although to a lesser extent). Surely we would want the two tokens “colour”and “color” to be related to the same type or the British and US pronunciations ofthe word schedule, ([SEdju:l] versus [‘skEdZul]). On Kaplan’s account the individua-tion conditions are such that these tokenings all refer to a single word in each case.This account also allows for the possibility that two distinct words can be in posses-sion of the same meaning, spelling and pronunciation. I will return to that allegedphenomenon below. For now, we will survey some other features and advantages ofadopting this particular metaphysical picture of words.For one thing, the physicalism of this view seems to be more in tune with howwords evolve in language than is Platonism. On the latter view, words have eternal,unchanging natures which are imperfectly reflected by their physical instantiations.Kaplan adds that the Forms of these words are represented by their spellings. I donot think that this link to orthography is either necessary or necessarily true. Theconventional nature of orthography is generally appreciated and in certain cases,such as multiple transliterations of foreign alphabets, very apparent. In any event,on the stage-continuant conception, the history of a word, not its “phonographic”appearance, determines its identity. Hence the claim that distinct words can never-theless have the same semantic, phonological and orthographic form since they arecapable of having distinct histories.16Another advantage of this approach is its focus on the human creator in the con-text of words. People after all are the creators of lexical items in various languages,through either naming practices or the like, and these items are then transmittedthrough interpersonal contact.17 The human element goes a step further in providingan analogy of word identity in terms of personal identity. People tend to exist over aperiod of time in which we undergo vast changes at both the cellular and psycholog-ical levels. Nevertheless, we remain the same person (aside from some metaphoricaluses of the word) through that time period. Similarly, instead of accounting for wordchange in terms of a chain of replacements, “we can use the notion of a single entity
16This possibility relates to Kaplan’s other agenda of resolving certain puzzles in the philosophyof language, such as Kripke’s Paderewski case. I will not attempt to address this further agenda here.17A quirky alternative might be to view human language users as transmitters or “vehicles” ofwords conceived of as genes in the rhetoric of the Selfish Gene (1976). Thus, natural languageswould use us as tools for their survival over time.
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undergoing changes” (Kaplan, 1990: 101). The story of word creation then pro-ceeds in a similar fashion to Kripke’s account of initial baptisms. There is an initialdubbing, then transmission in various media from person to person and linguisticcommunity to linguistic community resulting in changes along the way. Words, liketravelling salesmen, retain their identity throughout the vagaries and vicissitudes oftheir existence.This is thus a part-whole conception of the metaphysics of words. Hawthorneand Lepore (2011) claim that it further entails a four-dimensionalist perspective.However, I tend to side with Bromberger (2011) in rejecting the need for such anontology in Kaplan’s case. One reason I have for siding with Bromberger is thatKaplan’s view seems to require a distinctive temporal component. Unfortunately adiscussion of the differences between 3D and 4D views or the A-series/B-seriesdistinction in metaphysics are beyond the current scope. Either way, the view underdiscussion is physicalist in spirit. No part of the continuant and certainly none ofits stages are to be found in an abstract realm of entities. Nor are Linsky andZalta’s worries of concern here, since types qua continuants are not modelled on thephysical characteristics of their tokens or stages. The types are a conglomerationof the features of their tokens over time (or “archipelago” as Hawthorne and Leporecall it).The last aspect of this view which I deem important for present purposes falls un-der the banner of the “mysterious” intrapersonal stages of words. A central questionfor Kaplan is “when does a word count as a repetition?” On the standard Platonicview, we could think of all tokens of a particular types as repetitions in a sense sincethey are all copies (albeit imperfect ones) of the type. Bromberger too can accountfor the repetition of a word if two or more members of a quasi-natural kind shareboth the answers to the projectible and individuating sets of questions. For Kaplan,matters are not that simple. For instance, how are different performances of a wordconnected to the same space-time worm given that its phonographic profile can beso distinct from other stages? Imagine a scenario in which you hear a speaker uttera particular word and then a moment later are expected to reproduce that utterance.
The identification of word uttered or inscribed with one heard or read is nota matter of resemblance between the two physical embodiments [...] Rather it isa matter of intrapersonal continuity, a matter of intention (1990: 102).
Kaplan insists that “[t]his notion of repetition is central to my conception” (1990:103). Words are physical entities on his view, their transmission is a physical processand without a concept of repetitive communicative transmission, word survival wouldseem mysterious. Therefore there needs to be an account of how this “hand-me-down” process works. Kaplan’s answer starts with what Hawthorne and Lepore callthe “constitutive role of intention”. In other words, what makes a word a repetition isthat the speaker intends to create a repeat performance of that word. There is some
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margin for error and dysfluency of imitation but the fact of the matter is settled bythe speaker’s intention.
ObjectionsThere are a number of reasons that I think this picture won’t do for the type-tokendistinction in linguistics. I will start with a few minor issues and then argue thatthey culminate into a significant problem for the view.One initial problem is specifically related to the task I have set myself (and towhich Kaplan perhaps is unconcerned). In order to interpret linguistic theory or itsmodels at the appropriate level of types, we need a concept of an uninstantiated type.Linguists study sentences that have not been tokened as of yet, so these types haveno initial baptism and thus no three-dimensional continuant in existence (they mighthave four-dimensional existence though). As Hawthorne and Lepore point out, thisconception “assumes there are no unperformed words” (2011: 477). Their exampleinvolves derivational morphology and the possibility that some prefixed version of aword such as unhappy might never have been produced but it still a word nonetheless.Morphology allows for the introduction of many new words of a specific category withresources already available in the language.This latter point brings us to Bromberger’s central complaint with Kaplan’s (andHawthorne and Lepore’s) framework, namely that the philosophical musings havetransmogrified the real linguistic order of things. In a damning pronouncement,Bromberger puts the point in this way.
Their [Hawthorne and Lepore’s] decisive objection is that Kaplan’s “model”and principle of individuation require that each time we use a term, we use itwith the intention of mimicking a specific previous use or memory icon of thatterm [...] and thus never access the generative powers of our morphology” (2011:489)
He adds that if they are correct on this point (which he thinks they “indubitably”are) then there is nothing significant left of Kaplan’s account, since it would onlydescribe a small number of cases (if that). Bromberger’s own objection is more in linewith the structuralist project I have undertaken in the previous sections. He claimsthat Kaplan’s view does not cover nearly enough ground to approach the ontologyof words conceived of more functionally. A definitive aspect of word individuationconcerns their roles in various hierarchical structures of syntactic theory, i.e. theirroles as constituents in larger expressions. Without such an extension we cannotdistinguish “John is eager to please” from ”John is easy to please”, in which Johnplays two distinct roles and similar syntactic data. Furthermore, I would add, thateven simple adjectival phrases would not receive a treatment on Kaplan’s isolationistapproach. There is a difference between a red apple, a red pen and someone whohas red hair.
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Bromberger’s further objection is that not only is Kaplan’s account is impover-ished as it currently stands but it also “distorts and diminishes” lexical mastery ofa language so much so that it is rendered incompatible with any legitimate accountof that mastery.18The above considerations point to the central failure of this view, it is unclearhow to generalise it to other expression types at all. Are sentences greater wholesof which words are parts? If so, what of the combinatorics of these expressions, á laBromberger? How does repetition and intention play a role is the metaphysics ofsentences?The target of Kaplan’s project is so sui generis that it at best cannot be used asa lauching-pad for the investigation of other quasi-concrete objects or the structuresin which the units of our languages are set and at worst fails to provide an accountof the full nature of words themselves.
10.4.3 Types and the Representation RelationAt this point, I would like to draw attention to an underlying motivation behind thisdetour into the ontology of words and the type-token distinction. The ante remrealism advocated in previous sections was developed with the rejection of Platon-ism (and nominalism) in mind as the best means of capturing the requisite realistview. This view involved the modification of pure (ante rem) structuralism to includethe existence of quasi-natural objects or structures so infused according to Parsons(1990).To review, quasi-concrete objects, such as words, are those objects which havemore than just relational properties capable of characterisation in purely structuralterms (such as sets of axioms).19 They also possess intrinsic properties or whatParsons calls either an instantiation relation or a representation relation in theconcrete. In this section, I want to make the claim that it is not an arbitrary choice asto which relation constitutes these objects for the particular ante rem proposal underdiscussion. The reason for this claim is essentially rooted in an old debate about theexistence of universals staged between Plato and Aristotle.20 More precisely, if weconceive of quasi-concrete objects in terms of an instantiation relation we smugglea version of Platonism back into the framework since instantiation presupposes aPlatonic conception of universals. Needless to say, this would be a most unfortunate
18On a related note, Bromberger criticises both Kaplan and Hawthorne and Lepore for offeringtoo parochial of an account of word change. He argues that the conception of word change “is atbest a shortcut, and a way of being noncommittal about empirical details” (Bromberger, 2011: 497).Language change involves factors ranging from the sociological and psychological to the political andfashionable and tends not to be focused on the changes involved in individual words in vacuo.19I also suggested that Devitt’s respect might be a means of tracking our choice of relation forlinguistic objects.20I thank Zoltan Szabó for drawing my attention to this general concern and specific point.
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result tantamount to inconsistency. Hence the need to banish this dogma. It istherefore necessary to find another route to identifying the nature of linguistic objects.I will propose a thesis to the effect that the relationship between types and tokensnecessary for the definition of quasi-concrete objects is to be defined in accordancewith a proposal made in Szabó (1999) in terms of the representational nature of theaforementioned relationship.Szabó pitches his framework in direct contrast to frameworks which endorse “theinstantiation view” or “[a] type T is instantiated by its tokens, and it is in virtue ofthis that empirical information about a token of T can play a role in justifying ourknowledge about T ” (1999: 147). If this view sounds familiar it is because it closelyresembles Bromberger’s Platonic Relationship Principle. Szabó’s characterisationgoes further to insinuate that most views which incorporate types as special kindsof sets or patterns with their tokens exemplifying a certain kind of (projectable)similarity are implicitly committed to the instantiation view.21 Kaplan’s accountabove is a notable exception.We have already seen some problems with the traditional type-token distinction.Generally, types are identified by features of the tokens, either the way they soundor are spelt (what Kaplan calls “phonographic” features). However, these featuresare generally unreliable sources for getting at the nature of types. Szabó followsKaplan, Wetzel and others in pointing out that “recognitional criteria” (based on the“physical appearance” of tokens) are often (although not always) unhelpful in thepursuit of type identification.
Categorizing tokens like this would make types linguistically widely hetero-geneous, in a way that would imperil the reliability of inductive inferences fromtokens to types. Even if phonological and othographic criteria are acceptable forsome purposes, they are unacceptable for explaining our linguistic knowledgeof types (Szabó, 1999: 148).
The point is that the forms or physical appearance of words and sentences andother tokens are part of a motley assortment of tools we use for the identificationof types (which could include Kaplan’s intentions, semantic information, context andeven linguistic theory). Proponents of the instantiation view tend to neglect this fact.I think that despite his disavowal of the view, Kaplan too is culpable of throwing thebaby out with the bathwater in this way. It is important to note that Szabó claimis not that the instantiation view is untenable, quite the contrary, he believes it inprinciple to be “simple and plausible” but he offers an alternative which aims tobetter capture the nature of the relationship between types and tokens. It is on tothis proposal or “representational view” that we now move.
21This is the main reason I did not consider Hawthorne and Lepore’s abstracta-articulations modelin any detail. The assumption being that general objections to the instantiation view will militateequally against their representation of it.
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A good starting point for the appreciation of the difference between the repre-sentational view and its Platonic rival, is an insight which dates back to Aristotle.‘Types are nothing more than abstract particulars’. The central idea of this claim isthat types are incapable of instantiation or they cannot have instances. In AncientGreek syntax, attaching the definite article to any noun (or infinitive, if the neuterarticle is used)22 results in an abstract version or concept pertaining to the referentof that word. For instance, from “good things” (one word in Greek) we derive “thegood” (ἀγαθοί –>τό ἀγαθόν), from the infinitive “to do wrong” to “the wrong” or sim-ply “injustice” (ἀδικεῖν –>τό ἀδικεῖν). In English, singular terms often fulfil this role.“We talk about the first line of Gray’s Elegy, the last words of Goethe, of the fourthletter of the Hebrew alphabet” (Szabó, 1999: 152). In these cases, words, infinitivesand singular terms are being used to fulfil a certain role, namely a representationalone.The sort of reasoning employed in the previous paragraph indicates a functionalapproach to the role of tokens and their relationship to types. The function of a tokenis to represent a type and it is commonground that they play this role in the language.In this way, tokens are representations which stand “proxy” for what they represent.There is an element of arbitrariness to this relation. Unlike the idea that tokens areinstances of an overarching type, which suggests a more intrinsic picture of the roleof tokens, on this view tokens are related to the class of objects which have Grice’snon-natural meaning. In this sense, Bromberger’s initial “modelling condition” wasn’tthat far off in that it emphasised the multiple realisability of tokens qua models. Hedid not, however, push the artefactual nature of tokens far enough.The story goes on to specify exactly what kind of representation relation tokensbear to their types, namely an indirect one.23 By way of example, Szabó writesthat “[t]he English word-type ‘horse’ represents horses and so do all its tokens. Butunlike the word-type, those tokens represent only indirectly: they represent theword-type ‘horse’, which in turn represents horses” (1999: 150). Thus, this viewencompasses two stages from tokens to the referents of the types, we learn about thenature of types not only by looking at the features of the tokens but also by knowingtheir roles as representations. To use a variant of Szabó’s example, if we want toknow about a particular species of animal, we use not only reference to that animalbut also reference to representations of it (as found in books or pictures). Tokensare then in this sense very much like models in scientific discourse. They act asintermediaries between the types and the kinds of things that types represent. Theimportant difference between this view and the instantiation account is that instancesrequire additional ontological connections with their types that representations donot. This is why a sign in British Sign Language, a spoken speech act in CockneyEnglish, Morse code and a written word can all represent the same word type without
22German too shares this feature as far as I am aware.23Here Szabó’s account is analogous to my view of semantic modelling in Part II.6.
10.4. BANISHING A DOGMA 185
issue. To find the set of shared features through which they instantiate that type isa more daunting task than to understand their roles as representations.24This view allows for a lot of flexibility which in turn can explain more uses oftokens. The problem, Szabó acknowledges, is that many of the reasons for andagainst this proposal can seem to lead to an irresolvable conclusion (as with manyof the original debates concerning universals). What is a natural explanation fora representationalist might be unnatural for an instantiationalist. In light of this,Szabó has a specific argument based on inverted spectrum arguments, tailored tobring out the advantages of the former position. I will summarise the idea below.Imagine a scenario in which a second language English learner inverts the map-ping between numbers and numerals such that certain teens (i.e. from 13 to 19) aresystematically confused for their counterparts in the terms of multiples of 10 (i.e.from 30 to 90). Now imagine further that this speaker performs the inverse mappingin speech. So whereas she might write ‘14’ to indicate ‘40’, she would not pronouncethe mistake. When asked about her age (which we can assume lies within eitherrange), the mistake is not detectable and the utterance seems to be true. But thereis a problem here. By some Gettier-like luck, the speaker happens to make whatseem to be true numeral utterances when prompted in speech, but in writing the er-rors are exposed. The problem is that the speaker/learner makes a mistake about therepresentational value of certain tokens (numerals). If tokens are merely instances,it would be harder to explain the distinctive error in such cases. All the speakerwould be doing erroneously, would be failing to categorise the token of say ‘40’appropriately in the same way that believing ‘40’ to be a verb or a mass noun wouldbe a failure of categorisation. The two-part representational analysis explains whythe speaker lacks the knowledge of the referent whereas the instantiation view doesnot. “The inverted word argument shows that knowledge of reference is mediated byknowledge of tokening” (Szabó, 1999: 155).The point of the above argument is that in order to know the reference of aterm, one needs to know the types represented by the tokens. And as we have seen(also with the national border case), tokens can fail to represent their types andwe can make errors, an account of which the instantiation view seems inadequateto provide. In its two-part representational picture, Szabó’s view allows for a morenuanced account of the error in the inverted word scenario in terms of tokens failingto represent the appropriate types and this failure impeding knowledge of reference.There is a profound worry within this proposal. The worry is that despite all thebest efforts to distinguish the representational view from the instantiation view, whenconfronted with ontological questions, the former allows for a version of Platonismto resurface like a dormant virus. Furthermore, the ontological package with which
24Presumably there are two notions of representation at work here. Tokens represent types in adifferent manner to which types represent their referents. For instance, tokens might “stand proxy”for types but it doesn’t seem to be the case that types are proxies for their referents. The type horsedoes not stand proxy for horses.
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this view comes is supposed to be purely physicalist one. Types or those thingswhich are represented by tokens are not supposed to be ontologically occult, theyare not Platonic forms. Certainly, there is nothing inconsistent about supposing thatthe representata are physical in some sense but exactly what this sense is is notan easy matter to resolve. This is where Szabó’s account becomes (self) admittedly“tentative and speculative”. I think that it is at this point that the representationalview can be buttressed by the ante rem realist framework presented for linguisticsin this thesis. I will offer some details in that vein, among other things, in thefollowing subsection. But first I will describe some advantages of incorporating therepresentational type-token distinction into the larger ante rem realist picture.
Advantages of this view for Ante Rem Realism (and vice versa)Besides the fact that this view rescues ante rem realism from falling back into Pla-tonism, its adoption has a number of other benefits. I will mention the most importantone below before considering how ante rem realism might assist the representationalview in a similar escape from a Platonic ontology.The original objection which Parsons posed to pure structuralism was that thereare certain kinds of objects which cannot be described from a purely external rela-tional perspective. The reason that these objects are recalcitrant to such character-isation is that they possess an “intrinsic” representation or instantiation relation inthe concrete, hence the name “quasi-concrete”. Thus, the claim is that there is some-thing about tokens such as inscriptions on a page etc. which they possess, rootedin the concrete, in addition to their relational properties. We have already seen theperils of opting for the Platonic interpretation of quasi-concrete objects in terms ofinstantiation in section 10.4.1 and above. The option I proposed, with Szabó (1999),was that this “something” concrete about quasi-concrete objects is their representa-tional capacity. Tokens of linguistic types, such as words or sentences, possess anability to represent types of all kinds outside of their structural properties.In a sense, this capacity is “intrinsic” as Parsons puts it, in that it is part of therole of a linguistic token that it represents a type in addition to featuring in largerstructural configurations. However, I would be cautious to construe this intrinsicnature in essentialist terms. Tokens have a non-natural ability to represent types,which is why tokens of varying phonographic profiles can represent a single typeand tokens of a similar or the same profile can represent distinct types. There is acertain arbitrariness to this relation. Tokens of all sorts can perform (and fail to per-form) in their representational tasks but they are generally defined by that capacitynonetheless. Following Szabó’s picture, word tokens and sentence tokens etc. rep-resent types and indirectly referents. Departing from this picture (but hopefully stillwithin its spirit), the types do not refer to or represent objects in the world directly(or abstract objects) but represent nodes in larger linguistic structures in either theplaces-as-objects or the places-as-offices perspective (see section 10.2 above).
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Ante rem realism was developed as an ontological alternative to Platonism. Itis at this point that the view might be of use to the representational view of tokensand their types. Szabó has a distinct account of what types are not, i.e. Platonicforms. His view of what they are, ontologically speaking, is more vague. He holdsthat types are created, not discovered, and thus that they have starting points intime. The problem with this claim is that it requires a certain creative power to beattributed to representation, since it presupposes that there must have been a firsttoken of any given type. Without ever-existing Platonic types of words, this is hardto maintain. In the following I will argue that ante rem realism can buttress therepresentational account such that it neither needs Platonic forms nor the explicitmoves made by Szabó in order to avoid them.In terms of ontology, Szabó makes a few ingenious observations but also concedestoo much in others. In terms of the former observations, he proffers a more nuancedpicture of representation such that it can occur before and independently of theexistence of a representatum. On the intuitive copy-model of representation, word-types must exist before they can be represented by tokens, as an original must existprior to its copies. This latter model, however, cannot account for some cases ofrepresentation such as the one below.
Most of the work of an architect consists in producing representations –floorplans, drawings, models, detailed descriptions – of buildings that do not yetexist. Once we abandon the copy-model of representation, there is no difficultyhere. The representation view can coherently maintain that the first tokens ofa new word-type are much like the drawings of the architect: they representsomething that does not yet exist (Szabó, 1999: 162).
I think that there is something to this idea but it is too quick in its current form.An adherent of the copy-model could object that the architect does not producerepresentations of non-existent buildings but rather uses existing representations toassemble novel structures. In this way, the creativity of representation resemblesthe creativity of language-use in terms of compositionality advocated in section 8.1and 9.1 earlier in this chapter. At the sentential level, Szabó’s idea is sound. Thereare types of sentences determined by the rules of language, much like there aretypes of buildings determined by the laws of design and physics, that have yetto be tokened. The architect’s blueprints represent something more abstract thana particular building, they represent a building structure-type. The point here isthat attempting to describe representations sans the representatum is problematic ifconstrued in a piecemeal manner but with relation to systems of structures it mightbe more appealing. Nor do the structures themselves need to exist in toto for theprocess to work. As the rules of the language develop and evolve, so do the systemsof rules which represent the yet-to-be represented structures of that language.The copy-model also incorporates an independence claim or the claim that thething represented must exist independently of its representations. The necessity of
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this condition on representation is also challenged by Szabó by means of the nationalborders case. There are various ways of representing a national border (fences, walls,xenophobic attitudes etc). If these ways of representing are eliminated, so too arethe borders, Szabó argues. Thus, the border does not exist independently of theobjects which represent it. Indeed, a national border seems like a good candidatefor a quasi-concrete object. But I wonder if this reasoning applies to objects likethe equator. There are ways in which we can represent the equator, imaginary linesacross the circumference of the planet (or real lines drawn on representations of theplanet), perhaps a long physical tube across the surface of the earth etc. However,if these representations are destroyed the equator remains. One could think of anational border analogously.25 Of course, destroy the planet and with it go theequator and all national borders but that is beside the point for now. The problemwith the example is that one could ask how the representations of the borders are setup in the first place if there were no independently existing templates from which towork. For this reason, I think that these examples fall into the camp of bad prospectsfor a “quick resolution” which Szabó dismisses earlier in his paper. Worse still, theyforce him to concede that certain linguistic types “cannot exist untokened” (Szabó,1999: 162). Furthermore, this possibility then produces a distinction in kind betweenthe complex expression types (e.g. clauses and sentences) and the simple expressiontypes (e.g. morphemes and word roots) of which these types are comprised. He offersa Kaplanian suggestion for how the histories of word-types might have transpired tolend credence to this new distinction.26I argue that on a more structuralist account, such as ante rem realism, the conces-sions made above, that tokens can represent in the absence of types and that wordsand sentences are representationally distinct, are not strictly necessary. In termsof the latter, following Kaplan on word histories and the like might commit us thesame error which Bromberger (2011) points out, namely that we are starting from anarrow conception of word-change over time as opposed to a more empirically soundconception of language change over time. To recap, Bromberger urged two separate
25There are differences between the two objects. For instance, the equator is a mathematicalfeature of an object shaped in a certain way. One could argue that its existence is necessary or atleast necessarily dependent on the existence of that entire object. National borders, on the otherhand, are political objects defined by treaties and historical contingencies. Nevertheless, once theyare so conceived they can take on mathematical properties.26Hawthorne and Lepore’s objection to Kaplan also militates against this suggestion in terms ofthe generative capacity of derivational morphology. To take this idea a bit further, the line betweenword and sentence seems to be quite clear in isolating languages such as English or Afrikaans butthis is not the case for certain members of agglutinative and polysynthetic language families, wherewhat we would render with an entire sentence can be expressed with a single unit (with affixesappropriately appended). For example, in some of the Yupik languages of parts of Alaska and Siberialarger expression types typically involve a one word root upon which various suffixes are added inorder to create sentences or sentence-like structures. Consider an example from Steven Jacobson(1984) of the Central Yupik word angyaliurvigpaliciquq, which can be translated as “he will build abig place for working on boats.”
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points. The first was that a proper account of word-type needs to account for thestructural elements of words, i.e. “that words function as constituents of phrases andsentences”. He took this to be the essence of words, that they function in largerstructures “whatever their intrinsic perceptual and referential features”. The pointmight be overstated and I think that a proper account of words should consider bothrepresentational and structural components of words in terms of their quasi-concretenatures. The second point was that the focus on initial dubbings and individual wordchange is a red herring. In other words, Kaplan’s attempt to anthropomorphise wordsis a non-starter. In fact, the sociological perspective is a better place to start thanthe individualistic one.
Normally, single words do not change in isolation, but whole families ofwords that share features change together as certain shared constituent featuresget replaced in shared phonological environments (Bromberger, 2011: 497).
He goes on to cite examples from the Great Vowel Shift in English to the ValleyGirls Rise in North American dialects. I think that this line of objection might bedamning for Kaplan’s (and Hawthorne and Lepore’s) view but not so for Szabó’s. Therepresentational view buttressed with an ante rem realist account of quasi-concreteobjects offers a route to accommodating both of Bromberger’s worries. Firstly, struc-tural elements of words are readily accounted for in this framework since it is atbase a structuralist view of linguistic objects. Secondly, any changes are naturallypitched at the level of structures and substructures through which natural languagesare characterised. Ante rem realism is thus in tune with linguistic literature onlanguage change which is often described as law-like (as Bromberger asserts) andintegrated, in that changes have structural effects and do not generally occur inisolation with individual histories. It is therefore not guilty of the linguistic façonsde parler Bromberger so strongly opposes for the ontology of words. Nor do wehave to drive a wedge between our ontological treatment of words-types and morecomplex expression types such as sentences since both words and sentences arequasi-concrete construed in terms of the representational view of types and tokens.
10.5 Subconclusion
Since the late 1950’s linguists have discussed linguistic structures, their implementa-tion in grammar formalisms and their interrelations. Very little has been said specif-ically about what these structures are and how they relate to other non-linguisticstructures. I have attempted to give the beginnings of an account here. Much workstill needs to be done. Nevertheless, ante rem realism provides not only an accountof the foundations of linguistics and its subject matter but also aims to demystify theconcept of structure used throughout the discipline as an abstract pattern producedby competence but distinct from it in ontology.
The question remains, what kind of science is linguistics? Is it a formal sciencein terms of mathematics or an empirical science like psychology. On the view I havebeen pushing, the answer is that it is a little bit of both. One could either take itto be an empirical science with formal aspects or a formal science with empiricalaspects (depending on your funding grant), it lies in the same disciplinary lacunathat most applied sciences do (see Part II of this thesis).In this chapter, I have attempted to provide a more sound realist footing forthe foundations of linguistics than is provided by the traditional Platonism of Katzand Postal, in the hopes of offering ontological support to the structural realistsuggestion of the previous part. I argued for three conditions or desiderata on anyrealist account of linguistic ontology in light of critiques found in the Platonist andnominalist literature, namely creativity and infinity, the correct level of scientificabstraction and respect between the distinct structures of the mind and linguisticworld respectively. I then showed that Platonism cannot meet these conditions.Lastly, I drew from the philosophy of mathematics to provide a novel account ofthe nature of the linguistic enterprise and the natural languages it studies, in termsof an ante rem or non-eliminative structuralism with the inclusion of quasi-concretestructures, which I called ante rem realism. Within the course of developing this view,I took a necessary detour into the ontology of abstract objects with specific emphasison the class of such objects to which I claimed linguistic structures belong, namelyquasi-concrete objects. I defined them in terms of a representation as opposed to aninstantiation relation in the concrete so as to avoid a resurgence of Platonism. Thisaccount aimed to meet all of the desiderata of a realist linguistic account in a waymore amenable to naturalism.
Conclusion
One of the aims of this thesis has been to unite theoretical linguistics, the philoso-phy of science (particularly modelling) and the ontology of language. Each part ofthe research presented here targeted these goals separately with the unified aim ofbringing greater clarity to the foundations of linguistics from a philosophical per-spective.In the first part of this thesis, I argued for a grade of mathematical involvementfor linguistic grammars which was neutral on issues of ontology and the exact mech-anisms underlying human language cognition. I described and condemned the math-ematisation of natural language which draws untoward connections with arithmeticand in turn linguistics and the formal sciences. I went on to argue that further com-mitments as to the ontological or representational nature of linguistic grammars wasdeeply problematic (although not altogether hopeless). This reframing and recon-ceptualising of the traditional debate on the foundations of linguistics told a storyof continuity between Conceptualism and Platonism in terms of the interpretationof the grammars and mathematisation of the object of inquiry. Nevertheless, at thelevel of each grade different positions on methodology were teased apart from viewson ontology with the result that Platonism was not entailed by the third grade ofinvolvement and Conceptualism could be consistently recaptured by the first. I con-sider these to be significant results in a debate which has not given much way in 50years.The task of the Part II was related to the philosophical agenda set forth in thefirst grade of involvement. Where the first grade and first part provided philosophicalarguments for the rejection of various ontological constraints on grammars and alsothe view that grammars are scientific theories, the second part offered a descriptivebasis in the actual practice of syntax and semantics with the aim of bolstering theposition that grammars are in fact more akin to scientific models. This latter goalwas achieved through two distinct strategies. In the first chapters, I surveyed thedevelopment of generative grammar with special attention paid to the modellingstrategies employed in its service. I argued that two idealisation techniques wereof particular significance to the linguistic project, minimal generation and isolationidealisation, both indicative of the minimalist idealisation of Weisberg (2007b, 2013).I argued that in linguistics, Cartwright’s simulacrum account of the mendacity of
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fundamental laws was particularly apt (perhaps more so than in physics). I thenwent on to recast the generative tradition purely in terms of modelling. This construal(following Blutner’s (2011) similar construal on the theoretical side) allowed for apreviously unconsidered perspective on the contribution of generative linguistics ina time when most of its core theoretical tenets are being challenged. This view alsoallowed for a novel connection to be made between generative grammar, optimalitytheory, the parallel architecture and dynamic syntax. The corollary of this connectionwas that the alternative models of model-theoretic syntax could be distinguisheddespite the often confusing discussions of weak generative capacity and notationalvariance.Part II also saw a development of modelling techniques in formal semantics. Inthis chapter my aim was not only to survey the landscape with a novel interpretationin mind but also to offer an appropriate analogy between formal semantics andapplied mathematics. In so doing, I provided a lens through which to appreciate theexplanations present in the field and the syntax-semantics interface in a genuinelynew light, as embedded indirect representation. Lastly, I briefly attempted to steerthe discussion of modelling in linguistics away from the Scylla of instrumentalism andthe Charybdis of anti-realism by suggesting a structural realist alternative in whichthe models of syntax and semantics provide genuine insights into real structures ofnatural language via indirect representation of those structures (in a way germaneto the discussion in Part I of the first grade of involvement).Part III investigated the ontology of natural language. It started by taking Realismseriously as an alternative to the Conceptualism (and Platonism) of Part I. Anotherway to think of this Part is that it aimed to support the realism of Structural Realismby offering an account of what linguistic structures might in fact be. It challengedand eventually rejected Platonism as a viable Realist theory of natural language andproffered a unique account in terms of what I called ante rem realism. This accountdrew from the mathematical structuralism of Shapiro and Resnik while modifyingand amending their view to the specific exigencies of the linguistic enterprise, i.e.its empirical and a posteriori nature. One way in which I did this was throughadapting Devitt’s (2006) respect relation connecting competence to the output ofthe grammar. I took a stance on the ontology of words and the type-token distinctionin metaphysics and sided with a representational account proposed by Szabó (1999)while introducing some specific additions in light of the general framework presentedin this part of the thesis. At the end of the day, I hope to stand this view up nextto its various competitors in Conceptualism, Platonism, Pluralism and Inferentialismand argue for its advantages over these other frameworks for the foundations andontology of linguistics.Despite the generally ambitious task set for each part of this thesis, it holdsmany suggestions for further research and inquiry. For instance, the structural re-alist interpretation of the science of linguistics suggested in Part II is in need ofdevelopment the likes of which were not possible in the present work (due in part to
focus and in part to space). Another interesting point of possible later investigationis the further connection between idealisations and abstractions in linguistics com-pared with the other social sciences such as economics, sociology and psychology.This strikes me as a particularly fruitful endeavour.In the present work, I have attempted to provide a unified theory of naturallanguage and the science which sets itself the goal of taming it. I have identifiedsystematic errors such as mathematisation and offered novel construals such as theembedded indirect modelling of formal semantics. I have divorced methodology fromontology in Part I and set up a cutting edge framework for bringing them backtogether in Parts II and III. My hope is that this work can serve to cultivate theinterest of philosophers of all persuasions into the appreciation of the genuinely richtheoretical terrain that is linguistics, its mathematics, models and structures.
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